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About this Report
B
angladesh has some social safety net programs that transfer food to the 
poor, some that transfer cash, and some that provide a combination of 
both. This study evaluates the relative impacts of food and cash transfers on 
food security and livelihood outcomes among the ultra poor in Bangladesh. The 
programs’ impacts are evaluated according to various measures, including how 
well transfers are delivered; which transfers beneficiaries prefer; how accurately 
the programs target the extremely poor; effects on food security, livelihoods, 
and women’s empowerment; and cost effectiveness. The report identifies what 
has and has not worked in food and cash transfers and recommends ways of 
improving these programs. This study will be valuable to policymakers and others 
concerned with poverty reduction in Bangladesh and elsewhere.
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he recent global food crisis and the subsequent economic downturn have 
prompted vitally important efforts to promote sustainable food produc-
tion and speedy recovery of economic growth in developing countries. 
At the same time, these crises reveal the urgent need for strengthening social-
protection  mechanisms  for  poor  people  in  developing  countries  to  improve 
their resilience to systemic shocks. In Bangladesh, a quarter of the country’s 
population  lives  in  extreme  poverty,  is  chronically  underfed,  and  is  highly 
vulnerable to shocks. Clearly, targeted interventions to improve the food secu-
rity and livelihoods of Bangladesh’s extreme poor are strongly needed. Given 
the limited resources available for targeted-transfer programs and the large 
number of needy people, however, safety-net programs in Bangladesh need 
to become more efficient. This study by Akhter Ahmed, Agnes Quisumbing, 
Mahbuba Nasreen, John Hoddinott, and Elizabeth Bryan is particularly timely and 
relevant as a guide to streamlining the targeted interventions.
  To help determine the relative effectiveness of food and cash transfers, 
the authors examine the efficacy of both types of transfers in enhancing the 
food security and livelihoods of the ultra poor in rural Bangladesh. The evalu-
ation assesses how well transfers were delivered; which transfers beneficia-
ries preferred; how well transfers were targeted; what effects the transfers 
had on food security, livelihoods, and gender-related outcomes; and how cost 
effective the transfers were. 
  The study shows that transfers from safety-net programs in Bangladesh 
are playing an important role in improving food security and protecting and 
expanding the asset bases of poor households, and that the programs are 
fairly well targeted. The authors also show, however, that revisions within 
the current portfolio of social safety-net programs are urgently needed. Most 
of the programs seem to be providing poverty-alleviation impacts that are 
only temporary. Increasing the size of transfers and strengthening access to 
microcredit and savings services are critical to achieving sustainable improve-
ments in the food security and livelihoods of the ultra poor, while promoting 
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xvi  ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONSSummary
T
he study reported here examined the efficacy of food and cash trans-
fers in enhancing the food security and livelihoods of the ultra poor in 
rural Bangladesh, with a focus on four interventions. The first two are 
components of the Vulnerable Group Development (VGD) program: (1) Income-
Generating VGD (IGVGD) and (2) Food Security VGD (FSVGD). The last two are 
the (3) Food for Asset Creation (FFA) component of the Integrated Food Secu-
rity (IFS) program and the (4) Rural Maintenance Program (RMP). In 2006, these 
programs covered 830,840 beneficiaries with 3.72 million family members.
  The IGVGD program exclusively targets poor women, who receive a monthly 
food ration over a period of 24 months. IGVGD also has a built-in mechanism 
to provide credit to its participants. The FSVGD program also targets poor 
women and provides a combination of food and cash to program participants. 
The FFA component of IFS distributes a combination of food and cash as wage 
payments to workers in labor-intensive public works programs. Although both 
men and women participate in FFA, the program requires that at least 70 
percent of the participants be women. In contrast, RMP targets only women, 
who receive cash wages for maintaining rural roads.
  The evaluation assesses the operational performance of food or cash trans-
fer delivery; beneficiary preferences for the form of transfers; the accuracy of 
targeting; the impacts of program participation on food security, livelihood, 
and gender-related outcomes; and the cost-effectiveness of transfers. In doing 
so, the study draws on both qualitative and quantitative survey data from   
beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries. Gender-disaggregated information was  col-
lected wherever it was meaningful. The quantitative assessments of impact rely 
heavily on the propensity score matching (PSM) method of impact evaluation 
—the most appropriate approach given that these programs had already been 
implemented when the household survey for the study was carried out.
Transfer Delivery
Type of Food
There are differences across programs in the type of food households receive. 
Rice is the only food given through FFA and makes up about 60 percent of the 
xviifood given through IGVGD. By contrast, the food provided by FSVGD is almost 
entirely micronutrient-fortified atta (whole-wheat flour).
Transfer Amount
IGVGD  participants  received  fairly  uniform  amounts  of  food  rations  each 
month. For FSVGD beneficiaries, however, the amount of monthly food rations 
varied, mainly because of the irregularities in the atta milling and fortifica-
tion process.
Timeliness of Payment
IGVGD participants received food transfers on a monthly basis, while food 
transfers under the FSVGD were less regular. Cash payments were received 
irregularly in all three programs.
  Virtually  all  FSVGD  beneficiaries  and  52  percent  of  FFA  beneficiaries 
received one to three cash transfers in six months. In the case of RMP, 75 
percent of participants received only one or two payments in six months. 
Indeed, 9.7 percent of FFA and 6.8 percent of RMP beneficiaries received no 
payments in the six months prior to the household survey.
  The main reasons for the irregularity of cash transfers to FSVGD partici-
pants are (1) delays in fund release from donor to the Government of Bangla-
desh, (2) irregular flow of funds from the Bangladesh Bank (the central bank) 
to local commercial bank branches due to administrative difficulties, and (3) 
disruptions in payment disbursements because the FSVGD program was in its 
last phase in 2006 and the process of closing it down caused delays.
  The story is quite different for the FFA program. The levels of FFA work-
ers’ payments depend on the time it takes to complete a works project and 
the amount of work (mostly moving earth for construction) undertaken by 
individual workers. FFA participants receive half the value of their wage in 
food and half in cash. After a project starts, workers receive periodic pay-
ments in food on a piece-rate basis. Once the project is completed, the total 
remaining food payment is calculated and provided. The outstanding cash 
segment of the wage is then paid to workers. As a result, the cash payments 
are generally delayed.
  In the case of RMP, the primary reason for the irregularity in payment is 
that the program was in transition at the time of the household survey, which 
caused major disruptions in payments in the reference period. In June 2006, 
the operation of the program was shifted from CARE to the Ministry of Local 
Government, Rural Development, and Cooperatives. During the period when 
the program was being phased out from CARE, an audit of accounts was in 
progress, and payments to program participants were often withheld.
xviii  SUMMARYWhat Do Participants Prefer—Food or Cash?
Most participants express a preference for the type of transfer provided by 
the program in which they are participating: 72 percent of IGVGD participants 
prefer only food, 57 percent of RMP participants prefer only cash, and 75 
percent of FFA and 48 percent of FSVGD participants prefer a combination 
of food and cash.
  Does a beneficiary household’s level of income influence the beneficiary’s 
preference for food or cash? To answer this question in a scientific way, we 
used econometric methods to isolate the effect of the income levels of ben-
eficiaries on their preference from program participation and other factors 
that may affect preferences. The results suggest that as income increases, 
beneficiaries’  preference  for  food  declines,  indicating  that  the  poorest 
households prefer only food as the transfer. Conversely, relatively better-off 
beneficiaries tend to prefer only cash. These results are statistically signifi-
cant. Beneficiaries’ preference for a combination of food and cash transfer, 
however, is unrelated to household income.
Accuracy of Targeting
All programs are fairly well targeted to the poorest, with FFA the best tar-
geted. In the absence of the program, 72 percent of all FFA beneficiary house-
holds would have been among the poorest 10 percent of all households in their 
income distribution and 84 percent among the poorest 30 percent of all house-
holds in their income distribution. In the FFA program, both female and male 
beneficiaries do physical work that mainly involves moving earth. Only out of 
desperation would a rural Bangladeshi woman be willing to work with men in 
onerous, low-paying manual labor. As a result, the program is strongly self-
targeted. Among the other three programs, 67 percent of IGVGD, 64 percent of 
RMP, and 63 percent of FSVGD households would have belonged to the poorest 
30 percent of all households in the income distribution without the programs.
  The study found no major contravention of program rules in the benefi-
ciary selection process across the programs. Some of the selection criteria, 
however, are difficult to verify (for example, the criteria that members con-
sume less than two full meals per day or have extremely low and irregular 
family income from daily or casual labor).
Effectiveness of Training
In addition to food and cash transfers, the interventions provide development 
support to program participants consisting of training in income-generating 
activities (IGAs), life skills, and basic literacy and numeracy and increasing 
their awareness of social, legal, health, and nutrition issues. The majority of 
SUMMARY  xix   program participants reported that they had started IGAs after receiving the 
training. This and some qualitative evidence suggest that the IGA training has 
been quite effective. Raising poultry and cows or goats is the most common 
IGA undertaking. The values of livestock and poultry assets are substantially 
higher for those who adopted IGAs than for those who did not. The difference 
is particularly large for IGVGD participants; those who undertook IGAs had 
livestock assets almost three times as valuable as those who did not. These 
results show the success of participants’ adoption of IGAs after receiving the 
training. However, this success may not be fully attributed to training; quali-
tative field research found that IGVGD’s built-in provision of microcredit is 
instrumental in such success.
  Literacy  training  does  not  seem  to  be  effective.  Although  IGVGD  and 
FSVGD provide training in basic literacy and numeracy, more than 80 percent 
of IGVGD and FSVGD women remained illiterate even after 18 months of pro-
gram participation at the time of the study.
Impact of Transfers on Food Consumption
Transfer  sizes  and  the  type  of  food  offered  are  especially  important  in 
explaining the differences in the impact of transfers on food consumption. 
Participation in IGVGD, RMP, FSVGD, and FFA increase household per capita 
food consumption by 45, 35, 66, and 23 kilocalories (kcal) respectively per 
person per day per 1 taka transferred. These increases can be interpreted as 
the marginal propensity to consume calories out of income transfers in food 
(IGVGD), cash (RMP), and a food-cash combination (FSVGD and FFA).
  The amount of the FSVGD atta ration is vastly larger than the amount of 
atta that a recipient household would have consumed without the ration; 
the atta ration is thus extramarginal. Owing to the substitution effect of the 
extramarginal atta ration, the FSVGD households consume much more atta 
than their matched control households and increase the consumption of other 
products because of the income and cross-price effects of the ration. Because 
a large part of households’ consumption of other products is food, the net 
effect on food consumption is quite large for FSVGD households. Rice rations 
provided to FFA and IGVGD participants are inframarginal and thus have only 
an income effect on food consumption.
Intrahousehold Impacts on Caloric Intake and Nutritional Status
Participation by an adult female does not lead to increased caloric intakes by 
preschool-age children in any of the four programs. Only in the case of RMP—
the intervention providing around 70 percent higher payments than IGVGD 
and FSVGD—do the caloric intakes of school-age and older persons increase. 
The benefits in terms of increased caloric intake from the pure cash program, 
xx  SUMMARYRMP, appear to be evenly split between men and women. The form of food 
transfer has an effect on who benefits within a household: the food inter- 
ventions that provide rice (IGVGD and FFA) have a larger effect on men’s caloric 
intake relative to women, whereas the converse is true for the one intervention 
that provides atta flour (FSVGD). Here, the use of a less preferred food—atta—
increases the share of the food that goes to women relative to men.
Impacts on Women’s Empowerment
Because the food and cash transfer programs are targeted to poor women, we 
are also interested in the programs’ impacts on indicators of women’s empower-
ment—the ability of beneficiary women to make decisions, mobilize resources, 
and exercise choices over various aspects of their lives. The programs that had 
the greatest impacts on indicators of women’s decisionmaking and mobility are 
FFA and RMP, which are the programs that have the largest payments and that 
challenge traditional norms of gender seclusion. IGVGD, however, has the larg-
est impact on indicators related to taking loans from nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) owing to the program’s emphasis on obtaining access to credit.
  Because  transfer  sizes  differ  markedly  among  programs,  we  compared 
programs with similar transfer sizes, comparing IGVGD to FSVGD and FFA to 
RMP. Married women’s empowerment outcomes improve more the higher the 
proportion of transfers received in cash. This effect probably arises because 
receiving cash enables married women to control resources they were previ-
ously unable to control and to expand their area of decisionmaking beyond 
their traditional roles. FSVGD and RMP have the largest positive impact on 
married women’s empowerment. Compared with recipients of IGVGD, a pure 
food transfer, FSVGD recipients receive a combination of food and cash (a 
50:50 value). Likewise, compared with participants in FFA, RMP participants 
receive a higher proportion of the payment (100 percent) in cash.
  We also note that improving one’s status within the household does not 
automatically translate to an improvement in status within the community. 
Although FFA and RMP appear to have had a large, positive, and significant 
effect on the empowerment outcomes of participants at the household level, 
their status in the community may not have changed at all or could even 
have worsened owing to their participation in the program. Some participants 
mentioned that they were the victims of verbal attacks by other villagers 
because of their participation in these programs, for it is not considered appro-
priate for women to engage in manual labor.
Impact on Income
Our assessment of impact on income, as measured by total per capita consump-
tion expenditures, indicates that a monthly payment of 100 taka increases 
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and  RMP  households  (Tk  85  per  month)  than  for  those  in  the  other  two 
programs. By contrast, the increase in income for IGVGD and FSVGD house- 
holds is considerably larger than the size of the transfer. A number of program- 
specific factors account for these findings. FFA and RMP have work requirements 
that may crowd out other income-generating opportunities. These require-
ments differ, however, between the two public works programs. Whereas FFA 
engages its members mostly in moving earth for construction, RMP engages 
its crews in road maintenance. And whereas most FFA participants work a 
full day during the working season, the RMP daily work schedule is 8 a.m. to 
2 p.m. The FFA work is also harder than that of RMP.
Impact on Poverty
We estimated the impact of transfers from each of the four programs on 
the poverty status of current beneficiaries of the programs. Using the PSM 
method of impact assessment, we estimated poverty impacts by comparing 
the proportions of program households in extreme poverty with those in the 
matched control groups.
  Program transfers reduced extreme poverty by 20 percentage points for 
IGVGD, 30 percentage points for FSVGD, 15 percentage points for FFA, and 
16 percentage points for RMP households. Even after considerable poverty 
reduction, however, 60 percent of IGVGD households, 51 percent of FSVGD 
households, 64 percent of FFA households, and 48 percent of RMP households 
remained in extreme poverty.
  Why do such large percentages of program participants remain in extreme 
poverty? The size of transfers and their multiplier effects on income are not 
enough for most beneficiaries to move out of extreme poverty. Although most 
program participants were extremely poor before they joined the programs, 
the range of their incomes varied considerably. Therefore, those who were 
extremely  poor  but  lived  closer  to  the  poverty  line  were  able  to  escape 
extreme poverty, but those further away from the line remain in poverty.
Impact on Assets
The ownership or control of productive assets is an important indicator of 
livelihood because assets generate income. Income transfers from the four 
safety-net programs play an important role in protecting and expanding asset 
bases of poor households. The impacts on various types of asset holdings, 
however, are mixed across the programs. Results show that participation in 
the IGVGD program facilitates the renting or leasing of land for cultivation. 
All programs significantly increase the value of consumption-asset bases for 
participating households. In the case of productive assets (excluding livestock 
and poultry), IGVGD, FSVGD, and FFA have statistically significant impacts, 
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cantly for IGVGD and RMP members. Access to NGO loans may have enabled 
IGVGD women to buy livestock. For RMP participants, the larger amount of 
cash payments as well as the unevenness of these payments seems to have 
enabled participants to expand their livestock holdings as well. The average 
value of poultry holdings increased for IGVGD, FSVGD, and RMP participants, 
but not for FFA participants.
  The average amount of liquid asset holdings, in the form of savings, increased 
considerably for IGVGD, FSVGD, and FFA and staggeringly for RMP households. 
The mandatory saving requirements of the case study programs accounted for 
most of the savings of program participants. The amount of savings required is 
much higher for RMP participants than for participants in the other three pro-
grams, which explains why the impact on saving is so great for RMP women.
Effects on Sustainability of Livelihood
Our analysis of the income of former program beneficiaries suggests that 
IGVGD  and  RMP  result  in  reasonably  long-term  sustainable  improvements 
in the income of their beneficiaries, lasting at least 18 months for former 
IGVGD and 25 months for former RMP households. IGVGD probably achieves 
this result through a program design that consciously incorporates graduation 
steps—particularly the built-in provision of microcredit. It is likely that the 
primary reason for RMP women’s sustained livelihood improvements is their 
relatively large accumulation of savings, which is due to the relatively high 
rate of mandatory savings required by RMP. The participants receive their 
savings after completing the program cycle.
  In  contrast,  although  current  FSVGD  participants  show  relatively  large 
improvements in food security and livelihood indicators, they do not seem to 
be able to maintain these improvements after leaving the program. FSVGD 
has neither a built-in mechanism for access to microcredit (among the four 
programs, only IGVGD has this) nor a substantial savings requirement (RMP’s 
mandatory savings requirement is 9.4 times higher than that of FSVGD).
Cost-Effectiveness
We assessed the cost-effectiveness of transfers by comparing the costs of pro-
viding measured benefits to transfer recipients. The fiscal costs consist of the 
direct cost of the transfer itself (food, cash, or a combination) and the costs 
of delivering the transfer amount to the point of distribution. On average, 
the food-based programs transfer 1 taka’s worth of food at a cost of Tk 1.20, 
which includes the cost of the transferred food.1 In other words, the delivery 
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1 The delivery costs of transfers of wheat and atta to program beneficiaries are higher than the 
costs of delivering rice, mainly because of handling costs and pilferage/loss incurred at thecost of transferring Tk 1 worth of food is Tk 0.20 (or 20 paisa). In contrast, 
the delivery cost of cash is virtually zero—it costs only 15 paisa to transfer Tk 
1,000 to a cash recipient.
  The complete monthly costs of increasing the per capita daily calorie intakes 
of household members by 100 kilocalories are Tk 249 for IGVGD, Tk 156 for FSVGD, 
Tk 440 for FFA, and Tk 255 for RMP. The cost is the lowest for FSVGD, mainly 
because of its distribution of extramarginal atta rations. In contrast, FFA requires 
182 percent higher costs than does FSVGD to increase calorie intake by the same 
amount, primarily because it distributes an inframarginal quantity of rice.
  The full monthly costs of increasing monthly household incomes by 100 
taka per program beneficiary are Tk 53 for IGVGD, Tk 47 for FSVGD, Tk 272 for 
FFA, and Tk 99 for RMP. The relative costs of increasing household incomes are 
much lower for FSVGD and IGVGD than for FFA and RMP because FSVGD and 
IGVGD transfers have large multiplier effects in terms of generating incomes.
  In aggregate terms, the annual total costs of reducing extreme poverty by 
1 percent for all beneficiary households under each of the four programs are 
Tk 159 million (US$2.31 million) for IGVGD, Tk 17 million (US$0.25 million) 
for FSVGD, Tk 27 million (US$0.39 million) for FFA, and Tk 22 million (US$0.31 
million) for RMP. Here it is important to note that the calculations of costs of 
reducing poverty are based on short-term impacts of the programs on income 
poverty reduction during participation in the programs. Those who escape 
extreme poverty during their program participation could fall back into it 
after leaving the program. Therefore, these findings should be interpreted 
with caution and should not be picked up and quoted out of context.
Total Costs of Transfers
Based on full entitlements, we estimated the annual total costs of transfers 
(that is, the value of transfer plus delivery cost) in 2006 for each program. 
These costs were Tk 342.4 crore (US$49.58 million) for IGVGD, Tk 48.5 crore 
(US$7.02 million) for FSVGD, Tk 40.2 crore (US$5.83 million) for FFA, and Tk 
76.3 crore (US$11.05 million) for RMP. The total transfer cost of all four pro-
grams was Tk 507.3 crore (US$73.47 million) in 2006. The annual total costs of 
transfers per beneficiary (based on full entitlements) in 2006 were Tk 5,343 
(US$77.38) for IGVGD, Tk 4,431 (US$64.17) for FSVGD, Tk 10,266 (US$148.67) 
for FFA, and Tk 18,360 (US$265.89) for RMP.
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port. Our calculation suggests that 96 percent of all wheat (including the wheat used to produce 
fortified atta) provided to the three food-based programs was imported and only 4 percent was 
domestically procured from farmers. In contrast, 100 percent of all rice was domestically pro-
cured. The total food provided by the food-based programs is 6 percent wheat, 36 percent atta, 
and 58 percent rice.CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Scope and Objectives of the Study
B
angladesh possesses a wealth of institutional diversity and has had a 
wide range of experiences in providing assistance to the poor through 
social  safety-net  programs.  The  country  has  both  food-  and  cash-
based interventions, and some programs provide a combination of food and 
cash to the poor. The final section of this chapter provides an inventory of 
current safety-net programs in Bangladesh and the characteristics of each.
  Although the largest programs tend to be food-based, cash transfers have 
become increasingly important. The debate over whether cash transfers are 
more effective than food transfers continues, but momentum seems to be build-
ing in favor of cash transfers, especially among donors, for promoting a social 
protection agenda that moves beyond the traditional food-based safety nets.
  Bangladesh has moved from a chronically food-deficient country to the 
brink of foodgrain self-sufficiency through increased domestic production and 
market liberalization. Indeed, the challenge in achieving food security is no 
longer to achieve food availability but rather to provide the poor with eco-
nomic access to food and to improve the biological use of food. In this changed 
context, some stakeholders are questioning whether food-based programs are 
more efficient than cash-based programs in addressing these challenges.
  The World Food Programme (WFP) of the United Nations commissioned 
this study to help inform the debate about the relative effectiveness of food 
transfers and cash transfers in improving the well-being of the very poor in 
Bangladesh. The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) carried 
out the study.
  This study assesses the relative merits of food and cash transfer programs 
in improving the food security and livelihood of the ultra poor in Bangladesh. 
The information generated through this study should strengthen the empirical 
basis upon which policymakers can make informed policy choices to refine the 
social safety-net programs in Bangladesh. The objectives of the study are (1) 
to establish the relevance of food and cash in enhancing food security of the 
1ultra poor, especially women and children, in a sustainable fashion through 
overall improvements in livelihoods; (2) to inform and guide the ongoing social 
protection policy formulation exercise; and (3) to guide the formulation of 
effective program implementation strategies for the WFP in Bangladesh.
  This report is organized in eight chapters. The rest of Chapter 1 presents 
the definitions of food security and livelihood, conceptual issues and empiri-
cal evidence of the effects of food and cash transfers, the country profile, 
and the characteristics of social safety-net programs in Bangladesh. Chapter 
2 describes the salient features of the four programs covered by this study. 
Chapter 3 discusses the analytical methodology and the data used in the 
empirical work. Chapter 4 gives a profile of survey households. Chapter 5 
evaluates the delivery of transfers, looks into beneficiary preferences as to 
the form of transfers, and assesses the targeting performance of the four 
programs. Chapter 6 assesses the impact of the programs on various food 
security  and  livelihood  outcomes.  Chapter  7  discusses  gender  issues  con-
cerning targeted interventions and presents the impacts of the programs on   
gender-related outcomes. Chapter 8 summarizes the main findings and pro-
vides policy conclusions.
Defining Food Security and Livelihood
Food Security
Food security is broadly defined as physical and economic access by all people 
at all times to sufficient food to meet their dietary needs for a healthy and 
productive life. One essential element of food security is the availability of 
adequate food at a national level. Another essential element is access to ade-
quate food at household and individual levels. Yet availability of and access 
to adequate food are necessary but not sufficient conditions of a healthy life. 
Hence, the third essential element of food security is the effective biological 
use of food, which depends on a number of other factors, such as the health 
and sanitation environment and household or public capacity to care for vul-
nerable members of society.
  Food availability at the national level is determined by domestic food 
production,  public  and  private  food  stockholding,  food  imports  including 
food aid, and food exports. With the liberalization of international trade, 
global availability of food is of increasing importance for national food secu-
rity. Availability of food at the household level depends on the household’s 
own capacity to produce food, household food stockholding, and availability 
of food in the local markets, which, in turn, is a function of market opera-
tions,  infrastructure,  the  flow  of  information,  and  seasonal  variations  in 
domestic food production.
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ings, world prices, and debt-service obligations, as well as the policies and 
capacities of food aid donors. A household’s access to food depends on food 
prices, household income, and the asset or resource base. Increased house-
hold income can improve a household’s food security in terms of increased 
access to food. In addition, an expanded asset base reduces a household’s 
vulnerability to short-term disruptions in income flows because part of the 
asset base can be sold in times of adversity (von Braun et al. 1992). Thus pov-
erty is a major determinant of chronic household food insecurity. The poor 
do not have adequate purchasing power to secure their access to food, even 
when food is available in local markets. Moreover, the poor are vulnerable to 
shocks (such as natural disasters or crop failure) that cause transitory food 
insecurity. Sudden increases in food prices also result in transitory food inse-
curity, particularly for low-income households, by lowering their real income 
and, hence, eroding their purchasing power.
  As food availability and access to food increase, hunger may decrease, but 
malnutrition may not. One reason for persistent malnutrition may lie in the 
complex interaction between food intakes and illness, affecting the use of 
food by the body, which in turn is influenced by the overall health and car-
ing environment. This interaction is often called the “leaking bucket effect”; 
improvements in availability and access to the foods that are important for 
good nutritional status may be offset by poor access to nonfood inputs, such 
as  high-quality  health  care  facilities  and  services,  education,  sanitation, 
and clean water or by ineffective mechanisms for delivering these services 
(Haddad et al. 1995).
Livelihood
Livelihood has to do with the ways and means of making a living. Academics 
and development practitioners have discussed the definition of livelihood 
extensively (Bernstein, Crow, and Johnson 1992; Chambers and Conway 1992; 
Carney 1998; Ellis 1998, 2000; Batterbury 2001; Francis 2002; Radoki 2002).1 
The most widely accepted definition of livelihood stems from the work of 
Chambers and Conway (1992): “A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets 
(including both material and social resources), and activities required for a 
means of living” (Carney 1998). Ellis (2000) suggests a definition of livelihood 
as “the activities, the assets, and the access that jointly determine the living 
gained by an individual or household.”
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1 This discussion on livelihood has been summarized from materials posted at the Wageningen 
University website, <http://www.livelihood.wur.nl/index.php?id=24>.  One feature that these definitions and interpretations share is that they 
underline the generally accepted idea that “livelihood” deals with people, 
their resources, and what they do with these.
  Livelihoods also have to do with creating and embracing new opportuni-
ties. While gaining a livelihood, or attempting to do so, people may have 
to  cope  with  risks  and  uncertainties  such  as  erratic  rainfall,  diminishing 
resources, pressure on the land, changing life cycles and kinship networks, 
epidemics such as HIV/AIdS, unstable markets, increasing food prices, infla-
tion, and national and international competition in trade. These uncertain-
ties, together with new and emerging opportunities, influence how material 
and social resources are managed and used and what choices people make.
Cash and Food Transfers: Conceptual Issues  
and Empirical Evidence
Conceptual Issues
In assessing the impact of these transfer programs, there are three conceptual 
issues to consider: their general impact on household welfare, the specific 
fact that these target women, and the fact that some of them are in-kind 
rather than cash transfers.
  To provide a framework for understanding these issues, we propose a 
conceptual framework grounded in three components: “settings,” “assets,” 
and “activities.”2 Settings describes the environment in which a household 
resides. All assets share a common characteristic, namely, that alone or in 
conjunction with other assets, they produce a stream of income over a period 
of time. Some assets have a second characteristic, namely, that they are a 
store of value. The allocation of these assets to IGAs is conditioned by the 
settings in which these households find themselves. (Indeed, these activities 
can be thought of as the livelihoods described earlier.) The outcome of these 
allocations is income, which is a determinant of consumption, poverty, and 
vulnerability.
  Consider a household residing in a rural locality. This locality is character-
ized by a growing season, followed by a period of time in which no crops are 
cultivated. As shown in Figure 1.1, this household exists within five types of 
settings: physical, social, political, legal, and economic. The physical setting 
refers to natural phenomena such as the level and variability of rainfall, the 
natural fertility of soils, distances to markets, and the quality of infrastruc-
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2 This framework draws on ideas developed by deaton (1992), Baulch and Hoddinott (2000), Hod-
dinott, Haddad, and Mukherjee (2000), dercon (2001, 2002), Hoddinott and Quisumbing (2003, 
2008), and Hoddinott (2006).ture. The social setting captures such factors as the existence of certain norms 
of behavior, of social cohesion and strife. The legal setting can be thought of 
as the general “rules of the game” in which exchange takes place, which, in 
turn, is partly a function of the political setting that captures the mechanisms 
by which these rules are set. Finally, there is the economic setting, which 
captures policies that affect the level, returns, and variability of returns on 
assets. Within these settings, the household has endowments of capital and 
labor. Capital includes physical capital (agricultural tools, livestock), natural 
capital (land), human capital (in the form of knowledge, skills, and health), 
financial capital (cash in hand, bank accounts, net loans outstanding), and 
social capital (networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination 
and cooperation). Labor endowments reflect the household’s ability to work 
either for itself or for external employers.
  The household allocates these endowments across a number of activities. 
In Figure 1.1, these activities are food crops, cash crops, and other IGAs, but 
these are solely for illustration. They could just as easily be disaggregated 
into, say, agricultural and nonagricultural activities or disaggregated further 
by crop and livestock type. These allocations are based on the household’s 
perception of the level of returns to these activities as well as the variability 
of returns and their covariance. Similarly, the household might diversify into 
off-farm activities (such as handicrafts of processing) or casual wage labor.3
  The relationships among endowments, activity choice, and income are 
affected by the likelihood of a shock’s occurring. A shock could emanate 
from the setting in which households are situated—a common or covariant 
shock—or it could be restricted to a given household—an idiosyncratic shock. 
The distinction between covariant and idiosyncratic shocks is not always clear-
cut. A drought in only one locality might result in poor, rainfall-dependent 
households’  selling  assets  to  richer,  non-rainfall-dependent  households  so 
that, although the event was common to both types of household, it adversely 
affected only the poor.
  The  allocation  of  endowments  to  activities,  together  with  returns  to 
endowments in these activities, generates income.4 However, it is unlikely 
that there is a one-to-one relationship between income and consumption. 
Households engage in ex post risk management; for example, they may alter 
the amount of labor they supply to the labor market. They may draw down 
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3 Morduch (1990, 1995, 1999), Alderman and Paxson (1992), Townsend (1995), and Baulch and 
Hoddinott (2000) discuss these mechanisms further.
4 Some households may allocate assets to activities that may not generate income immediately 
but may have a return at some point in the future. Investments in social relations and covering 





























Figure 1.1  Conceptual framework: Settings, assets, and activities
Source:    Quisumbing and Hoddinott (2003).savings held in financial form, as livestock, as jewelry, or in the form of other 
durables. Alternatively, they may enter the credit market and borrow. They 
may alter their investment in human capital.5 As shown in Figure 1.1, some 
ex post responses generate feedback mechanisms from consumption decisions 
to inform changes in asset holdings.
  An unattractive feature of this framework is that it treats the household as 
a single undifferentiated unit. It is plausible that household welfare and the 
impact of the program on desired outcomes may depend on the preferences 
of the specific decisionmaker within the household. For example, recent con-
ditional cash transfer programs have targeted transfers to women because of 
the growing evidence that resources in the hands of women are more likely to 
be spent on children. The model described in Figure 1.1 assumes that house-
hold members pool their income, including transfers, and make consumption 
decisions according to a single household preference structure. Therefore, 
the models predict that regardless of which household member receives a 
transfer, household consumption will be affected in the same way. However, 
there is now a considerable body of evidence that contests this assumption 
(Alderman et al. 1995; Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003).
  Fortunately, it is relatively straightforward to make it gender, and gen-
erational, sensitive. This is shown in Figure 1.2. Rather than assume that   
the household has an endowment of assets, assume that assets are held indi- 
vidually. Allocations of assets to activities is a function of intrahousehold   
allocation rules, themselves a function of the settings in which the house- 
hold is placed. So, for example, changes in the legal environment—such as laws 
banning wage discrimination against women—will change the allocation of assets 
to activities within the household. Some shocks may be individual specific. 
Further,  changes  in  these  settings  will  influence  household  consumption   
decisions. For example, strengthening women’s rights to assets upon house- 
hold dissolution will enhance women’s bargaining position within the household 
(McElroy 1990; Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman 1997; Adam, Hoddinott, and 
Ligon 2003; Quisumbing 2003; Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003).
  The  interventions  considered  in  this  study  work  through  several  chan-
nels. Those that provide training in IGAs augment women’s human capital. 
Interventions  that  provide  access  to  credit  or  make  deposits  into  savings 
accounts increase financial capital. Pure transfer programs provide additional 
resources that can be used for consumption or investment. Programs with a 
labor requirement can be considered as falling into the box labeled “women’s 
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Figure 1.2  Making the conceptual framework gender sensitive
Source:  Meinzen-dick and Quisumbing (2008).
8  CHAPTER 1other IGAs.” Note that such programs have a complex relationship with the 
generation of income. On the one hand, they can crowd out labor supplied 
to other IGAs such as food production, either because participants choose to 
reduce the labor they supply to these other activities (and thus maintain their 
preprogram level of leisure consumption) or because the timing of program 
activities  directly  conflicts  with  the  agricultural  activities  that  cannot  be 
shifted to other dates. On the other hand, to the extent that these programs 
provide new resources to households, they may relax liquidity constraints 
that restrict food production.
  A number of additional conceptual issues arise in assessing the appropri-
ateness of cash transfers and in-kind transfers. In theory, cash is preferable 
to in-kind transfers because it is economically more efficient (Tabor 2002). 
It does not distort individual consumption or production choice at the mar-
gin (Subbarao et al. 1997). Cash transfers provide recipients with freedom 
of choice and give them a higher level of satisfaction at any given level of 
income than does food or another type of in-kind transfer. In other words, 
cash allows beneficiaries to choose to buy what they need most. distribut-
ing cash is likely to be cheaper than distributing food or other commodi-
ties. Cash distribution can also stimulate agricultural production and other 
activities.
  In contrast, in-kind transfers are often used as a means of controlling, 
modifying, or otherwise influencing the behavior of recipients (Tabor 2002). 
For example, a food-based program may provide a basic food to those who 
could not otherwise afford the food or would be unlikely to purchase an 
adequate quantity of the food even if they did have the cash to buy it.
  The degree to which the food (or other in-kind) transfer influences actual 
household consumption behavior hinges on whether the food assistance is 
inframarginal (in other words, the ration is less than what would normally be 
consumed without the transfer). Economic theory holds that if the food (or 
other in-kind) transfer is inframarginal, the transfer will result in the same 
additional food purchases as would a cash transfer of equal value. In this 
case, the in-kind transfer has only the income effect (as in the case of any 
cash transfer), and the price incentive effect at the margin is lost.
  The in-kind transfer is extramarginal if the transfer (for example, food 
ration) received is greater than the amount the recipient household would 
have consumed without the ration. In this case, the transfer may have two 
effects—an income effect and a substitution effect. The pure price effect of 
the ration is captured through the substitution effect. The net effect, which 
also includes the income effect, may lead to an increase in the consumption 
of the ration commodity, as well as increased consumption of complementary 
products  and  reduced  consumption  of  substitutes  (Kennedy  and  Alderman 
INTROdUCTION  9   1987).6 The substitution effect, however, will take place only if resale of the 
ration is effectively prohibited or if resale entails a high transaction cost that 
decreases the implicit selling price for the ration recipient. If there is no 
transaction cost and the recipient has the option of selling the ration at mar-
ket price, the in-kind transfer is equivalent to the income effect only, even if 
the ration is extramarginal (Ahmed 1993). Thus, comparative effects of food 
and cash transfers on food consumption and nutrition will depend on, among 
other things (such as intrahousehold control of cash and food resources), the 
size of the ration, the price of the ration and the ease with which it can be 
resold, and the frequency of food or cash distribution.
  Which type of transfer is better—cash or in-kind? The answer depends 
partly on the purpose of providing the benefit and partly on administrative 
and financial considerations (Grosh 1994).
  Generally, a household will spend only a portion of its additional income 
on food. This pattern is referred to as the marginal propensity to consume 
food (MPCf), which ranges between zero and one. If, for example, 65 percent 
of any income increment is spent on food, the value of the MPCf is 0.65 and 
that of the MPC nonfood is 0.35. If a program’s primary goal is to improve the 
nutritional status of the target group and if an income transfer in food has a 
higher MPCf than does a cash transfer, a food-based program could be more 
effective in achieving the goal. If improving nutrition is not the primary goal, 
however, food distribution is not necessarily preferable to cash transfers. 
If the MPC household essentials (such as health care, education, clothing, and 
shelter) from a cash transfer is higher than that for a food transfer, a cash 
transfer program may be preferable if the program’s primary goal is to improve 
overall livelihoods.
  The choice between cash and food transfers may have an impact on pro-
gram administration and costs. In general, cash transfer systems require a 
larger and more sophisticated institutional structure (such as a rural network 
of banks) than do in-kind transfer systems. Once that administrative system 
is in place, however, the costs of operating a cash transfer system are likely 
to be lower than are those of an equivalent in-kind transfer system (Grosh 
1994).  The  primary  disadvantage  of  distributing  food  is  that  the  logisti-
cal difficulties and transfer costs are substantial. There are administrative 
problems with the procurement, storage, transportation, and distribution of 
food (Rogers 1988). Experience with several food-based safety-net programs 
in Bangladesh suggests that food transfers raise program costs by about 25 
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6 If the in-kind ration is an inferior good (that is, has a negative income elasticity), the income 
effect of the ration will reduce its consumption.percent because of the internal costs for the transport and handling of bulky 
food commodities (WGTFI 1994).
  For food-based programs, an effective tool for targeting the poor is to 
select an “inferior” food for distribution.7 For example, in Tunisia, semolina 
(durum wheat pasta) has been subsidized because it is consumed dispropor-
tionately more by the poor than by the rich (Tuck and Lindert 1996). For simi-
lar reasons, barley has been subsidized in Korea, coarse rice in the dominican 
Republic (Alderman 1991), and coarse baladi bread in Egypt (Ahmed et al. 
2001). The principal administrative disadvantage of any form of cash transfer 
is the fact that “cash” cannot be self-targeted. Unlike in the case of basic 
food items, an inferior category of cash cannot be created to direct benefits 
to the needy. For targeted cash transfers, criteria for program eligibility must 
be established and eligibility must be periodically reconfirmed. This require-
ment imposes a significant administrative burden on program implementers 
(Blackorby  and  donaldson  1988).  If  self-targeting  commodities  cannot  be 
found to target the neediest, administrative targeting will need to be used for 
in-kind transfer programs as well. Indeed, most targeted food-based inter-
ventions rely on administrative targeting mechanisms, because effective self-
targeted commodities are hard to identify.
  In the case of cash transfers, the real value to the beneficiaries may erode 
with inflation, but the government’s nominal budget is fixed and predictable. 
If benefits and real budgets are to keep pace with inflation, the government 
must make explicit decisions to raise benefit levels. In contrast, in the case 
of food transfers, the real value of benefits to consumers is constant, and the 
cost to the government (or food aid donors) rises and falls with the price of 
the commodity (Grosh 1994).8
Empirical Evidence
A number of studies conducted in Bangladesh and other developing countries 
suggest that the poor tend to have a higher MPCf out of food transfers than 
cash transfers or increased cash income (Edirisinghe 1987; Garcia and Pinstrup-
Andersen 1987; Bouis and Haddad 1990; Ahmed 1993; Ahmed and Shams 1994; 
del Ninno and dorosh 2003). For example, a study in Bangladesh by Ahmed and 
Shams (1994) found that the MPCf out of cash transfers from the Rural Mainte-
nance Program was 0.48, while the MPCf out of income transfers in wheat from 
the Food-for-Work program was 0.61. del Ninno and dorosh (2003) examined 
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7 An inferior food is one that has a negative income elasticity of demand. In other words, it is 
consumed by the poor but not preferred by the wealthy.
8 If program beneficiaries sell a large proportion of the ration received, however, the value of 
the food transfer will fluctuate with the price of the food in the market.the impact of wheat transfers and cash income on wheat consumption and 
wheat markets in Bangladesh. Their study suggests that the MPC wheat out of 
wheat transfers to poor households is approximately 0.25, while the MPC wheat 
out of cash income is near zero. These studies show that income transfer in 
food is more effective in improving household food consumption than are cash 
transfers.
  Several recent studies are available on the efficacy of conditional and 
unconditional cash transfers. Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have 
become an important poverty reduction tool primarily in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, where they were originally developed, but also elsewhere 
(such as in Turkey). Most CCT programs include a combination of education, 
health, and nutrition objectives. CCT evaluations provide concrete evidence 
of the success of programs in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Tur-
key in increasing school enrollment rates, improving preventive health care, 
and  raising  household  consumption  levels  (Behrman  and  Hoddinott  2000; 
Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd 2000; Gertler 2000; Hoddinott, Skoufias, and 
Washburn 2000; Schultz 2000a–c; Yap, Sedlacek, and Orazem 2001; Maluccio 
and Flores 2005; Morris 2005; Skoufias 2005; Ahmed et al. 2006).
  In the face of chronic poverty, food insecurity, and increasing HIV and 
AIdS  in  Eastern  and  Southern  Africa,  there  is  growing  recognition  of  the 
importance of cash transfers for reaching vulnerable children and households. 
A variety of cash transfer schemes are being piloted. A recent study docu-
ments the use of unconditional cash transfers and lessons learned from initia-
tives in Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mozambique, and Zambia. Evidence is presented 
that the use of regular and predictable cash schemes is a feasible option in 
low-income countries. International donors and nongovernmental organiza-
tions are supporting cash transfer schemes in response to the unmet need for 
social protection. Cash transfers give people the choice to buy more than just 
food, and they benefit children, even when transfers are pensions that target 
older people, because grandparents are increasingly caring for orphans and 
other vulnerable children. Pensions in Botswana, Lesotho, and Namibia, for 
instance, reach vulnerable children because large numbers of young people 
live with grandparents. The pension is simple and cost-effective because it 
targets a group that is universally identifiable without the costly administra-
tive problems of income testing (devereux, Marshall, and MacAskill 2005).
  A recent study in Ethiopia, however, contends that the demand created 
by cash transfers led to increased food prices because supplies could not 
keep up; traders may have profited the most. Those left out of the programs 
suffered the double burden of not benefiting from transfers and relying on 
markets with inflated prices. The study compares findings from the Ethiopian 
government’s new Productive Safety Net Program in two districts where Save 
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hood development program. Cash transfers seem better suited to areas with 
market-oriented infrastructure and institutions, such as Meket, and in-kind 
transfers, such as food, to remote areas like Sekota. With Ethiopia’s weak 
market network and widespread poverty, however, both cash and food can 
affect the market, distorting prices. Cash transfers may be less expensive 
than locally purchased or imported food, but costs are likely to be higher if 
action is needed to address problems of market supply. The study suggests 
that cash-based programs need to integrate the development of local infra-
structure (such as roads, banks, and data services), skill development, effec-
tive targeting, and compatibility with other programs (Kebede 2006).
  Although research on cash and food transfers has increased considerably, 
comparative studies on cash and food transfers remain limited. A study in 
Bangladesh compared the relative impacts of food versus cash for education 
programs. The results of this study show that although both programs raised 
school enrollment rates, food rations increased families’ food consumption,   
but cash transfers did not. Therefore, if an education incentive program seeks 
to support nutrition in addition to increasing school enrollment, a food-based 
incentive system appears to be more effective (Ahmed 2005b).
  In 2006, WFP implemented a Cash Transfer Pilot Project in Sri Lanka in 
the aftermath of the tsunami. The key objective was to compare outcomes 
for food and livelihood security between households that receive food assis-
tance and households that receive an equivalent amount of cash assistance. 
Significant  differences  were  seen  in  expenditure  patterns  between  cash-
receiving households and food-receiving households only in the poorer, more 
remote, and more conflict-ridden communities in eastern Sri Lanka, not in 
the relatively urbanized south. Transaction costs imposed by remoteness and 
conflict had the effect of eroding the value of cash transfers relative to food 
transfers, and for this reason, households generally preferred food to cash. 
When the households received cash, however, not only did they spend more 
on better-quality cereals but they also made larger expenditures on dairy 
products, meat, and packaged foods and on nonfood essentials such as cloth-
ing and footwear. The study concludes that cash transfers are perhaps more 
cost-effective  and  preferred  by  beneficiaries  in  areas  where  markets  are 
functioning and accessible. In those areas where markets are less functional 
or accessible, food assistance is likely to be a better option (Sharma 2006; 
Mohiddin, Sharma, and Haller 2007).
  On the issue of intrahousehold resource allocation, several empirical stud-
ies show that targeted transfers can be more effective in improving specific 
household members’ outcomes than are transfers given to households as a 
whole (see Box 1.1 and the section headed “Results” in Chapter 7).
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Box 1.1  A household’s use of income transfers:  
Whose preferences matter?
A  household  usually  consists  of  several  members.  In  the  traditional 
approach to microeconomic theory, all members of the household are 
assumed to have the same preference—that is, the household is consid-
ered to act as one. But in reality, individual household members will 
likely have different preferences.
  Several  recent  empirical  studies  have  shown  that  intrahousehold 
allocation depends on which member brings income into the house and 
whether the income is conditional or unconditional (Thomas 1990; duflo 
2003; Quisumbing 2003; Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003). Studies by soci-
ologists and anthropologists suggest that men and women make different 
choices in spending income under their control. Often men spend some 
of their income on goods and amenities for their personal satisfaction 
that may have adverse effects on household welfare (such as cigarettes, 
gambling), whereas women are more likely to purchase goods for chil-
dren and for general household consumption (Haddad, Hoddinott, and 
Pena 1992). Thomas (1992) found that in Brazil additional income in 
the hands of women will increase the share of the household budget 
spent on health, education, and household services three to six times 
more than if the additional income is in the hands of men. Several stud-
ies document evidence that in both Africa and Asia income controlled 
by women is associated with higher household food expenditures and 
calorie intakes than is male-controlled income (Guyer 1980; Garcia and 
Lotfi 1991; Haddad and Hoddinott 1992; von Braun and Kennedy 1992). 
These findings suggest that targeting income transfers (cash or in-kind) 
to households in which women control income will likely improve the 
welfare of household members.
  Recent evidence from Bangladesh shows that assets controlled by 
women are associated with higher shares of expenditure on education 
(Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003) as well as lower incidence of child ill-
ness, particularly in girls (Hallman 2000). In addition, a study using demo-
graphic and Health Survey data from 40 developing countries shows that 
increasing women’s status within the household reduces child malnutri-
tion, particularly in South Asia (Smith et al. 2003).  A recent synthesis paper that lays out key factors affecting the choice of 
cash and food transfers concludes that the appropriateness of cash- or food-
based interventions cannot be predetermined. Rather, program objectives, 
economic  analysis,  market  assessments,  administrative  capacity  require-
ments, and beneficiary preferences play important roles in the choice (Gen-
tilini 2007).
  There is no guarantee that the success of cash or food transfers in some 
countries can be reproduced in other countries. Because most cash and food 
transfer programs are implemented in different contexts, research on the 
relative advantages of one or the other must take the contextual factors into 
account.
Country Profile
With a population of 144.4 million living in an area of only 147,570 square 
kilometers (56,977 square miles), Bangladesh is the second most densely popu-
lated country in the world after Singapore.9 The population density was 609 
people per square kilometer of land area in 1981. It increased to 755 per 
square kilometer in 1991 and to 979 per square kilometer in 2006. The annual 
rate of population growth was 2.2 percent between the census years of 1981 
and 1991 (BBS 2006). The rate declined to 1.9 percent between 2000 and 
2006 (World Bank 2007). About 75 percent of the country’s population lives 
in rural areas.
  Although  the  agricultural  sector  continues  to  dominate  the  economy, 
the share of agriculture in gross domestic product (GdP) declined from 31.9 
percent in 1986 to 19.5 percent in 2006 (World Bank 2007). The agricultural 
sector is the largest employer, involving about 48 percent of the total labor 
force in 2003 (BBS 2006).
Macroeconomic Performance
Bangladesh has recorded impressive and steady economic growth, relatively 
low inflation, and fairly stable domestic debt, interest, and exchange rates 
since the 1990s (World Bank 2006). In 1986–96, GdP grew at 4.2 percent 
annually on average. A higher average annual growth rate of 5.4 percent in 
1996–2006, coupled with a decline in the population growth rate, led to a 
near-doubling of annual per capita GdP growth, from 1.8 percent in 1986–96 
to 3.4 percent in 1996–2006. In terms of per capita GdP growth, Bangladesh 
outperformed low-income countries in this period. In 2006, Bangladesh achieved 
a remarkable growth rate of 6.7 percent of GdP, up from 6.0 percent in 
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9 The population figure of 144 million relates to 2006.2005. Its per capita GdP increased by 4.8 percent in 2006 (World Bank 2006, 
2007).
Poverty and Undernutrition
Bangladesh’s progress in economic growth has contributed to a modest reduc-
tion in the headcount poverty rate of around 1.5 percentage points a year 
since the early 1990s. Changes in the poverty level over time have aroused 
considerable  interest  and  passionate  debate  in  Bangladesh.  Although  the 
data gathered by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics in its Household Income 
and Expenditure Survey (HIES) remain the standard time series microdata on 
which analysts base their poverty estimates, changes in the methodology for 
data collection (a switch from seven-day recall to daily diaries in 1983/84) 
and poverty estimation (from recording direct calorie intake to recording the 
cost of basic needs in 1995/96) have compromised efforts to make compa-
rable assessments over long periods of time (Ahmed 2000).
  To simplify a debatable subject, it is most convenient to consider the 
period between 1995/96 and 2005, when the HIES used consistent data col-
lection and poverty estimation methodologies. Table 1.1 shows the declin-
ing trends in poverty (that is, the share of the population below the upper 
poverty line) and extreme poverty (the share of the population below the 
lower poverty line) in the period 1995/96–2005.10 At the national level, the 
poverty  headcount  declined  by  only  about  2  percentage  points  between 
1995/96 and 2000. This minimal poverty reduction over the five-year period 
was probably due to the offsetting effect of the devastating floods of 1998, 
which severely damaged crops, livestock, housing, and other assets of people 
across Bangladesh. Nevertheless, a significant decline of nearly 9 percentage 
points occurred in the first half of the 2000s; the percentage of the popula-
tion living in poverty fell from 48.9 percent in 2000 to 40.0 percent in 2005 
(BBS 2006).
  More important, there were substantial improvements in the livelihoods of 
the poorest of the poor during the period 2000–05, as the decline in the inci-
dence of extreme poverty and the distributionally sensitive poverty measures 
(poverty gap and poverty severity) reveal. These improvements were likely due 
to the relatively high level of economic growth in recent years.
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10 The population below the upper poverty line is poor. The upper poverty line includes the food 
consumption expenditure and the cost of consuming a bundle of nonfood items. The lower pov-
erty line identifies the households of the extremely poor, whose total household expenditures 
are below the food poverty line. The food poverty line represents the cost of acquiring a basic 
food basket that provides the minimum nutritional requirement of 2,122 kilocalories per person 
per day.  Bangladesh’s recent progress in poverty reduction, however, is little com-
fort:  the  overall  incidence  of  poverty  persists  at  a  high  level.  The  most 
startling consequence of widespread poverty is that a quarter (25.5 percent) 
of the country’s population—36 million people—cannot afford an adequate 
diet, according to the 2005 estimates of food poverty or extreme poverty 
(BBS 2006). Chronically underfed and highly vulnerable, they remain largely 
without assets (other than their own labor power) to cushion lean-season 
hunger or the crushing blows of illness, flooding, and other calamities. These 
extremely poor people are a group that straddles the outer limits of human 
survival. Therefore, the need for targeted interventions to improve the food 
security and livelihood of the extremely poor remains strong.
Characterization of the Social Safety-Net Programs in Bangladesh
Formal social safety-net programs redistribute resources to poor people to 
reduce their economic hardship. They include any direct transfers to the 
poor, whether in cash or in kind, made with or without a work requirement 
(Smith and Subbarao 2003). Bangladesh has a comprehensive portfolio of both 
food- and cash-based social safety-net programs. Currently, there are about 
27 such programs.11 Appendix A provides a summary of the programs, includ-
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11 Interventions to improve the nutrition of children and women (such as the national Nutrition 
Program and the Community Nutrition Initiative and the Training and Nutrition Center compo-
nents of the Integrated Food Security program) are excluded from the list of safety nets because 
these programs do not fall directly under the rubric of transfer programs.
Table 1.1  Trends in income poverty, selected years, 1995–2005
  Upper poverty line (%)  Lower poverty line (%)
Indicator  1995–96  2000  2005  1995–96  2000  2005
Headcount rate (P0)
  National  53.1  48.9  40.0  35.6  33.7  25.5
  Urban  35.0  35.2  28.4  14.3  19.4  13.7
  Rural  56.7  52.3  43.8  39.8  37.4  29.3
Poverty gap (P1)
  National  13.3  12.8  9.0  7.6  7.5  4.6
  Urban  7.2  9.1  6.5  2.6  4.1  2.6
  Rural  14.5  13.7  9.8  8.6  8.3  5.3
Poverty severity (P2)
  National  4.8  4.6  2.9  2.5  2.4  1.3
  Urban  2.5  3.3  2.1  0.7  1.2  0.7
  Rural  5.3  4.9  3.1  2.8  2.6  1.5
Source:    BBS (1998, 2006).ing  their  objectives,  administrative  arrangements,  targeting  criteria,  type 
and amount of benefits, coverage, and annual costs.
  A recent World Bank study assesses the current system of social safety nets 
in Bangladesh. The study shows that the ratio of expenditures on safety-net pro-
grams as a percentage of GdP and public expenditures has been declining. 
Expenditures on safety-net programs amount to less than 1 percent of GdP 
and about 4.4 percent of public expenditures. Although reasonable growth 
rates have led to declines in the percentage of the poor, the number of 
those who are poor has not declined. The number of people covered under 
the safety-net programs represents only a fraction of those in need. Taking 
mistargeting and leakage into account, only about 6–7 percent of the poor 
are actually covered. The study contends that real expenditures on safety-net 
programs should not decline further (World Bank 2006).
  Although some of the safety-net programs started as early as the mid- 
1970s,  the  administrative  structure  and  the  implementation  mechanisms 
have gone through substantive changes over the years. The notable changes 
include transforming “relief programs to development programs,” converting 
“ration food price subsidies to targeted food distribution,” and engaging other 
stakeholders—such as NGOs and microfinance organizations—in the implemen-
tation  of  various  safety-net  programs  (Ahmed  2005a).  The  Government  of 
Bangladesh (GoB) has also shown a remarkable willingness to evaluate pro-
gram effectiveness, confront shortcomings, and cancel or modify programs 
as a result. For example, the high cost of subsidies and heavy leakage to the 
nonpoor motivated the GoB to abolish the Palli (rural) rationing program in 
1992 (Ahmed 1992). GoB replaced Palli rationing with the innovative Food for 
Education program in 1993 (WGTFI 1994).
  The safety-net programs can be categorized in accordance with the spe-
cific objective that each program is designed to achieve. For example, pro-
grams may be designed to develop infrastructure, provide education incen-
tives to the poor, mitigate the consequences of disaster, or provide livelihood 
support to disadvantaged groups such as the aged and the disabled. Using 
such categorizations, it is possible to group existing programs in Bangladesh 
into five categories.
Infrastructure-Building Programs
Food-for-Work (FFW) or Rural development (Rd) programs, the FFA compo-
nent of the Integrated Food Security program, and Test Relief (TR) distribute 
foodgrains (rice and wheat) as wage payments to workers in labor-intensive 
public works programs. Both men and women participate in FFW/Rd and TR, 
whereas FFA requires that at least 70 percent of the participants be women. 
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rural earthen roads. All these programs require the participants to do physical 
work that mainly involves moving earth. These programs are typically self-
targeting, because only the poor would be willing to work at onerous, low-
paying manual labor. In addition to willingness to work, FFA and RMP screen 
administratively to ensure that only the neediest are employed. Chapter 2 
provides detailed descriptions of FFA and RMP.
Training Programs
The VGd program exclusively targets poor women and provides a monthly 
food ration over a period of 24 months. Although it was introduced as a relief 
program in the mid-1970s, it has evolved over time to integrate food secu-
rity with development objectives. The development package includes train-
ing in IGAs; awareness-raising on social, legal, health, and nutrition issues; 
and training in basic literacy and innumeracy. Similar to VGd in design, the 
FSVGd program also provides a combination of food and cash to program 
participants. Beneficiaries of the VGd and FSVGd programs are selected by 
administrative review. Chapter 2 describes these two programs in detail.
Education Programs
The Food for Education (FFE) program distributed monthly foodgrain rations 
to poor households if they sent their children to primary schools. FFE was ter-
minated in 2002 and has been replaced by the cash-based Primary Education 
Stipend (PES) program. The School Feeding (SF) program distributes biscuits 
fortified with energy-producing micronutrients to primary school children. 
These  programs  have  the  common  development  objectives  of  promoting 
school enrollment and attendance and reducing dropouts. In addition, the SF 
program aims to improve students’ attention spans and learning capacity by 
reducing short-term hunger and micronutrient deficiency. GoB also provides 
cash assistance to girls in secondary schools through the four components of 
the Female Secondary School Assistance Program.
Relief Programs
These programs are designed as a mechanism for mitigating the consequences 
of disasters such as floods, cyclones, and other natural calamities. Currently, 
there are only two such programs: the Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) and 
Gratuitous Relief (GR) programs. Unlike other programs, these programs have 
no preset criteria or conditionality for participation. They are relief programs 
that try to help the poor cope and smooth their consumption at times of 
natural disaster.
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These programs include the Old-Age Allowance Scheme; Allowance for Wid-
owed, deserted, and destitute Women; Honorarium Program for Insolvent 
Freedom Fighters; Fund for Housing for the distressed; Fund for Rehabili-
tation of Acid Burnt Women and Physically Handicapped; and the program 
most recently introduced, Allowance for the distressed disabled Persons. See 
Appendix A for the features of these programs.
  The key message is that the safety-net system in Bangladesh has evolved 
from being relief oriented to incorporate various components of long-term 
development  objectives.  The  government  has  formed  strong  partnerships 
with NGOs and multilateral and bilateral development organizations in imple-
menting them. For example, the VGF program, which had served as a pure 
relief distribution program since its inception in 1975, was renamed the VGd 
program in the mid-1980s when development objectives were incorporated 
into the program. One of the key changes in program design was the addition 
of a requirement that program beneficiaries obtain training in IGAs, adminis-
tered by national NGOs such as the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Commit-
tee (BRAC), to remain enrolled in the program. The underlying idea was that 
after a two-year program cycle, beneficiaries would save and build enough 
assets to be eligible to participate in microfinance programs.
  The  efficiency  of  these  safety-net  programs  must  improve,  especially 
given the backdrop of declining commitments of resources by donors and GoB 
to targeted assistance programs. In particular, it is necessary to reduce sys-
tem leakage and improve targeting in order to realize greater benefits from 
the existing social safety-net programs.
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Salient Features of the Case Study Programs
T
his study assesses the relative merits of food and cash transfers by 
examining four programs: the two components of the VGD program, 
IGVGD and FSVGD; the FFA component of the IFS program; and the RMP. 
IGVGD provides food transfers, FSVGD and FFA provide a combination of food 
and cash transfers, and RMP provides cash payments to program beneficiaries. 
Based on a review of various documents, this chapter provides an overview of 
these programs.
  Each of these four programs uses a set of official targeting criteria to 
select program beneficiaries. These program-specific selection criteria are 
provided in Chapter 5 of this report, which assesses the targeting performance 
of the programs. To avoid repetition, this chapter does not list the selection 
criteria for program beneficiaries.
The Vulnerable Group Development Program
The VGD program in Bangladesh is the world’s largest development interven-
tion of its kind that exclusively targets women. About 750,000 ultra-poor 
rural women in the country received support under the VGD program in 2006. 
The program began in 1975 as a relief program for families affected by natu-
ral calamities. The current VGD program seeks to integrate food security and 
nutrition with development and income generation. It is a collaborative food 
security intervention jointly managed and implemented by GoB and WFP.
  The VGD program is implemented through two components: IGVGD and 
FSVGD. Of the 750,100 women served by VGD, 640,721 women (85.4 percent) 
and their family members received IGVGD support and 109,379 women (14.6 
percent) and their dependents received support under the FSVGD compo- 
nent in 2005–06. Of the total 460 upazilas (subdistricts) of Bangladesh in 61 
districts, FSVGD operated in 57 upazilas in 7 districts in northern Bangladesh 
and IGVGD operated in 364 upazilas in 54 districts.1
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1 The administrative structure of Bangladesh consists of divisions, districts, upazilas, and unions, 
in order by decreasing size. There are 6 divisions, 64 districts, 489 upazilas (of which 29 are in 
four city corporations), and 4,463 unions (all rural).  The FSVGD project commenced in July 2001, and project activities ended 
on December 31, 2006. The European Commission (EC) funded the provision 
of cash allowances to program participants. WFP multilateral and bilateral 
donors, including GoB, provided food assistance to FSVGD.
  The VGD program involves multiple partners, including GoB, WFP, bilateral 
donors, and several NGOs. The Ministry of Women’s and Children’s Affairs 
(MWCA) is the main coordinating ministry for the VGD program. Under its 
coordination, the Department of Women’s Affairs (DWA) and the Directorate 
of Relief and Rehabilitation (DRR) of the Ministry of Disaster Management and 
Relief (MDMR) are responsible for implementing the VGD program. WFP pro-
vides the necessary technical backstopping services to the relevant ministries 
and agencies of the government. The NGO partners play an important role in 
implementing project activities. Of the activities carried out by NGOs, the 
most important is providing livelihood development training to the ultra-poor 
women served.
  The IGVGD program exclusively targets poor women, who receive a monthly 
food ration. Each participant is entitled to receive either 30 kilograms of 
rice or 30 kilograms of wheat or a 25-kilogram sealed bag of micronutrient-
fortified atta (whole-wheat flour) per month. The fortified atta is called pusti 
(nutritious) atta. Although it is otherwise similar to IGVGD in design, the 
FSVGD program provides a combination of food and cash to program partici-
pants. Monthly entitlements are a 15-kilogram sealed bag of micronutrient-
fortified atta and Tk 150 per beneficiary.2 VGD participants receive the assis-
tance over a period of 24 months. This support period is referred to as the 
“VGD cycle.”
  In addition to food and cash transfers, NGOs provide development sup-
port consisting of providing training in IGAs (such as rearing poultry, raising 
livestock, maintaining fisheries, and sericulture); raising awareness on social, 
legal, health, and nutrition issues; offering basic literacy and numeracy train-
ing; and providing access to credit. VGD participants are required to make a 
monthly savings deposit of Tk 32 into an interest-bearing account maintained 
by the VGD service-providing NGOs. Savings are deposited into a bank or post 
office in areas not served by the VGD partner NGOs.
  Although  the  VGD  program  operates  nationwide,  it  concentrates  more 
resources  in  food-insecure  areas  of  the  country.  About  two-thirds  of  the 
resources are directed to about one-third of the upazilas. Consequently, cov-
erage is higher in more food-insecure areas. GoB and WFP have devised a 
resource allocation map for food-assisted development on which each upazila 
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2 The official exchange rate for the taka (Tk), the currency of Bangladesh, was Tk 71.36 per 
US$1.00 on April 25, 2007.of the country has been categorized by its relative level of food insecurity. 
The level of food insecurity is determined by factors such as the area’s food- 
grain surplus or deficit, agricultural wage rate, infrastructure status, popula-
tion density, number of landless households, employment opportunities, and 
susceptibility to natural disasters. Based on this map, VGD food resources geo-
graphically target upazilas in proportion to their levels of food insecurity.
  The VGD program’s beneficiaries are selected by administrative review 
using upazila-level committees of government officials; union parishad (coun-
cil) members, elected representatives of local government; and partner NGO 
representatives. The selection committee selects VGD participants on the 
basis of set criteria. The role of elected female union parishad members in 
this process is crucial. They currently have the right to select 50 percent of 
the VGD women. In the most recent VGD cycle of 2005–06, simplified selec-
tion criteria were formulated and introduced to make targeting more accu-
rate. These criteria are provided in Chapter 5.
The Food for Asset Creation Component of the Integrated  
Food Security Program
GoB and WFP signed an operational contract in March 2001 to support ultra- 
poor people through development activities as specified in the Country Pro-
gram 2001–05. The three activities undertaken during the Country Program 
are the two existing activities—the VGD and RD programs—and a new activ-
ity, the IFS program. The IFS program was introduced in February 2002 in 10 
upazilas in 3 districts in the Rangpur cluster of northern Bangladesh.
  The IFS program is designed as follows. The purpose of the program is to 
allocate resources to the most food-insecure areas in the country as identified 
by vulnerability analysis and mapping and to target ultra-poor individuals living 
in these areas. Local NGOs follow a simple and results-oriented participatory 
planning  process  to  identify  ultra-poor  households,  including  malnourished 
women and children. The program follows an area-based approach and aims 
at improving the household food security and nutrition of the rural ultra poor. 
It is beneficiary-driven; it uses participatory techniques for microplanning at 
the village level and allocates resources to community bodies. The program is 
based on the lessons learned from the well-established VGD and RD programs 
as well as other development activities in Bangladesh and elsewhere.
  The IFS program has three components: the Community Nutrition Initia-
tive, training and nutrition centers, and FFA activities. The FFA component 
of the IFS is described here.
  The FFA component has been designed to promote human and capital 
resource development for the ultra poor by providing awareness and training 
in legal, social, health, and nutrition issues; by enabling participants to work 
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and by providing marketable skills training for IGAs. The Local Government 
Engineering Department under the Ministry of Local Government Rural Devel-
opment and Cooperatives coordinates FFA activities.
  Both women and men participate in FFA, but at least 70 percent of the 
participants must be women. User committees are formed from among the 
participants, and the committees are responsible for organizing village-based 
microplanning to identify participants in FFA activities. Stipulated selection 
criteria are to be followed in selecting participants. Local service providers 
and NGOs facilitate this process. User committees also participate in identify-
ing schemes and activities and are responsible for transporting and distribut-
ing wheat.
  Participants in the FFA component (who are not already VGD beneficiaries) 
receive food and cash compensation. Food and cash for work are normally 
provided during the months of December to May, which is the period suitable 
for moving earth. Training in awareness-raising and IGAs is conducted from 
June to November. During the working season, each participant in the build-
ing of community infrastructure and assets is entitled to receive a minimum 
wage of 2 kilograms of rice or wheat and Tk 15 per working day, subject to 
the accomplishment of a minimum amount of work. A participant’s monthly 
entitlements for the training period are 20 kilograms of wheat or rice and Tk 
100. FFA participants are required to save Tk 25 per month.
  FFA follows a one- to two-year project cycle. Depending on the type of 
activities, however, the implementation period may vary. For the training 
in awareness-raising and IGAs, a flexible schedule is followed for the conve-
nience of the project participants. In 2006 FFA covered 39,200 participants 
in 38 upazilas.
The Rural Maintenance Program
In 1983 CARE initiated the RMP as a cash-for-work road maintenance project 
on a pilot basis in seven unions of seven districts. Since then the program 
has gradually expanded and become a national program. In 2006 the RMP 
operated in 4,200 unions (out of a total of 4,443 unions in the country) in 
61 districts across rural Bangladesh, employing 41,540 women. In June 2006 
the operation of the program was shifted from CARE to the Ministry of Local 
Government, Rural Development, and Cooperatives.
  RMP provides destitute women with four years of employment maintaining 
rural roads.3 The term destitute refers to female heads of households who are 
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3 In other words, RMP makes a four-year contract with the women selected for the program.divorced, widowed, separated, or abandoned, with little or no other means 
of financial support (see Chapter 5 for the selection criteria used to deter-
mine beneficiaries). RMP participants receive cash wages for work. Each RMP 
woman is entitled to receive a wage of Tk 51 per day, of which she is required 
to save Tk 10 per day (S. Ahmed 2005). Therefore, the take-home wage is 
Tk 41 per day. RMP women are entitled to receive their daily wages for 30 
days a month, which implies a monthly salary of Tk 1,530, or Tk 1,230 after 
the deduction of mandatory savings.Therefore, RMP provides a steady, year-
round income to one of the poorest segments of society. Rural communities 
benefit from good roads, and poor women benefit from improved standards 
of living for themselves and their dependents.
  RMP selects 10 women from each union to constitute one “crew.” The 
program disburses cash wages to crew members through direct transfers to 
the bank accounts of women’s groups. Banks offer other services as well. 
They facilitate a savings element of the RMP program. A fraction of partici-
pants’ wages (Tk 10 per day) is deducted by the bank before salaries are paid. 
This share is transferred to each individual’s savings account. The women can 
withdraw their savings only after completing the four-year cycle. For a poor 
woman, the accumulated savings become a substantial amount that she may 
use to initiate and operate an income-generating activity when she leaves 
the program. RMP provides life skills training and counseling to participating 
women with a focus on developing self-reliant business skills for managing 
sustainable  income-generation  activities.  Women  receive  counseling  that 
helps them understand and establish their rights and improve their health and 
nutrition and that of their families.
Summary
Table 2.1 summarizes the characteristics of the four case study programs. In 
2006 these four programs covered a total of 830,840 beneficiary households 
with 3.72 million family members.4 IGVGD covered 640,721 participants (77 
percent); FSVGD, 109,379 participants (13 percent); FFA, 39,200 participants 
(5 percent); and RMP, 41,540 participants (5 percent).
  In sum, the four case study programs have a number of common features: 
they target impoverished rural women, use similar criteria for administrative 
selection of program beneficiaries, impart skill development and awareness-
raising training, and have mandatory savings requirements for program par-
ticipants. There are also notable differences across these programs. Whereas 
IGVGD provides only food payments, RMP provides only cash payments, and 
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26  CHAPTER 2FSVGD and FFA provide a combination of food and cash; these are not the 
only differences. IGVGD and FSVGD beneficiaries receive transfer payments; 
FFA participants receive daily wages for their workdays during the work sea-
son (December–May) and transfer payments during the training season (June–
November); and RMP participants receive wages on a fortnightly fixed-salary 
basis.  Because  payments  for  work  are  different  from  direct  transfer  pay-
ments, we use the term “payments” or “wages” for FFA and RMP payments 
in this study.
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Methodology and Data
T
he study design engaged scientific analytical methodology and data 
collection procedures to generate useful and valid information on the 
relative effects of cash and food transfers through the four programs: 
IGVGD, FSVGD, FFA, and RMP. This chapter first presents the methodology of 
evaluating the impact of the programs. It then describes the data collection 
approach and process.
Assessment of Program Impact
To measure program impact, it is necessary to compare outcomes for ben-
eficiaries to what those outcomes would have been had the program not been 
implemented, so it is necessary to construct a counterfactual measure of what 
might have happened without the program. The most powerful way to con-
struct a valid counterfactual is to randomly select beneficiaries from a pool 
of equally eligible candidates. If program assignment is random, all individu-
als (or communities, schools, etc.) have the same chance of being selected 
for the program. Average outcomes for those not randomly selected should 
provide an unbiased estimate of what beneficiaries would have experienced 
without the program. When a randomized design evaluation is done well, 
beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries will have, on average, the same observed 
characteristics  and,  more  important,  the  same  unobserved  characteristics 
(more important because they are more difficult to control for). In this way a 
credible basis for comparison is established, freed from selectivity concerns, 
and the direction of causality is certain. A further advantage of a randomized 
design is that program impact is easy to calculate and, as a consequence, 
easier to understand and explain.1
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1 Heckman and Smith (1995), however, point out that this apparent simplicity can be deceiving, 
particularly in poorly designed evaluations in which there is randomization bias (that is, the 
process of randomization itself leads to a different beneficiary pool than would otherwise have 
been treated) or substitution bias (that is, nonbeneficiaries obtain similar treatments from dif-
ferent sources—a form of “contamination”).  IFPRI has taken the randomized design approach in its evaluations of CCT 
programs in a number of countries in Latin America, as well as in recent 
evaluations of the effectiveness of food and cash transfers in emergencies in 
Sri Lanka and of food-for-education programs in Uganda. In all of these stud-
ies, baseline household surveys were carried out before the program began 
and then after the program was implemented based on random assignment 
of communities to treatment and control groups.
  For the evaluation of the four case study programs in Bangladesh, how-
ever, a randomized approach was not feasible because the programs had 
already been implemented before the evaluation. Therefore, in this study 
we employed a nonrandomized approach for impact assessment. Moreover, 
budgetary  constraints  did  not  permit  us  to  complete  two  survey  rounds; 
therefore, we compared the control and treatment groups at a given point in 
time rather than comparing changes through time.
  The approach we used for constructing a comparison group was PSM. Through 
comparisons with experimental estimators, Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 
1998) and Heckman et al. (1998) have shown that PSM provides reliable, low-
bias estimates of program impact provided that (1) the same data source is used 
for participants and nonparticipants, (2) participants and nonparticipants have 
access to the same markets, and (3) the data include meaningful explanatory 
variables capable of identifying program participation.
  We designed the evaluation to fulfill these requirements for PSM. A com-
prehensive household survey was designed and questionnaires were prepared 
to meet these requirements. The variables included in the questionnaires 
capture many of the determinants of participation that are typically unob-
servable by the researcher, which helped to reduce a potentially significant 
source of bias in PSM estimators.
The Evaluation Problem and the Propensity Score  
Matching Methodology
Constructing a valid estimate of program impact requires the comparison of 
outcomes for program beneficiaries with what those outcomes would have been 
had they not received the program. These counterfactual outcomes, however, 
are not observed. A central focus of the literature on evaluating social programs 
concerns how to identify or construct a comparison group that was statistically 
similar to the program beneficiaries but that was not included in the program 
for some reason. If such a comparison group could be identified, differences in 
the mean outcomes between program beneficiaries and the comparison group 
would provide a reasonable measure of program impact.
  As mentioned, the most reliable methods for measuring program impact 
are experimental methods in which a comparison group is constructed by 
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and Smith (1995) and Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) have shown how 
random program assignment among eligible households solves the evaluation 
problem, making it likely that observed differences in outcomes between 
beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries are due to the program and not to selec-
tion effects. Selection effects arise when characteristics of the communities 
or households that are correlated with the outcomes of interest and that also 
affect the probability of being selected for the program are not removed or 
controlled for in estimating program impact. Selection effects lead to bias 
in estimates of program impact. There are two main types of selection bias: 
(1) targeting of the program based on characteristics unobservable to the 
researcher and (2) self-selection into the program by a subset of eligible 
households.  Randomly  selecting  which  eligible  households  or  communities 
participate in a program helps remove both types of bias.
  In the following section we describe how PSM constructs a counterfactual 
comparison group for the evaluation problem, following Heckman, Ichimura, 
and Todd (1997) and Smith and Todd (2001, 2005).
Propensity Score Matching
Let Yi
1 be the outcome of the ith household if it is a beneficiary of the pro-
gram, and let Yi
0 be that household’s outcome if it is not selected for the 
program. The impact of the program is given by D = Yi
1 – Yi
0. only Y1 or Y0 is 
realized for each household, however. Let D indicate whether the household 
participates in the program or “treatment”: D = 1 if the household is selected 
for the program; D = 0 otherwise. The evaluation problem is to estimate the 
average impact of the social program on those included in it. So
E(D | X, D = 1) = E(Y1 – Y0 | X, D = 1) = 
  E(Y1 | X, D = 1) – E(Y0 | X, D = 1),    (1)
where X is a vector of control variables and subscripts have been dropped. 
This measure of program impact is generally referred to as the “average 
impact of the treatment on the treated.”
  In expression (1), E(Y0 | X, D = 1) is not observed. PSM provides one method 
for estimating this counterfactual outcome for participants (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin 1983). Let P(X) = Pr(D = 1 | X) be the probability of participating in 
the CCT program. PSM constructs a statistical comparison group by match-
ing observations regarding beneficiary households to observations regarding 
nonbeneficiaries with similar values of P(X). This requires two assumptions:
  E(Y0 | X, D = 1) = E(Y0 | X, D = 0), and  (2)
30  CHAPTER 3  0 < P(X) < 1.  (3)
The first assumption, known as “conditional mean independence,” requires 
that after controlling for X, mean outcomes of nonparticipants be identical 
to outcomes of participants if they had not received the program. Expression 
(3) ensures valid matches by assuming that P(X) is well defined for all values 
of X. Covariate matching methods estimate E(Y0 | X, D = 1) by E(Y0 | X, D = 
0) using mean outcomes of comparison households matched with beneficia-
ries directly on the X variables. This procedure is complicated for large X, an 
effect known as the “curse of dimensionality.” PSM overcomes this problem. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin show that if outcomes are independent of program par- 
ticipation  after  conditioning  on  X,  outcomes  are  independent  of  program   
participation after conditioning only on P(X). If (2) and (3) hold, PSM provides 
a valid method for estimating E(Y0 | X, D = 1) and obtaining unbiased esti-
mates of (1).
  Although it is not possible to test the assumptions in (2) and (3) on non-
experimental data, Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998) and Heckman 
et al. (1998) used experimental data to identify the conditions under which 
PSM provides reliable, low-bias estimates of program impact, as mentioned.
  We used care in selecting X variables whose levels had mostly been deter-
mined  before  the  start  of  the  program.  When  selecting  X  variables,  it  is 
important to choose variables that are associated both with the probability of 
participating in the program and with the outcome of interest (Heckman and 
navarro-Lozano 2004). These variables should be determined before the pro-
gram begins, however, to ensure that they are not affected by the program 
itself. In addition, we included village dummies to control for unobserved 
village-specific effects.
Estimation Methodology
The PSM procedure involves several steps. For each outcome and each type 
of transfer, we estimated the propensity score for participation in the pro-
gram using a probit model including both determinants of participation in the 
program and factors that affect the outcome. Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 
(1997, 1998) emphasized that the quality of the match can be improved by 
ensuring that matches are formed only where the distribution of the density 
of the propensity scores overlaps between treatment and comparison obser-
vations  or  where  the  propensity  score  densities  have  “common  support.” 
Common support can be improved by dropping treatment observations whose 
estimated propensity score is greater than the maximum or less than the 
minimum of the comparison group’s propensity scores. Similarly, observations 
of the comparison group with a propensity score below the minimum or above 
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be dropped.2
  A shortcoming of this approach identified by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 
(1997) is that observations of the treatment group with a score near these cut 
points have a potential of being compared with a group with propensity scores 
that are either all lower or all higher than those of the treatment observa-
tions. To account for this problem, we modified this “min/max” approach to 
identifying a region of common support using the following procedure.
  We first estimated the probit model for program participation and identi-
fied the lower and upper cut points of common support in the comparison or 
treatment groups. Typically only comparison observations were dropped in the 
left  part  of  the  distribution  and  treatment  observations  were  dropped  in 
the right part. We then added back the 5 percent of observations from each 
tail that had been dropped that were closest in terms of propensity scores. 
In  addition,  we  trimmed  the  treatment  observations  from  the  interior  of 
the propensity score distribution that had the lowest density of comparison 
observations. We chose to drop 2 percent of treatment observations using this 
trimming procedure. on this common support sample, the probit model was 
again used to obtain a new set of propensity scores to be used in creating 
the match. We also tested the “balancing properties” of the data by testing 
whether treatment and comparison observations had the same distribution 
(mean) of propensity scores and of control variables within groupings of the 
ranked propensity score. All impact results presented in this study are based 
on specifications that passed the balancing tests.
  We matched treatment and comparison observations through local linear 
matching with a tricube kernel using Stata’s PSMATCH2 command (Leuven 
and Sianesi 2003). Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) and Smith and Todd 
(2005) have argued in favor of local linear matching over other matching 
techniques. Local linear matching performs well in samples with low densities 
of the propensity score in the interior of the propensity score distribution. 
Frölich (2004) provides evidence in support of the finite-sample properties of 
local linear matching relative to most other matching estimators, with the 
exception of an infrequently used ridge matching approach. Standard errors 
of the impact estimates are estimated by bootstrap using 1,000 replications 
for each estimate.
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2 The distribution of propensity scores for the comparison group often lies to the left of the 
distribution for the treatment group for targeted social programs. As a result, the highest pro-
pensity scores tend to come from treatment observations, whereas the lowest are dominated by 
comparison observations. This pattern indicates effective targeting.  It is important to note that matching is done on the basis of observable 
characteristics. When multiple rounds of data are available, a difference-in-
differences PSM estimator can be used. Changes in outcomes are compared 
across treatment and control groups before and after the intervention, and 
thus the influence of unobserved time-invariant differences between recipi-
ents and matched nonrecipients is eliminated. With the single round of data 
available to us, this approach was not feasible. Instead, our matching relied 
on a stronger assumption, namely, that unobservables and observables had 
the same distribution.
Quantitative Data Collection
The information collection approach we used involved combining quantitative 
surveys with qualitative semistructured key informant interviews and focus 
group discussions (FGDs). This mixed method of data collection provided a 
rich pool of data and analytical power that would not be available with any of 
these methods on their own. Gender-disaggregated information was collected 
wherever it was meaningful.
  The quantitative data required to address the research questions came 
mostly from a household survey. The survey included beneficiaries of the 
four programs and nonbeneficiary control households. The quantitative data 
were supplemented by qualitative information, to be discussed in the next 
section.
  A community survey was also carried out to provide information on area-
specific contextual factors. Further, data were collected on the costs of 
Bangladesh’s food procurement from internal and external sources and on 
detailed breakdowns of the costs of delivering cash and food to program 
beneficiaries.
Sample Size
The  budget  for  the  household  survey  supported  data  collection  on  2,000 
households. of this total sample, the survey included 1,200 households of 
beneficiaries of the four programs (300 households per program), 400 house-
holds in control groups, and 400 former beneficiaries of the four programs.
  Although the decision on the total sample size was driven by budgetary 
considerations, we derived estimates of statistical power for the size of the 
sample used in assessing the impacts of the case study programs on household 
welfare. We worked backward to determine the minimum change in house-
hold welfare that could be identified at the given sample size for evaluating 
each program. We used per capita monthly total consumption expenditure 
(a  proxy  for  income)  as  the  outcome  indicator  for  household  welfare  for 
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objective of the programs.
  The calculation of minimum sample size determined the smallest change 
in outcome indicators that could be identified (using a Pearson’s chi-square 
test) between intervention and control groups. We followed the standard 
practice to find the sample size that would give an 80 percent chance (the 
power of the test) of rejecting the null hypothesis of zero change in income 
at the 0.05 level of significance. The design effect for clustered random sam-
pling was taken into account in determining sample size.3
  To estimate the parameters required to determine sample size, we used 
IFPRI’s 2002 household survey in Bangladesh for “A Study on Food Aid Leakage 
in Bangladesh” (Ahmed et al. 2003), which included VGD and FFA beneficiary 
households and therefore was comparable to our present study. From the 
survey data, three parameters necessary for sample size estimates—mean, 
standard deviation, and intraclass correlation coefficient—were estimated for 
the outcome indicator of per capita monthly consumption expenditure.
  Table  3.1  presents  the  minimum  estimate  of  sample  size  required  to 
detect a change in per capita total monthly expenditure. The estimates sug-
gest that, with the predetermined sample of 400 households for each of the 
four programs (300 treatment and 100 control households), the study should 
be able to detect a minimum statistically significant increase in income of at 
least 17 percentage points for the program participants. However, it is worth 
noting that the matching methodology used for the evaluation would increase 
the power of the evaluation design. The power calculations used here are 
based on the assumption of a randomized trial, so the effects of the matching 
on the power calculations are not taken into account. As a result, we believe 
that the estimate of minimum effect size is conservative in that it may be 
possible to identify effect sizes smaller than that presented here because of 
the matching.
Selection of Survey Areas
The survey sample areas were selected using a random sampling technique 
known  as  probability  proportional  to  size  according  to  the  distribution  of 
beneficiaries of the four programs. WFP-Bangladesh provided complete lists 
of participants and areas for the IGVGD, FSVGD, and FFW programs. Because 
RMP has nationwide coverage and the number of RMP crews per union are the 
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3 We used the Stata statistical software package and the Sampsi command to estimate the sam-
ple size for a two-sample comparison of means and the Sampclus command to adjust the sample 
size for cluster design.same, RMP survey sample areas were taken from survey sample areas of the 
other three programs.
Sampling Technique
A stratified random sampling technique was adopted for the household sur-
vey. For each of the four programs, the sampling process randomly selected 
districts,  upazilas,  and  unions  using  the  probability-proportional-to-size 
sampling method, based on the total number of program participants at the 
district, upazila, and union levels. Program participants were selected ran-
domly from the lists of beneficiaries obtained from program administrators. 
Control households (which met the beneficiary selection criteria but did not 
participate in the programs) were selected from the program areas.4
  The sampling process and survey administration included the following 
steps:
1.   Using  the  probability-proportional-to-size  random  sampling  method,  the 
sampling process randomly selected 20 IGVGD upazilas, 10 FSVGD upazilas, 
and 10 FFA upazilas, respectively, from the list of 364 IGVGD upazilas, 57 
FSVGD upazilas, and 38 FFA upazilas.
2.   one union from each of the 40 selected upazilas was randomly selected 
with probability proportional to size using a union-level number of IGVGD, 
FSVGD, and FFA cardholders. A total of 40 unions were selected.
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Table 3.1  Minimum sample size required to detect change in the 
selected outcome indicator
  Required sample size
Indicator  Minimum impact  Treatment  Control  Total
Per capita total expenditure  An increase of 17   285  94  379 
  per month (using the 2002     percentage points 
  IFPRI household survey data)    
Source:    Estimated by authors using data from IFPRI’s 2002 household survey in Bangladesh for 
“A Study on Food Aid Leakage in Bangladesh” (Ahmed et al. 2003).
4 In Bangladesh, targeted safety-net programs cover only a fraction of the very large number of 
eligible candidates. In 2004 IFPRI conducted a study on the targeting effectiveness of the Vulnera-
ble Group Development Program in Bangladesh (Ahmed 2004). The study revealed that most of the 
nonbeneficiary households belonging to the poorest 25 percent of all households in the program 
communities meet the VGD targeting criteria, whereas the program covers only 4.3 percent of all 
households. Therefore, finding households for the control group was not a problem.3.   Thirty RMP unions were randomly selected from the 40 unions of the 40 
upazilas selected in Steps 1 and 2 for IGVGD, FSVGD, and FFA. (RMP crews 
are equally distributed, 10 per union, in all unions of all upazilas.)
4.   From each of the IGVGD unions, 15 current IGVGD participant households 
and 5 former IGVGD participant households were randomly selected from 
the union-level participants’ list.
5.   From each of the FSVGD unions, 30 current FSVGD participant households 
and 10 former FSVGD participant households were randomly selected from 
the union-level participants’ list.
6.   From each of the FFA unions, 30 current FFA participant households and 
10 former FFA participant households were randomly selected from the 
union-level participants’ list.
7.   From each of the RMP unions, 10 current RMP participant households and 3 
to 4 former RMP participant households were randomly selected from the 
union-level participants’ list.
8.   From each of the 40 unions selected in Steps 1 and 2, 10 control house-
holds were randomly selected from the union-level potential participants’ 
list that met the selection criteria of respective programs but never par-
ticipated in any of the programs.
  Table 3.2 provides a list of the survey districts, upazilas, and unions and 
the programs covered by the survey in each of the locations. Figure 3.1 shows 
the survey upazilas on the map of Bangladesh.
Preparation of Survey Questionnaires
IFPRI has extensive experience in the design and implementation of similar 
impact evaluation surveys in Bangladesh and other countries. We also con-
sulted the HIES questionnaires of the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics in order 
to collect data on a comparable set of variables.
  Two questionnaires were prepared—one for female respondents and the 
other  for  male  respondents.  The  questionnaires  were  designed  to  collect 
information on multiple topics, including household demographic composi-
tion, level of education, school participation, occupation and employment, 
dwelling characteristics, assets, food and nonfood expenditures, morbidity, 
economic shocks, anthropometric measurements of children and women, and 
participation in the CCT program. The questionnaire included a dietary intake 
module  to  collect  data  on  individual  food  intake  using  a  24-hour  recall 
methodology. Female enumerators with expertise and long experience in admin-
istering the dietary intake module (including in past IFPRI surveys in Bangla-
desh) collected the dietary intake data.
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District  Upazila  Union  Programs covered
Bhola  Bhola Sadar  Pashchim Ilisha  IGVGD, RMP
Bogra  Dub Chachia  Gobindapur  IGVGD, RMP
Chandpur  Kachua  Koraiya  IGVGD, RMP
Dinajpur  Birampur  Katla  FSVGD
Faridpur  Sadarpur  Sadarpur  IGVGD
Gaibandha  Saghatta  Muktinagar  IGVGD, RMP
Jamalpur  Dewanganj  Char Amkhawa  IGVGD, RMP
Jessore  Sarsha  Dihi  IGVGD, RMP
Kishoreganj  Katiadi  Banagram  IGVGD, RMP
Kishoreganj  Kishoreganj Sadar  Maizukhapon  FFA, RMP
Kurigram  Bhurungamari  Pathordubi  FSVGD
Kurigram  nageswari  Kedar  FSVGD
Kurigram  Rajarhat  Rajarhat  FFA, RMP
Kurigram  Ulipur  Tabokpur  FSVGD, RMP
Kushtia  Kushtia Sadar  Alampur  FFA, RMP
Kushtia  Kushtia Sadar  Manohardia  IGVGD, RMP
Lalmonirhat  Kaliganj  Madati  FFA, RMP
Lalmonirhat  Lalmonirhat  Harati  FSVGD, RMP
Manikganj  Saturia  Hargaze  IGVGD, RMP
Meherpur  Gangni  Gangni  FFA
Mymensingh  Fulbaria  Kaladaha  IGVGD, RMP
naogaon  Manda  Paranpur  FSVGD
naogaon  Porsha  Tetulia  FSVGD
nilphamari  Dimla  Gayabari  FFA, RMP
nilphamari  nilphamari  Kunda Pukur  IGVGD, RMP
nilphamari  Sadar  Panchapukur  FFA
noakhali  Begumganj  Hajipur  IGVGD, RMP
Pabna  Faridpur  Hadol  IGVGD, RMP
Panchagarh  Debiganj  Sonahar  FFA
Panchagarh  Tetulia  Bhojanpur  FSVGD, RMP
Patuakhali  Dashmina  Dashmina  IGVGD, RMP
Rajbari  Pangsha  Bahadurpur  FFA
Rajshahi  Godagari  Rishikul  FSVGD, RMP
Satkhira  Kaliganj  Tarali  IGVGD, RMP
Serajganj  Shajadpur  Potajia  IGVGD, RMP
Sherpur  Jhinaigati  Hatibandha  FFA
Sherpur  Jhinaigati  Jhenaigati  IGVGD, RMP
Sylhet  Balaganj  Paschim Gouripur  IGVGD, RMP
Tangail  Shakhipur  Bahera Toyl  IGVGD, RMP
Thakurgaon  Pirganj  Hazipur  FSVGD, RMP
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.
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38  CHAPTER 3  In May 2006 IFPRI received comments and suggestions on the survey ques-
tionnaires from a large number of reviewers including GoB officials, donor rep-
resentatives, nGo officials, and academics and researchers in Bangladesh. The 
questionnaires were revised in line with these comments and suggestions.
Training and Survey Administration
IFPRI contracted with Data Analysis and Technical Assistance Ltd. (DATA), 
a Bangladeshi consulting firm with expertise in conducting surveys and data 
analysis, to carry out the surveys. over the past 14 years, DATA has carried 
out numerous surveys for IFPRI’s research work in Bangladesh.
  In May 2006 the IFPRI study leader and DATA trained the survey team on 
the questionnaires and survey administration. The survey team pilot-tested the 
questionnaires in a number of villages under IFPRI supervision. The question-
naires were finalized after incorporating observations from the pilot test.
  The household survey started on June 10, 2006, and was completed on 
August 10. Data entry was completed by mid-September. Data cleaning, includ-
ing logical consistency checking and data validation, was completed by the end 
of December 2006.
Quality Control
Much care was taken to ensure the quality of the household survey data. 
In the field, survey supervisors routinely oversaw interviews conducted by 
enumerators and verified all questionnaires completed by enumerators on a 
daily basis. If inconsistencies in responses were detected in completed ques-
tionnaires, the supervisors visited the respondents involved to find out the 
reasons and corrected the responses as needed. In addition, the supervisors 
made random checks of about 10 percent of the completed questionnaires by 
revisiting the sample households. To ensure data quality, DATA survey coor-
dinators made frequent field visits to supervise the field work.
  The IFPRI study leader visited some of the survey sites and was in regular 
touch with DATA during the course of the survey, providing necessary guid-
ance. Further, the representatives of the funding agencies of the study—the 
U.K. Department for International Development and WFP—made unannounced 
field visits to observe survey interviews.
Qualitative Data Collection
Quantitative  data  were  supplemented  by  qualitative  information  in  order 
to  allow  researchers  to  hear  how  participants  and  program  implementers 
perceived the program “in their own words.” Participatory approaches were 
used to collect detailed information. Qualitative exercises using participa-
tory research appraisal (PRA) at the village level were conducted separately 
METHoDoLoGy AnD DATA  39   for women and men. Women were further subdivided into two categories: 
beneficiaries and former beneficiaries. Husbands of beneficiary women were 
also consulted separately.
The Process and Locations
PRA was conducted in five different unions of four districts, with the high-
est concentration in the northern region of Bangladesh. The districts were 
selected based on the list of unions in the household survey (Table 3.2) in 
consultation with the members of the study team. To cover all the programs 
including RMP, Faridpur was selected from the southern part of Bangladesh. 
Although the qualitative study sample was not statistically representative, 
the unions and districts chosen for the qualitative study were those with the 
highest concentration of beneficiaries within each region. The villages cov-
ered under the study were located in the following unions:
•	 	 Sadarpur	upazila (Sardarpur union) of Faridpur district (RMP, IGVGD),
•	 	 Shaghata	upazila (Muktinagar union) of Gaibandha district (IGVGD),
•	 	 Nilphamari	upazila (Panchapukur union) of nilphamari district (FFA), and
•	 	 Tetulia	 and	 Deviganj	 upazilas  (Bhajanapur  and  Sonahar  Mallikadaha 
unions) of Panchagarh district (FSVGD, FFA, RMP).
  A total of 16 FGDs were held with the different groups mentioned earlier. 
In addition, 16 case studies were conducted among female beneficiaries and 
former  beneficiaries.  Moreover,  10  key  informants’  interviews  were  held 
with the service providers (nGo representatives) in the field and with locally 
elected representatives. The key informants’ interviews and stakeholders’ 
meetings were also conducted at the central level with policymakers.
  The processes of data collection and analysis were participatory. During 
PRA  exercises  at  the  village  level,  various  tools  of  PRA,  such  as  rapport-
building,  wealth-ranking,  community-mapping,  seasonal  calendar  develop-
ment, and mobility-mapping were used. open-ended questions were asked in 
key informants’ interviews and FGDs to learn, among other things, whether 
women and men prefer cash or food transfers and why; how they perceive 
their well-being; whether the transfers have made any difference in their 
livelihoods, how, and why; and whether cash and food transfers affect the 
social  or  community  relations  between  beneficiaries  and  nonbeneficiaries 
within communities.
Quality Control
A four-member gender-balanced team of experienced facilitators conducted 
the FGD sessions guided by the research team, which included a sociologist 
with extensive experience in gender research in Bangladesh. The facilitators 
40  CHAPTER 3also participated in the training arranged for the quantitative study team. In 
addition, the qualitative team underwent three additional days of training on 
qualitative methods.
  The sociologist led the qualitative study team for the whole period of 
data collection. For in-field training she conducted the full PRAs in the first 
field while the other members of the team facilitated and observed. She also 
provided constant supervision and suggestions in person and/or over phone 
to the team members. She conducted the interviews of the service providers 
at the central level and cross-checked the field-level data. The field data 
collection started on July 20 and ended in the last week of August 2006.
Comparison of Quantitative and Qualitative Sample Sites
In order to assess whether participants in the qualitative work are similar to 
the sample, as a whole, and to other program beneficiaries who were not 
included in the qualitative work, one would ideally want to compare descrip-
tive statistics only of those participants who were included in the qualitative 
study. However, because participation in FGDs can sometimes be fluid, and 
because participants in FGDs were not necessarily chosen from the respon-
dents in the household survey, it was not possible to directly compare char-
acteristics of respondents in the qualitative study with those in the quantita-
tive study. Instead we compared characteristics of respondents at the sites 
chosen for the qualitative study with those in the sample as a whole.
  Appendix  H,  Table  H.1,  presents  a  comparison  of  selected  household 
characteristics  for  all  survey  respondents  (column  1),  current  and  former 
beneficiaries (column 2), and current and former beneficiaries at the quali-
tative survey sites (column 3). Beneficiaries and former beneficiaries—both 
at all sites and at the qualitative sites only—have higher levels of schooling 
and monthly food and nonfood expenditures compared with the full sample 
that includes controls and beneficiaries. However, beneficiaries and former 
beneficiaries at all sites (column 2) and those at the qualitative study sites 
(column 3) are quite similar across a whole range of household character-
istics. Because eligibility criteria differ across programs, we also compare 
beneficiaries and former beneficiaries in the full and qualitative site samples 
by program. This comparison shows that, by and large, the qualitative study 
sites are quite similar to those of the full sample. This is because, as we said 
earlier, sampling for the qualitative study focused on those regions with the 
highest concentrations of beneficiaries.
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Profile of Survey Households
U
sing household survey data collected for the evaluation, this chapter 
provides profiles of IGVGD, FSVGD, FFA, and rMP participants and the 
comparison (control) group. At the outset, it is important to note that 
the findings in this chapter portray the state of affairs of program beneficiaries 
and the comparison group and do not necessarily reflect the impact of the pro-
grams. Chapters 6 and 7 provide the results of the impact assessments.
Household Characteristics
Table 4.1 shows the characteristics of the survey households, disaggregated 
by program and control. As mentioned in Chapter 3, control households were 
randomly selected from the pool of households that met the program selec-
tion criteria but were not in the programs.
  Although household size is quite similar across the four programs and 
the control group (3.5 to 4.6 persons per household), the households are 
somewhat smaller than average rural households in Bangladesh. According 
to the latest HIES, the average household size in rural areas is 4.9 persons 
(BBS 2006).
  A common selection criterion for all four programs is that households be 
headed by a female (one who is widowed, divorced, or deserted by her hus-
band). In the sample, 69 percent of rMP households are headed by females. 
This rate is 36 percent for FFA, 31 percent for IGVGD, and 22 percent for 
FSVGD  households.  About  46  percent  of  control  households  are  female-
headed. Chapter 5 of this report provides the selection criteria of the pro-
grams and presents the results of an assessment of the selection process.
  Some highlights of other results from Table 4.1 are as follows:
•	 	 The	percentage	of	households	with	primary	school–age children who do 
not send their children to school varies considerably across the programs; 
whereas 37 percent of FFA households do not send their children to school, 
this rate is 17 percent for FSVGD households. The proportion of secondary 
school–age children (aged 12–18) who do not go to school is high in gen-















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PrOFILE OF SurVEy HOuSEHOLDS  43   •	 	 The	educational	attainment	of	adult	family	members	is	extremely	low;	
the average completed grades of schooling range from only grade 0.5 for 
rMP households to grade 2.5 for FSVGD households. In the entire sample 
of households, 69 percent of adult males and 80 percent of adult females 
never attended school.
•	 	 For	women	under	age	30	at	the	time	of	the	survey,	their	age	at	first	mar-
riage was around 15, on average.
•	 	 A	household	with	less	than	half	an	acre	of	cultivable	land	is	defined	as	a	
functionally landless household in rural Bangladesh. Survey results reveal 
that about 98 percent of all survey households are functionally landless. 
Landlessness ranges from 95 percent for FSVGD households to 99 percent 
for FFA households.
•	 	 Because	the	majority	of	households	are	landless,	daily	wage	laborer	is	by	
far the most common occupation of the heads of households.
  Table  4.2  shows  the  household  composition  and  dependency  ratios  of 
program-participant and control households. On average, households have 
2.1 adults of working age (15–60 years), 0.5 children under age 5, 1.2 children 
between the ages of 5 and 14 years, and only 0.1 elderly persons over age 
60.1 Household composition differs across program households. Whereas IGVGD 
and FSVGD households have 2.4 adults aged 15–60, rMP households have 1.9 
adults in that age group.
  Three types of dependency ratios are presented in the table. The total 
dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of the number of members in the 
age groups 0–14 years and above 60 years to the number of members of working 
age (15–60 years). The ratio is expressed as a percentage. The total dependency 
ratio is largest for rMP (111 percent) and smallest for FSVGD households (88 
percent). The difference between FSVGD and rMP households’ total depen-
dency ratio is accounted for mainly by the difference in the child dependency 
ratio rather than the dependency ratio for the aged. This indicates that adult 
members of working age in rMP households have more children to support 
than those in FSVGD households.
Budget Shares of Food Consumption
The measure of total consumption expenditures is extensive and draws on 
responses to several sections of the household survey. In brief, consumption 
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1 This is the notion of working age commonly used by demographers (see, for instance, Shryock 
et al. 1976). Of course the actual working age of individuals depends in part on their standard 
of living and can often be lower, especially for the poor.is measured as the sum of total food consumption and total expenses for non-
food (nondurable and durable) goods. Expenditures on individual consumption 
items were aggregated to construct total expenditures. Quantities of goods 
produced by the household for home consumption and foods received from the 
programs were valued at the average unit market prices of commodities.
	 Table	 4.3	 shows	 the	 shares	 of	 total	 household	 expenditures	 on	 major	
consumption items. The differences between per capita consumption expen-
ditures of households show that FFA households are economically worse off 
than households in the other three programs.
  Overall, the sample households spent 65 percent of their total expendi-
tures on food. Although FSVGD households spend a relatively higher share 
of their budget on food, in absolute terms, rMP households spend relatively 
more on food than households in other programs. Expenditures on fuel rep-
resent the second-highest share of the budget; IGVGD and FSVGD households 
spend 11 percent of their total budget on fuel, and the share is about 1 per-
centage point higher for FFA and rMP households. Overall, medical expenses 
constitute 5 percent of the total budget, clothing and footwear 4 percent.
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Table 4.2  Demography and dependency ratio of survey households
Characteristic  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control  All
Number of household members  
    in the age group
  0–4 years  0.54  0.52  0.46  0.29  0.56  0.48
  5–14 years  1.45  1.21  1.19  1.24  1.04  1.21
  15–60 years  2.39  2.43  2.13  1.86  1.86  2.12
  Over 60 years  0.19  0.16  0.13  0.11  0.12  0.14
Demographic composition (%) 
  0–4 years  10.3  10.8  10.4  7.5  13.8  10.8
  5–14 years  29.0  25.5  27.8  33.6  25.8  28.2
  15–60 years  56.5  59.3  58.6  55.8  56.9  57.4
  Over 60 years  4.2  4.4  3.2  3.0  3.6  3.7
  Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Dependency ratio (%) 
  Child (0–14 years)   96.3  79.8  86.3  101.9  95.4  92.2 
    dependency ratio 
  Aged (more than 60 years)   9.0  7.9  7.5  8.6  9.2  8.5 
    dependency ratio 
  Total dependency ratio  105.3  87.7  93.9  110.5  104.6  100.7
Source:    IFPrI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; rMP—rural Maintenance 
Program.  Table  4.4  shows  the  patterns  of  food  expenditures.  On  average,  rice 
accounts for 48 percent of total expenditures on food for all survey house-
holds. rice is the preferred staple in Bangladesh—where “Have you eaten?” 
directly translates as “Have you taken rice?” A comparison of the patterns of 
food expenditures across programs, however, shows considerable variation 
in expenditures on rice and atta, which follows the patterns of food rations 
received from the programs: FSVGD households received only an atta ration, 
FFA households only a rice ration, and IGVGD households rice, atta, and wheat 
rations before the survey (see Chapter 5).
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Table 4.3  Budget share of selected budget items
  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control  All
Budget item
  Monthly per capita total   824  823  725  862  624  762 
    expenditure (taka) 
  Monthly per capita food   499  528  455  532  396  477 
    expenditure (taka) 
  Monthly per capita nonfood   325  295  270  330  228  286 
    expenditure (taka) 
Budget share of expenditures (%)
  Food  63.0  66.2  65.2  64.0  65.1  64.7
  Fuel  11.3  10.6  12.2  11.6  13.7  12.0
  Clothing and footwear  4.3  4.5  4.4  4.4  4.3  4.4
  Drugs and medicines  6.2  3.9  5.7  4.8  4.5  5.0
  Other medical expenses   0.5  0.3  0.8  0.6  0.6  0.6 
    (fees, lab tests, etc.) 
  Education  1.1  1.1  0.6  1.0  0.7  0.9
  Personal care and hygiene  2.7  2.5  2.5  2.9  2.8  2.7
  Transport  2.6  1.9  1.7  2.3  1.7  2.0
  Communication  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.2
  Entertainment  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
  Furniture and appliances  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.5
  utilities  0.4  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.2
  Family events (birthdays,   1.3  2.3  1.3  2.0  1.3  1.6 
    weddings, funerals, etc.) 
  Tobacco  1.1  1.1  1.0  0.6  1.0  1.0
  Betel leaves and betel nuts  1.5  1.2  1.3  1.7  1.6  1.5
  Pocket money given to   0.9  0.8  0.6  0.8  0.5  0.7 
    children 
  Other  2.2  2.6  2.1  2.3  1.5  2.1
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source:    IFPrI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; rMP—rural Maintenance 
Program.  Table 4.5 presents the quantity of daily per capita food consumption. FFA 
household members consume more rice than households in other programs 
because FFA participants receive their food ration entirely in rice. In con-
trast, FSVGD households consume 14 times more atta than FFA households 
and  7  times  more  atta  than  rMP  households  because  FSVGD  participants 
receive only an atta ration from the program.
  Table 4.6 presents per capita calorie consumption and calorie shares of 
food  items.  FSVGD  households  consume  more  calories  than  households  in 
other programs. For the entire sample, rice accounts for 76 percent of total 
calorie consumption, implying that there is very little diversity in the diet 
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Table 4.4  Food budget share of selected food budget items
  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control  All
Budget item 
  Monthly per capita total   824  823  725  862  624  762 
    expenditure (taka)
  Monthly per capita food   499  528  455  532  396  477 
    expenditure (taka) 
  Monthly per capita nonfood   325  295  270  330  228  286 
    expenditure (taka) 
Budget share of food  
    expenditures (%)
  rice  45.5  42.9  52.4  44.5  52.7  47.9
  Atta (whole-wheat flour)  3.9  5.8  0.7  0.8  0.5  2.2
  Other cereals  0.2  0.8  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.4
  Pulses  2.6  2.3  1.6  2.5  1.7  2.1
  Oils  3.3  3.2  3.0  3.5  3.4  3.3
  Potatoes  3.2  3.7  3.3  3.7  3.6  3.5
  Leafy vegetables  2.1  2.1  3.1  2.7  3.3  2.7
  Other vegetables  6.5  6.6  6.9  7.7  7.5  7.1
  Meats  2.6  4.6  2.6  3.0  1.9  2.9
  Fish  1.0  1.3  0.9  1.0  0.7  1.0
  Eggs  5.8  6.3  6.6  7.1  5.2  6.1
  Milk and milk products  2.2  2.2  1.3  1.9  1.2  1.7
  Fruits  6.9  6.4  6.2  7.5  5.2  6.4
  Spices  5.4  5.0  5.4  5.5  5.7  5.4
  Sugar and gur  1.0  1.4  0.6  1.2  0.7  1.0
  Beverages  2.0  1.8  1.0  1.2  1.1  1.4
  Prepared food (eaten   5.9  3.6  4.1  5.6  5.5  5.0 
    outside home) 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source:    IFPrI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; rMP—rural Maintenance 
Program.of these households. rice accounts for about three-fourths of total calorie 
intakes of rMP households, 73 percent for IGVGD, 69 percent for FSVGD, and 
81 percent for FFA households.
  rice’s share of the food budget, however, is only 48 percent, showing that 
rice is a relatively inexpensive source of energy. Table 4.7 shows that atta is 
the least expensive source of calories, closely followed by rice. Meat is the 
most expensive source of calories, about 29 times as expensive as rice as a 
source of energy.
The Nutritional Status of Children and Women
Within households, some members are at greater nutritional risk than others. 
Various studies have documented that preschool children and women suffer 
from more severe undernutrition than do other household members. Indeed, 
an IFPrI study in Bangladesh assessing the food consumption and nutritional 
effects of targeted food-based programs found that preschoolers are at the 
greatest risk of undernutrition, followed by pregnant and lactating women 
(Ahmed 1993).
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Table 4.5  Quantity of daily per capita consumption of food items
  Quantity consumed (grams per person per day)
Food item  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control  All
rice  401  438  451  436  397  423
Atta (whole-wheat flour)  43  82  6  11  4  28
Other cereals  1  7  3  4  3  3
Oils  9  10  7  10  7  9
Potatoes  34  44  32  41  30  36
Vegetables  143  184  181  200  162  173
Meats  29  10  5  7  3  10
Fish  17  21  17  23  13  18
Eggs  3  4  3  3  2  3
Milk  23  28  16  21  13  20
Pulses  10  10  6  10  5  8
Fruits  118  141  119  142  83  118
Spices  22  25  21  25  19  22
Sugar and gur  4  6  3  6  2  4
Beverages  13  13  6  9  6  9
Prepared foods  68  30  28  47  43  43
Salt  14  17  16  16  15  16
Source:    IFPrI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Notes:    Estimated from food expenditure data. FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food 
Security Vulnerable Group Development; IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group 
Development; rMP—rural Maintenance Program.Table 4.6  Calorie consumption and composition
  Calorie consumption (percentage of total calorie intake)
  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control  All
Per capita calorie intake   2,065  2,348  2,020  2,118  1,801  2,053 
  (kcal) 
Food item
  rice  72.5  69.3  81.1  75.3  80.3  76.0
  Atta (whole-wheat flour)  6.8  10.8  1.1  1.5  0.7  4.0
  Other cereals  0.2  1.0  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5
  Oils  3.9  3.7  3.5  4.3  3.7  3.8
  Potatoes  1.5  1.8  1.5  1.8  1.6  1.6
  Vegetables  3.0  3.3  3.9  4.1  4.0  3.7
  Meats  0.5  0.4  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.3
  Fish  0.7  0.8  0.8  1.0  0.7  0.8
  Eggs  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.2
  Milk  0.7  0.9  0.5  0.7  0.5  0.7
  Pulses  1.7  1.4  0.9  1.7  1.0  1.3
  Fruits  1.6  1.7  1.4  1.9  1.2  1.6
  Spices  1.0  0.9  1.0  1.1  1.0  1.0
  Sugar and gur  0.7  1.0  0.5  1.0  0.5  0.7
  Beverages  0.3  0.3  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2
  Prepared foods  4.7  2.4  2.9  4.4  4.1  3.7
Source:    IFPrI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Notes:    Estimated from food expenditure data. FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food 
Security Vulnerable Group Development; IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group 
Development; rMP—rural Maintenance Program.
Table 4.7  Cost of calories by food groups
  Cost (taka per 1,000 kilocalories)
Food item  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control  All
rice  4.6  4.3  4.5  4.5  4.5  4.5
Atta (whole-wheat flour)  3.9  3.6  4.2  5.0  4.8  4.0
Other cereals  8.4  7.4  7.2  5.8  6.3  6.9
Oils  6.6  6.4  6.7  6.5  6.5  6.5
Potatoes  17.2  15.9  16.4  16.8  16.4  16.5
Vegetables  19.2  16.4  16.7  18.5  17.4  17.6
Meats  112.1  115.8  123.7  111.2  112.5  115.0
Fish  71.4  61.8  65.1  65.7  63.6  65.4
Eggs  42.2  41.2  43.0  40.7  39.4  41.3
Milk  27.4  21.0  22.8  26.3  23.9  24.2
Pulses  13.2  12.5  14.0  13.7  12.9  13.2
Fruits  39.2  30.8  40.4  36.4  37.2  36.7
Spices  49.4  44.1  43.4  47.1  47.1  46.3
Sugar and gur  12.4  12.2  12.1  12.5  12.4  12.3
Beverages  73.3  55.8  61.9  80.4  64.5  66.2
Prepared foods  13.1  14.5  14.4  13.8  14.0  14.0
Source:    IFPrI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Notes:    Estimated from food expenditure data. FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food 
Security Vulnerable Group Development; IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group 
Development; rMP—rural Maintenance Program.  This study assesses the nutritional status of preschool children (aged 6–60 
months) on the basis of anthropometric data for all preschool children in the 
sample households relative to child growth standards devised by the World 
Health Organization (WHO) of the united Nations. The levels of nutritional 
status are expressed as z-score values.
  Table  4.8  reports  z-scores  for  height  for  age,  a  measure  of  stunting; 
weight for age, a measure of whether a child is underweight; and weight for 
height, a measure of wasting. Weight for height is a short-term measure (low 
weight for one’s height indicates acute undernutrition), whereas height for 
age shows the long-term nutritional status of children (low height for one’s 
age indicates chronic undernutrition). Low weight for age (indicating under-
weight) can be viewed as a medium-term indicator that reflects both acute 
and chronic undernutrition. The results show no remarkable difference in 
the nutritional status of preschoolers between the programs. For the entire 
sample of preschool children, 54 percent are stunted, 50 percent are under-
weight, and 20 percent are wasted. At the national level, about 48 percent of 
children under age 5 years are underweight in Bangladesh—one of the highest 
rates of underweight children in the world. For example, the underweight 
rate in Sub-Saharan Africa is around 30 percent.
  Table  4.9  shows  the  nutritional  status  of  women  of  childbearing  age 
(15–49 years), the other high-risk group, from the program and control house-
holds. Body mass index (BMI) is used as the nutritional status indicator for this 
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Table 4.8  Prevalence of malnutrition among preschool children aged  
6–60 months
Program   Number 
participation   of  Average  Percent  Average  Percent  Average  Percent 
of household  children  HAZ  HAZ < 2  WAZ  WAZ < 2  WHZ  WHZ < 2
IGVD  132  –2.10  56.5  –1.83  45.5  –0.89  18.3
FSVGD  131  –1.92  53.9  –2.01  55.0  –1.11  23.0
FFA  129  –1.95  54.4  –1.88  50.4  –1.04  15.7
rMP  71  –2.11  58.0  –2.08  53.5  –1.10  14.1
Control  201  –1.97  50.8  –2.09  48.8  –1.24  25.1
  All  664  –2.00  54.0  –1.98  50.2  –1.09  20.3
Source:    IFPrI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Notes:    HAZ—height-for-age z-score; WAZ—weight-for-age z-score; WHZ—weight-for-height 
z-score. The child growth standards developed by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
were used in calculating z-scores. FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security 
Vulnerable Group Development; IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Develop-
ment; rMP—rural Maintenance Program.group.2 A BMI of 18.5 is considered normal for adults (James, Ferro-Luzzi, and 
Waterlow 1988). The results show that program women have somewhat bet-
ter nutritional status than do those in the control group. Based on appropriate 
analysis, however, the results of program impacts on the nutritional status of 
women and children are presented in Chapter 6.
Incidence of Illness and Disability
Table 4.10 shows the incidence of illness for age groups of all household 
members within 30 days prior to the household survey.
  Given that diarrhea is an important cause of child morbidity, its incidence 
among children is an important indicator of health outcomes. The incidence 
of diarrhea among all children in the sample aged 5 and under is about 12 
percent. Children from IGVGD households had the lowest incidence of diar-
rhea (9.9 percent), and those belonging to rMP households had the highest 
incidence (14 percent). A similar pattern (to a much lesser extent) also holds 
for children aged 6–10.
  The overall incidence of illness is very high among children aged 5 and 
under; 63 percent of all children in this age group suffered from some illness 
or	injury	within	30	days	of	the	survey.	After	under-5	children,	the	next-highest 
incidence of illness is observed among elderly people aged 60 and over. Among 
the types of illness reported, the prevalence of prolonged fever is the high-
est, followed by persistent cough, across the age groups.
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Table 4.9  Body mass index (BMI) of women of childbearing age,  
15–49 years old
Program participation   Number    Percent below 
of household  of women  Average BMI  18.5 BMI
IGVGD  321  19.51  39.9
FSVGD  329  19.33  41.9
FFA  315  19.20  43.2
rMP  335  19.20  41.2
Control  410  18.94  45.9
  All  1,710  19.22  42.6
Source:    IFPrI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; rMP—rural Maintenance 
Program.
2 BMI is defined as weight (in kilograms)/height (in meters)2. Pregnant women are excluded from 
BMI calculations because weight gained during pregnancy could bias the results.Table 4.10  Incidence of illness of household members during the  
30 days preceding the survey
  Percentage of household members in each age group
Age group  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control  All
0–5 years
		Any	illness	or	injury	in		 64.4	 66.1	 56.5	 65.8	 61.4	 62.6 
    the last four weeks 
  Prolonged fever  56.0  54.3  45.9  57.9  47.5  51.6
  Diarrhea  9.9  12.4  12.4  14.0  12.7  12.2
  Persistent cough  31.4  31.7  24.7  28.9  27.0  28.7
  Skin disease  4.7  4.3  3.5  4.4  6.6  4.9
  Throat infection  2.6  1.1  0.6  0.9  1.2  1.3
6–10 years
		Any	illness	or	injury	in		 41.6	 41.5	 38.2	 46.6	 43.8	 42.4 
    the last four weeks 
  Prolonged fever  35.4  31.3  32.1  42.0  39.3  36.2
  Diarrhea  1.9  2.1  5.7  5.9  4.1  3.9
  Persistent cough  15.2  15.4  10.8  17.4  18.2  15.5
  Skin disease  1.6  3.1  1.9  3.7  3.7  2.8
  Throat infection  2.3  1.0  0.5  0.9  0.4  1.1
11–17 years
		Any	illness	or	injury	in		 31.8	 33.2	 31.1	 40.2	 38.5	 34.8	 
    the last four weeks 
  Prolonged fever  26.2  26.9  21.1  33.9  30.8  27.8
  Diarrhea  1.4  5.8  3.7  2.9  1.6  3.1
  Persistent cough  10.7  12.6  10.6  14.4  15.4  12.7
  Skin disease  2.8  0.9  1.9  2.3  1.1  1.8
  Throat infection  0.9  0.4  1.2  3.4  0.0  1.2
18–59 years
		Any	illness	or	injury	in		 48.2	 42.6	 39.2	 45.0	 48.6	 44.9 
    the last four weeks 
  Prolonged fever  35.5  29.3  25.5  36.3  35.4  32.4
  Diarrhea  4.5  5.9  3.5  4.5  6.7  5.1
  Persistent cough  15.1  13.9  10.6  14.4  14.3  13.7
  Skin disease  3.5  1.3  2.4  1.2  2.2  2.2
  Throat infection  1.6  1.6  2.3  1.2  2.2  1.8
60 years and over
		Any	illness	or	injury	in	 60.3	 40.3	 48.1	 43.6	 46.8	 48.5	 
    the last four weeks 
  Prolonged fever  32.1  16.1  28.8  32.7  29.0  27.8
  Diarrhea  7.7  1.6  1.9  3.6  6.5  4.5
  Persistent cough  21.8  9.7  17.3  14.5  17.7  16.5
  Skin disease  2.6  1.6  3.8  3.6  3.2  2.9
  Throat infection  1.3  1.6  0.0  0.0  3.2  1.3
Source:    IFPrI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; rMP—rural Maintenance 
Program.
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bers. Among the four programs, the members of IGVGD and rMP households have 
relatively higher incidence of paralysis and missing or deformed limbs.
Types of Primary School Attended by Children
Primary schools in rural Bangladesh include government schools, registered non-
government schools, nonregistered nongovernment schools, Primary Training Insti-
tute schools, community schools, high school–attached primary schools, madrassas 
(Islamic education schools), kindergartens, nonformal schools run by BrAC and 
other NGOs, and the recently introduced Ananda schools (Ahmed 2006).
  Table 4.12 shows the percentage of all primary school students from pro-
gram and control groups of households attending different types of primary 
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Table 4.11  Physical disabilities of household members
  Percentage of household members
Type of disability  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control  All
Blindness in one or both eyes  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.3  1.0  0.8
Missing or deformed limb  3.3  1.9  1.9  2.5  3.1  2.5
Paralysis or body part that  2.5  1.0  1.4  2.7  2.2  1.8  
  has lost its sense of touch 
Source:    IFPrI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; rMP—rural Maintenance 
Program.
Table 4.12  Types of primary schools attended
  Percentage of household members attending
Type of school  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control  Total
Government school  60.6  64.6  58.6  62.8  69.5  63.4
Nongovernment registered school  16.1  11.7  13.6  7.3  14.8  12.8
NGO-run school  12.0  15.2  16.2  15.1  9.1  13.4
Madrassa  7.6  8.5  9.6  11.9  4.1  8.2
Ananda school  3.6  0.0  2.0  2.8  2.5  2.2
Source:    IFPrI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; rMP—rural Maintenance 
Program.schools. About 63 percent of all students go to government schools. More 
children from FFA households (16 percent) attend NGO-run schools than do 
those from other households. Among the four programs, a relatively higher 
percentage of children from rMP households attend madrassas.
Ownership of Household Assets
Table 4.13 presents the ownership status of some selected assets. There is 
considerable variation in asset-holding across the programs. FFA households 
have  the  lowest  level  of assets  among  the  four programs.  Among  various 
assets, ownership of tubewells is most prevalent, at 30 percent, followed by 
fishing nets, at 18 percent.
Dwelling Characteristics
Table 4.14 provides information on the types of dwellings of program and 
control households. In the entire sample, only 8 percent of households have 
electricity. This rate ranges from 5 percent for FFA households to 15 percent 
for IGVGD households.
  Because outer walls and the roof form the main part of each dwelling, 
information on these is provided in the table. Permanent walls are those 
made of tin, brick, and cement. Nonpermanent materials include bamboo, 
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Table 4.13  Selected household asset ownership
  Percentage of households
Asset  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control  Total
Electric fan  7.0  4.0  1.0  1.3  0.8  2.7
radio  7.3  8.3  5.3  5.7  3.3  5.8
Cassette player  5.7  4.0  0.7  4.0  0.8  2.9
Television  4.0  4.7  0.0  1.0  0.5  1.9
Sewing machine  3.0  2.3  0.7  1.0  0.8  1.5
Bicycle  10.3  18.0  5.3  5.7  3.0  8.1
rickshaw/van  9.7  9.0  10.3  6.7  5.5  8.1
Bullock cart  0.7  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2
Boat  2.0  0.0  1.7  1.7  0.5  1.1
Mobile phone  1.3  1.3  0.3  0.3  0.0  0.6
Tubewell  24.7  45.0  36.3  28.0  20.8  30.3
Fishing net  26.3  20.7  18.7  12.3  13.0  17.9
Source:    IFPrI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; rMP—rural Maintenance 
Program.mud,	jute	sticks,	and	thatch.	Whereas	38	percent	of	IGVGD	and	36	percent	
of rMP dwellings are made of permanent materials, only 14 percent of FFA 
and 10 percent of FSVGD dwellings are built of permanent materials. The vast 
majority	of	all	households	have	tin	as	their	roofing	material.
  Table  4.15  provides  information  on  types  of  latrines.  About  one-third 
of  all  households  have  unsealed  and  22  percent  have  kutcha  (nonperma-
nent) latrines. Among the programs, 45 percent of FFA households have no 
latrine.
Labor Force Participation
Table 4.16 presents the labor force participation rates and employment sta-
tus of household members aged 15 and over. By definition, the labor force 
consists of everyone above the age of 15 who is employed or unemployed but 
actively seeking employment. People not counted in the labor force include 
students, housewives, retired people, disabled people, and discouraged work-
ers who are not seeking work.
  For all household members aged 15 and over, the labor force participa-
tion rates range from 56 percent for FSVGD households to 74 percent for rMP 
households. There are large differences in labor force participation rates, 
however, between males and females for IGVGD and FSVGD households. For 
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Table 4.14  Presence of electricity and structure of dwelling
  Percentage of households
Characteristic  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control  All
Household has electricity  15.3  8.7  5.0  7.0  5.5  8.1
Structure of wallsa
  Permanent  38.0  10.3  13.7  36.0  16.3  22.4
  Nonpermanent  62.0  89.7  86.3  64.0  83.8  77.6
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
roofing material
  Tin  91.7  84.7  76.0  87.0  81.0  83.9
  Thatching (straw, grass,   7.0  15.3  24.0  11.7  18.5  15.5 
    plastic, etc.) 
  Concrete or tiles  1.3  0.0  0.0  1.3  0.5  0.6
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source:    IFPrI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; rMP—rural Maintenance 
Program.
aPermanent materials are fired bricks, concrete, wood, and tin sheets.56  CHAPTEr 4
Table 4.15  Types of latrine
  Percentage of households
Type of latrine  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control  All
Kutcha (nonpermanent)  20.0  20.0  22.7  24.3  21.3  21.6
Pucca (permanent,   40.3  43.3  22.7  38.7  26.8  33.9 
  unsealed) 
Sanitary without flush   21.0  9.0  9.0  17.0  12.5  13.6 
  (water sealed) 
Sanitary with flush   0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1 
  (water sealed) 
Other  0.0  0.3  0.3  0.0  0.3  0.2
No private latrine  18.7  27.0  45.3  20.0  39.3  30.6
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source:    IFPrI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; rMP—rural Maintenance 
Program.
IGVGD households, 84 percent of men and only 36 percent of women are in 
the labor force. In contrast, for the public works programs (FFA and rMP), 
the gender gap in labor force participation is quite small owing to women’s 
participation in these programs. For rMP households, the rates are 82 percent 
for men and 71 percent for women.
  rates of unemployment (calculated to include those reporting they were 
unemployed and looking for work, divided by the labor force) are quite low in 
general, and lower for women in particular. For example, the unemployment 
rates for IGVGD households are 6 percent for men and 3 percent for women. 
In the rMP program, the rates are 5 percent for men and only 0.7 percent for 
women. The low unemployment rates indicate that the poor cannot afford to 
remain unemployed.
  Wage labor (agricultural and nonagricultural) is the most important cat-
egory of employment, followed by nonagricultural self-employment.
Participation in Public Intervention Programs
Besides the four case study programs, Bangladesh has several other public 
assistance programs, as described in Chapter 1. Table 4.17 shows the inci-
dence of participation of survey households in these public assistance pro-
grams over one year preceding the time of the survey. More than one-fifth of 
all households receive benefits from the PES program, which provides cash 
assistance to poor families who send their children to primary school. About 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PrOFILE OF SurVEy HOuSEHOLDS  57   other three programs received food assistance from the VGF program, which 
is designed as a mechanism for mitigating the consequences of disasters, such 
as floods, cyclones, and other natural calamities.
Private Transfers and Remittances
Table 4.18 shows that only about 6 percent of all survey households received 
private assistance from within Bangladesh. About 7 percent of IGVGD and 
FSVGD households, 6 percent of FFA households, and only 4 percent of rMP 
households received private transfers in the year prior to the survey.
  Among  the  programs,  only  0.7  percent  of  IGVGD  households  received 
remittances from abroad. FSVGD, FFA, and rMP households did not receive 
any remittances from abroad in the year prior to the survey.
Access to Credit
Table 4.19 presents information on average loan size and sources of loans. 
The average loan size is largest for IGVGD households, followed by FSVGD 
households. IGVGD households’ loans are about 3 times larger than those of 
FFA households and 81 percent larger than those of rMP households.
  NGOs are the primary source of credit for program households. For IGVGD 
households, microcredit from NGOs accounted for 78 percent of the total 
amount borrowed. The corresponding figures are 52 percent for IGVGD, 41 
percent for FFA, and 48 percent for rMP households. Among the four pro-
grams, only IGVGD has a built-in provision for microcredit.
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Table 4.17  Households receiving public assistance
  Percentage of households
Form of assistance  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control  All
Primary Education Stipend  24.7  25.0  21.0  21.0  20.3  22.3
Stipend for secondary school   5.3  6.3  3.0  2.0  3.5  4.0 
  girls 
Gratuitous relief  2.7  7.7  13.0  5.7  8.8  7.6
Test relief  4.0  0.7  4.3  3.7  8.0  4.4
Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF)  13.3  13.0  26.0  13.7  24.0  18.4
Allowance for widows and   2.0  1.0  2.7  3.7  1.0  2.0 
  elderly people 
Ananda school allowance  1.7  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.5  0.5
Source:    IFPrI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; rMP—rural Maintenance 
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Table 4.18  Private transfers and remittances received
Transfer/remittance  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control  All
Average remittance   977  440  215  208  286  417 
  (taka per household year) 
Transfers from inside Bangladesh   7.0  6.7  6.0  4.3  6.3  6.1 
  (percentage of households) 
remittance from abroad   0.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.3 
  (percentage of households) 
Source:    IFPrI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; rMP—rural Maintenance 
Program.
Table 4.19  Loan size and sources of loans
Loan size/source  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control  All
Average loan size (taka/household)  5,175  4,129  1,621  2,864  1,804  3,036
Percentage of households that have  64.7  49.3  34.7  50.7  36.8  46.6 
    an outstanding loan amount 
Source of loan (percentage of  
    all loans)
  NGO  77.6  52.0  40.5  48.0  40.2  53.9
  Bank or other financial institution  4.8  19.9  19.7  11.6  15.1  13.3
  relative, friend, or neighbor  5.4  14.3  16.1  16.6  21.0  14.0
  Moneylender  7.3  3.3  8.4  5.5  13.3  7.5
  Shop, dealer, or trader  2.8  5.0  9.5  13.7  8.1  7.5
  Credit or savings group (other   1.9  3.3  5.8  2.0  1.6  2.7 
    than an NGO) 
  Other  0.3  2.3  0.0  2.6  0.7  1.2
  Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source:    IFPrI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; rMP—rural Maintenance 
Program.
  Table 4.20 shows the patterns of loan use by survey households. It is 
important to note that information elicited from lenders on the purpose of 
loans can be misleading because financial resources are generally fungible 
and it is difficult to trace the activity financed by the loan. This fungibility 
problem is somewhat reduced when information is elicited directly from bor-
rowers (as opposed to lenders), as was done in the survey. Of course, some level of misreporting will nonetheless exist, and this should be borne in mind 
when interpreting the results.
  IGVGD households used a relatively greater proportion of loans to finance 
productive activities, whereas a larger percentage of loans taken by FSVGD, 
FFA, and rMP households went toward financing consumption expenditures.
  Among all sources of loans, commercial banks charged the lowest rates of 
interest (12 percent, on average), closely followed by NGOs (14 percent). In 
contrast, village moneylenders charged 122 percent interest (Table 4.21).
Patterns of Savings
Table 4.22 provides information on savings. Although all program households 
had some savings, 71 percent of control households had no savings at all. 
Mandatory saving requirements of all four programs explain this difference. 
Among the four programs, rMP households had the largest amount of savings 
owing  to  the  program’s  significantly  higher  savings  requirement:  monthly 
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Table 4.20  Use of loans
Loan size/use  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control  All
Average loan size (taka/household)  5,175  4,129  1,621  2,864  1,804  3,036
Productive use (percentage of  
    all loans)
  Business enterprise  13.8  6.5  5.1  7.0  4.0  7.8
  Agricultural enterprise  4.4  11.9  3.8  5.6  2.0  5.6
  Purchase of productive assets  14.0  11.8  14.4  6.1  4.6  10.2
  rental/leasing-in of land  2.9  1.2  1.1  4.9  2.4  2.6
  Purchase of cow or goat  5.2  4.4  5.4  4.3  3.7  4.6
  Lending at higher interest  2.3  0.7  0.9  1.6  2.0  1.6
Consumption use (percentage of  
    all loans)
  Food  9.1  11.5  20.2  23.2  25.2  17.2
  Medical treatment  7.6  14.3  14.6  9.7  18.3  12.4
  Improvement of housing  17.3  9.5  5.7  12.3  10.0  11.7
  Marriage expenses  3.7  4.1  1.9  4.7  3.3  3.6
  Dowry  0.5  6.0  2.1  4.8  4.1  3.4
Other use (percentage of all loans)
  repayment of another loan  12.4  9.4  15.9  8.2  14.3  11.8
  Other  6.9  8.7  8.7  7.7  6.3  7.5
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source:    IFPrI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; rMP—rural Maintenance 
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Table 4.21  Interest rates by loan source
  Interest rate (percent per year)
Loan source  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control  All
NGO  14.2  13.8  13.5  14.6  13.8  14.1
Bank or other financial  
  institution  12.1  12  12.7  10.8  12.3  12.0
relative, friend, or  
  neighbor  79.4  108  93.6  84.3  97.7  93.6
Moneylender  100.6  99.4  138  105.3  148.3  122.2
Source:    IFPrI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; rMP—rural Maintenance 
Program.
Table 4.22  Incidence of savings
Savings indicator  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control  All
Average savings amount (taka  1,992  1,556  844  7,630  346  2,341  
    per household) 
Percentage of households with  99.7  99.7  99.7  100.0  28.8  81.2 
    any savings 
Place of saving (percentage  
    of total savings amount)
  Program savings  64.3  69.4  79.7  80.1  n.a.  66.8
  At home  0.9  2.1  2.2  0.2  3.9  1.6
  NGO (other than program   29.9  19.6  12.8  10.9  70.4  23.0 
    savings) 
  Savings group (other than NGO)  1.8  2.7  0.3  1.6  12.7  2.6
  Bank or post office  1.4  4.5  3.0  2.7  7.8  3.3
  Other  1.7  1.8  1.9  4.5  5.1  2.7
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source:    IFPrI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; rMP—rural Maintenance 
Program.
savings requirements are Tk 300 for rMP participants, Tk 32 for IGVGD and 
FSVGD participants, and Tk 25 for FFA participants.
  Table 4.23 shows survey respondents’ planned use of savings. Households 
across the programs reported that they would use their savings mainly to 
finance productive activities.Table 4.23  Planned use of savings
Use of savings  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control  All
Average savings amount (taka per   1,992  1,556  844  7,630  346  2,341 
    household) 
Planned use of savings (percentage  
    of total savings amount)
  To buy productive assets  48.8  57.5  64.0  28.2  42.1  49.2
  To start or help a business  10.2  6.3  3.6  15.0  1.8  8.1
  To buy land/house  5.0  3.4  7.7  22.0  6.0  9.1
  To build or repair a house  2.9  2.8  2.5  1.8  3.0  2.6
  For marriage or dowry expenses  8.8  6.8  6.3  11.2  15.6  8.9
  To get a loan  3.3  1.0  0.2  0.5  2.9  1.4
  To prepare for difficult times  6.5  4.9  4.6  5.6  10.8  5.9
  For the future of children  6.5  7.6  5.0  7.4  11.7  7.1
  Don’t know or no specific reason  1.7  3.7  3.0  0.2  4.3  2.4
  Other  6.3  6.0  3.1  8.1  1.9  5.5
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source:    IFPrI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; rMP—rural Maintenance 
Program.
Table 4.24  Incidence of shocks in the past five years
  Percentage of households
Shock  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control  All
Death of main earner  8.3  6.7  5.0  12.7  9.5  8.3
Death of other family member  4.7  2.7  6.0  3.7  3.3  4.7
Serious	injury	or	illness	that		 32.3	 23.0	 22.0	 21.7	 25.8	 32.3 
  kept a household member  
  from performing normal  
  activities 
Divorce or abandonment by   2.0  2.0  2.7  14.7  9.0  2.0 
  husband 
Major	loss	of	crops	 6.3	 2.7	 3.0	 2.0	 1.3	 6.3
Loss of livestock due to death,   6.7  7.7  9.0  5.0  3.8  6.7 
  theft, etc. 
Loss of assets or money due   3.0  0.7  1.3  0.7  0.8  3.0 
  to theft 
Loss of assets due to fire  0.7  1.7  2.3  2.0  1.8  0.7
Loss of assets due to flood  10.3  5.0  4.0  6.7  7.3  10.3
Loss of assets due to a natural   13.3  8.0  11.3  15.7  13.0  13.3 
  disaster other than a flood 
Paid a large amount as dowry   6.7  10.0  10.3  8.3  5.8  6.7 
  for daughter’s marriage 
Source:    IFPrI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; rMP—rural Maintenance 
Program.Shocks and Coping Mechanism
Table 4.24 shows the proportion of households affected by various types of 
shocks	in	the	five	years	prior	to	the	survey.	Severe	illness	or	injuries	were	the	
most common cause of crisis, affecting about one-third of all households on 
average. The most severe shock, death of the main earner of the family, was 
experienced by 13 percent of rMP households—the highest percentage among 
the four program households.
  Table 4.25 shows the measures taken by the affected households to cope 
with	relatively	severe	shocks:	the	death	of	the	main	earner,	serious	injury	
or illness, and severe floods and other natural disasters. The most common 
coping measure was to take help from others. A sizable proportion of rMP and 
IGVGD households reported that they ate less food or lower quality of food to 
reduce expenses.
PrOFILE OF SurVEy HOuSEHOLDS  63   
Table 4.25  Coping mechanisms (multiple responses)
  Percentage of cases
Coping mechanism  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control  All
Did nothing  11.4  12.5  14.2  13.5  10.4  12.1
Sold land  2.1  4.7  2.4  0.6  2.7  2.4
Mortgaged or leased out land  1.0  1.6  0.0  0.0  1.8  1.0
Sold productive assets  7.8  17.2  6.3  4.1  6.8  8.0
Sold consumption assets  1.0  0.8  5.5  2.4  2.3  2.3
Mortgaged assets  0.5  0.8  0.8  0.0  0.5  0.5
Took loan at a high interest rate  18.1  21.9  13.4  10.6  10.8  14.5
Took a loan from an NGO or  19.6  17.2  17.3  24.7  21.7  20.5  
  other financial institutions 
Ate less or lower-quality food   21.2  5.5  9.4  22.9  18.9  16.8 
  to reduce expenses 
Took children out of school  0.5  3.1  0.0  2.4  0.9  1.3
Was forced to change occupation  8.8  4.7  7.9  15.9  11.3  10.1
Moved to less expensive housing  1.0  0.0  1.6  1.8  0.9  1.1
Sent a nonworking household   5.7  7.0  2.4  4.1  4.5  4.8 
  member to work 
Took help from others  37.8  25.0  40.2  32.4  47.3  37.6
received government   1.6  0.8  4.7  0.6  1.8  1.8 
  compensation 
Total (exceeds 100 because of   145.1  131.3  134.6  145.9  146.4  141.9 
  multiple responses) 
Number of cases  193  128  127  170  222  840
Source:    IFPrI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Notes:    The coping mechanisms described are those used to deal with the death of the main 
earner,	serious	injury	or	illness,	or	floods	and	other	natural	disasters.	FFA—Food	for	
Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; IGVGD—Income-
Generating Vulnerable Group Development; rMP—rural Maintenance Program.CHAPTER 5
Transfer Delivery, Beneficiary Preferences and 
Training, and Accuracy of Targeting
I
n this chapter, first we evaluate the operational performance of transfer 
delivery to program participants. Second, we look at beneficiary prefer-
ences regarding the form of transfer payments. Third, we examine ben-
eficiary participation in the training component of the programs. Finally, we 
assess the targeting performance of the programs. We use information from 
both the household survey and qualitative field research.
Delivery of Transfers
Chapter 2 provides information on food and/or cash transfer entitlements 
and savings requirements for the beneficiaries of each of the four case study 
programs: IGVGD, FSVGD, FFA, and RMP.
  The household survey data show that all participants in the programs knew 
their entitlements. This knowledge did not, however, always ensure receipt of 
the full entitlement of transfer. Participants were asked how much food and/
or cash they received each month of the 12 months prior to the survey.
  The FFA participants had been in the program for 6 months at the time 
of the household survey.1 However, the length of program participation had 
been 18 months for IGVGD and FSVGD and 25 months for RMP households. 
Therefore, for comparability of receipts across the four programs we esti-
mated the average value of transfers received (as reported by participants) 
over the six-month period prior to the survey.2 Table 5.1 presents the results. 
FFA and RMP provided substantially larger transfers than either IGVGD or 
FSVGD. The average monthly FFA transfer (Tk 837) was 106 percent higher 
than that of IGVGD (Tk 407) and 107 percent higher than that of FSVGD (Tk 
404). The average FFA transfer was also 21 percent higher than the RMP 
transfer per beneficiary (Tk 694). The composition of transfers for IGVGD par- 
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1 FFA respondents had just completed the work activities and started attending training when 
the household survey was carried out in June–August 2006.
2 Food transfers are valued at market prices obtained from the household survey.ticipants is as follows: rice, 61 percent; fortified atta, 35 percent; and wheat, 
4 percent. For FSVGD participants, fortified atta accounted for 50 percent of 
the total value of the transfer, cash for 48 percent, and wheat for 3 percent. 
FFA participants received 68 percent of the total value of the transfer in rice 
and 32 percent in cash. RMP participants received all transfers in cash.
  Figure 5.1 shows average monthly transfers as percentages of the total 
monthly household expenditures of participating households. For FFA par-
ticipants, transfers accounted for as much as 38 percent of total household 
expenditures.
  There are differences across programs in the type of food households 
receive. Food transfers for FFA were solely in rice, as was about 60 percent 
of the food transfer under IGVGD. In contrast, under FSVGD virtually all 
food transfers (93 percent) were in the form of micronutrient-fortified atta 
(Table 5.2).
  Table  5.3  reports  the  levels  of  monthly  transfers  each  beneficiary 
received over the six-month period prior to the survey. Except for the month 
immediately preceding the survey, IGVGD participants received fairly uniform 
amounts of food rations each month. Survey data reveal that in the month 
preceding the survey, about 15 percent of the IGVGD beneficiaries did not 
receive their rations owing to delays in the delivery process and that they 
were expecting to receive the rations a few days after the interview. For 
FSVGD beneficiaries, however, the fluctuation in the amount of food rations 
received was mainly due to irregularities in the atta milling and fortification 
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Table 5.1  Monthly average value of transfers received over the six 
months prior to the survey
Transfer value/composition/number  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP
Value of transfer per beneficiary (taka/month)  407  404  837  694
Composition of transfers per beneficiary  
    (taka/month)
  Wheat  18  12  0  0
  Pusti atta (nutrient-fortified whole-wheat flour)  141  200  0  0
  Rice  249  0  572  0
  Cash  0  192  265  694
  Total  407  404  837  694
Households that received any transfers in the   100.0  100.0  100.0  93.2 
    6 months prior to the survey (%) 
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.process, as the qualitative research indicates. For instance, many FSVGD ben-
eficiaries did not receive any atta ration for some months but received two or 
three months’ rations for the next month or two after that. The main reasons 
for the variation in cash transfers to FSVGD participants were (1) delays in 
the release of funds from donors to Gob, (2) irregular flows of funds from the 
bangladesh bank (the central bank) to local commercial bank branches owing 
to administrative difficulties, and (3) disruptions in payment disbursements 
because the FSVGD program was in its last phase in 2006.
















Figure 5.1  Transfers as percentages of total household expenditures
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food 
and Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.
Table 5.2  Average quantity of food rations received monthly
Food item (kilograms/month/beneficiary)  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA
Wheat  1.48  0.99  0.00
Pusti atta (nutrient-fortified whole-wheat flour)  8.82  12.48  0.00
Rice  15.53  0.00  35.75
Total (wheat, pusti atta, and rice)  25.83  13.48  35.75
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TRAnSFER DElIVERy, bEnEFICIARy PREFEREnCES AnD TRAInInG, AnD TARGETInG  67     The story is quite different for the FFA program. At the time of the sur-
vey, FFA participants had just completed the works phase of the program 
and started attending training sessions. In their first two months of program 
participation (month 6 and month 5 in Table 5.3), the levels of payment 
were  extremely  low,  mainly  for  the  following  reasons.  Although  the  FFA 
cycle normally lasts two years, the FFA survey sample of participants was 
from a special one-year cycle.3 There are usually few project activities in 
the first month of a new cycle mainly owing to delays in the approval of 
works projects by the upazila local Government and Engineering Department 
office. The levels of FFA workers’ payments depend on how long it takes to 
complete a works project and on the amount of work (mostly work moving 
earth) undertaken by individual workers. FFA participants receive half the 
value of their wage in food and half in cash. After a project starts, workers 
receive periodic payments in food on a piece-rate basis. Once the project 
is completed, the total payment in food is calculated. The outstanding cash 
part of the wage is then paid to workers. As a result, the cash payments are 
generally delayed.
  Further, in the case of RMP, the primary reason for fluctuations in pay-
ment levels is that the program was in transition at the time of the household 
survey, which caused major disruptions in payments in the reference period. 
In June 2006 the operation of the program was shifted from CARE to the Min-
istry of local Government, Rural Development, and Cooperatives (lGRDC). 
During the period when the program was being phased out from CARE, an 
audit of accounts was in progress and payments to program participants were 
often withheld. Recent information suggests that disbursements of outstand-
ing payments from the CARE era were being made even in April 2007—10 
months after the program was handed over to lGRDC.
  Table 5.4 shows the timeliness of transfers. IGVGD recipients received 
food transfers on a monthly basis; 99 percent of them received five to six 
transfers over the six-month period prior to the survey. Although food trans-
fers under FSVGD were less regular than those under IGVGD, 78 percent of 
FSVGD participants received four to six food transfers in six months. In con-
trast, cash payments were received less frequently, for the reasons already 
explained. Virtually all FSVGD beneficiaries (99.3 percent) and 52 percent of 
FFA beneficiaries received one to three cash transfers in six months. In the 
case of RMP, 75 percent of participants received only one or two payments in 
68  CHAPTER 5
3 The last two-year cycle of FFA before the survey ended in 2005. In order to fit in the 
2001–06 WFP Country Program, a special one-year FFA cycle from January to December 2006 
was implemented.six months. Indeed, 9.7 percent of FFA and 6.8 percent of RMP beneficiaries 
received no payments in the six months prior to the household survey.
Beneficiary Preferences for the Forms of Transfer Payments
beneficiary preferences for cash or food are context-specific and hence dif-
ficult to generalize (Gentilini 2007). The household survey asked program 
beneficiaries whether they preferred only food, only cash, or a combination 
of food and cash.
  Figure 5.2 shows the preference patterns of beneficiaries of the four pro-
grams. Most participants express a preference for the transfer type provided 
by the program in which they are participating: 72 percent of IGVGD partici-
pants prefer only food, 57 percent of RMP participants prefer only cash, and 
75 percent of FFA and 48 percent of FSVGD participants prefer a combination 
of food and cash.
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Table 5.4  Transfers received over the six months 
prior to the survey
Type of transfer/ 
number of times  
transfers were  
received  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP
Food
  0  0.0  0.0  0.0  —
  1  0.0  0.0  0.0  —
  2  0.0  2.0  3.0  —
  3  0.0  19.7  43.7  —
  4  0.7  37.0  33.3  —
  5  15.0  40.0  16.0  —
  6  84.3  1.3  4.0  —
Cash
  0  —  0.0  9.7  6.8
  1  —  23.3  0.3  42.9
  2  —  47.3  3.0  32.1
  3  —  29.0  49.0  7.1
  4  —  0.3  28.0  5.0
  5  —  0.0  10.0  6.1
  6  —  0.0  0.0  0.0
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in bangladesh for the study 
“Relative Efficacy of Food and Cash Transfers.”
note:    — denotes not applicable. FFA—Food for Asset Creation; 
FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; 
RMP—Rural Maintenance Program.
Percentage of program participants  
who received transfers  besides current participants, the household survey included former pro-
gram beneficiaries from completed program cycles. We asked former benefi-
ciaries about their preferences; the patterns of their preferences are quite 
similar to those of the current beneficiaries (Figure 5.3).
  Does the level of income of a beneficiary household influence the ben-
eficiary’s preference for food or cash? To answer this question in a scientific 
way, we used econometric methods to isolate the effect of the income levels 
of beneficiaries on their preferences from program participation and from 
other factors that may affect preferences. The use of program participation 
variables in the models separates the effect on preferences of income from 
all attributes  of program participation,  including  beneficiaries’  adherence 
to the types of transfer received, variations in the size of transfers, and 
irregularities and nonreceipt of transfers in cash and food. We used per capita 
total household expenditure as a proxy for income. Although most program 
participants in the household survey sample are poor, there are variations in 
their incomes, as shown later in this chapter.
























Figure 5.2  Preferences of beneficiaries for the forms of transfer 
payments
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food 
and Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.Specification of an Empirical Model
The equation for estimating beneficiary preferences is
  K
  Di
P = a1Y i + a2Pi + SbkXk,i + ln + ui,  (1)
  k=1
where Di
P represents the preference of a program participant, i. For example, 
Di
P equals one if a participant prefers “only food,” zero otherwise. Y i repre-
sents the total monthly per capita expenditure of the participant’s house-
  K
hold; Pi depicts program participation; SbkXk,i, is a set of control variables
  k=1
denoted by X and indexed by k = 1, . . . , K. b is a K × 1 vector of parameters;
ln represents location fixed effects; and ui is a participant-specific error term 
representing unobserved determinants of preference.
  The parameters of interest are a1 and a2; a1 denotes the level of house-
hold income of the participant, and a2 represents the program of which the 






























Figure 5.3  Preferences of former beneficiaries for the forms of transfer 
payments
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food 
and Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.person is a beneficiary. The vector of additional control variables includes the 
participant’s household size; dependency ratio; age; whether the participant is 
illiterate; whether the participant is widowed, divorced, or separated from her 
husband; the total land owned; the time required to go to the nearest bank; the 
time necessary to go to the local market or haat; the quantity of rice purchased 
last time; the price of the rice; and a set of location (union) dummy variables 
to control for union-level unobservable characteristics. Equation (1) is estimated 
using a probit regression.
  Two sets of equations are estimated, one with program participation dum-
mies, the other without. Each set has three equations, indicating that the par-
ticipant prefers “only food,” “only cash,” or “a combination of food and cash.”
Results
Table 5.5 presents the results of the estimated probit regressions for benefi-
ciary preferences. The results suggest that as income increases, beneficiary 
preferences for food decline, indicating that the poorest households prefer 
only food as the transfer. Conversely, relatively better-off beneficiaries tend 
to prefer only cash. These results are statistically significant. beneficiary 
preferences for a combination of food and cash transfer, however, are unre-
lated to household income.
  The food recipients appreciate being assured of food provided by the pro-
grams, as the following quotes from the qualitative field research suggest:
•	 	 “We	do	not	need	to	think	about	bhat (rice) at least for half of the month. 
My husband also depends on me,” said Joinob, an IGVGD participant from 
Faridpur.
•	 	 “Money	will	be	spent	easily.	Rice	can	be	eaten	even	with	salt.	Money	will	
be taken away by my husband,” said Amena, an IGVGD participant from 
Faridpur.
•	 	 “Before	the	project,	we	used	to	buy	only	small	amounts	of	rice	every	two	
or three days—we could not afford to buy more. now we do not have to 
worry about food for at least 20 days in a month,” said Halima, an FFA 
participant from Rangpur.
  The results in Table 5.5 also show that participants tend to prefer what 
their  program  provides:  IGVGD  participants  prefer  transfers  in  food  only, 
FSVGD participants prefer a combination of food and cash, FFA participants 
prefer a combination, and RMP participants prefer only cash. Some of their 
responses were as follows:
•	 	 “Both	are	good	because	food	can	be	eaten	when	hungry	and	cash	can	be	
used to buy clothes,” said Roshna, an FSVGD participant from Panchagarh 
district.
72  CHAPTER 5•	 	 “We	like	both	rice	and	cash.	Rice	gives	us	the	energy	to	work.	We	use	the	
cash to pay for our children’s education and to repay our loans. We can 
use the cash to buy medicine when someone in the family becomes ill,” 
said a participant in an FGD with FFA participants in nilphamari district.
•	 	 “We	use	the	cash	to	buy	food	and	other	necessities.	We	also	deposit	cash	
in the savings group,” said a participant in an FGD with RMP participants 
in Panchagarh district.
Training of Program Participants
As mentioned in Chapter 2, in addition to food and cash transfers, IGVGD 
and  FSVGD  provide  development  support  to  program  participants  consist-
ing  of  training  in  IGAs  (such  as  rearing  poultry,  raising  livestock,  fishery 
maintenance,  and  sericulture);  awareness-raising  on  social,  legal,  health, 
and nutrition issues; and basic literacy and numeracy training. FFA provides 
awareness-raising and training in IGAs. RMP provides life skills training to 
participating women with a focus on developing the business skills necessary 
to manage sustainable IGAs as a way of promoting self-reliance. The RMP also 
provides counseling to women on understanding and establishing their rights 
and improving their health and nutrition and that of their families.
  The household survey for this study collected information on beneficia-
ries’ participation in the training component of IGVGD, FSVGD, and RMP. In 
the case of FFA, training had not fully started when the survey was fielded. 
Food- and cash-for-work activities in the FFA program are carried out from 
December to May, which is the period suitable for moving earth. Awareness-
raising and training in IGAs are normally conducted from June to november. 
The FFA participants had been in the program for six months and had just 
completed the work activities at the time of the household survey. The train-
ing module of the household survey asked questions about IGAs. The qualita-
tive part of the research covered the awareness-raising aspects of training.
  Although IGVGD and FSVGD provide training in basic literacy and numer-
acy, the household survey results show that 83 percent of IGVGD and 84 per-
cent of FSVGD women remained illiterate even after 18 months of program 
participation at the time of the survey (see Table 5.8 later in this chapter). 
The high level of continuing illiteracy of VGD women despite the provision of 
basic literacy (and numeracy) training indicates that the literacy training was 
not very effective.4
  Table 5.6 provides information on IGVGD, FSVGD, and RMP participants’ 
IGA training. Most of the program participants received training in IGAs; only 
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4 It is worth noting, however, that the illiteracy rates are even higher for FFA (93 percent) and 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.4 percent of FSVGD and RMP beneficiaries and 7 percent of IGVGD beneficia-
ries reported that they did not receive the training. For IGVGD and RMP par-
ticipants, poultry-rearing was the most prevalent type of training received. 
Training  in  cow  or  goat  rearing  was  most  common  for  IGVGD  and  FSVGD 
participants. business skill development training was most widespread among 
RMP participants.
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Table 5.6  Participants’ training in income-generating activities (IGAs) 
and outcomes of training
  Percentage of participants
Training indicator  IGVGD  FSVGD  RMP
Received training in IGAs  92.7  95.7  96.0
Type of IGA training received
  Poultry rearing  65.1  45.6  63.5
  Cow or goat rearing  70.1  62.7  44.8
  Vaccination of poultry and livestock  1.4  0.7  1.0
  Vegetable gardening  4.0  8.4  15.6
  Pisciculture or fishpond development  0.7  2.1  0.0
  Weaving, sewing, or embroidery  1.1  5.9  1.0
  Handicrafts  3.2  16.7  6.3
  Food processing  0.0  1.7  2.1
  business skills development  10.8  24.7  56.3
  Total (exceeds 100 because of multiple responses)  156.5  168.6  190.6
Started an IGA after training  68.7  65.5  85.4
Type of IGA started
  Poultry rearing  58.1  50.5  53.7
  Cow or goat rearing  36.7  53.7  39.0
  Vaccination of poultry and livestock  0.0  0.5  0.0
  Vegetable gardening  0.0  2.7  6.1
  Pisciculture or fishpond development  0.0  0.0  0.0
  Weaving, sewing, or embroidery  1.1  3.7  1.2
  Handicrafts  2.6  4.3  2.4
  Food processing  0.0  0.0  1.2
  Small business enterprise  1.6  2.6  36.5
  Total (exceeds 100 because of multiple responses)  100.0  118.1  140.2
Reasons for not undertaking an IGA
  Training was not useful  2.3  1.9  0.0
  Received insufficient training  3.4  1.9  14.3
  lacked confidence  27.6  11.7  28.6
  Husband/other family members were against it  3.4  1.9  0.0
  Amount of loan was not enough to start IGA  10.3  12.6  7.1
  Did not know how to do it  4.6  4.9  7.1
  Perceived an IGA to be risky  9.2  1.9  0.0
  Did not want to run a business  63.2  75.7  50.0
  Total (exceeds 100 because of multiple responses)  124.1  112.6  107.1
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
note:    FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; IGVGD—Income-Generating Vul-
nerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance Program.  The majority of program participants—85 percent of RMP, 69 percent of 
IGVGD, and 66 percent of FSVGD women—reported that they had started IGAs 
after receiving the training. The high rates of adopting IGAs after the train-
ing show that the training was quite effective. Overall, poultry- and cow- or 
goat-rearing were the most common IGA undertakings. About 37 percent of 
RMP participants also started small business enterprises.
  Among those who did not pursue IGAs after receiving the training, the 
most common reason for not doing so was that they did not want to run a 
business. lack of confidence in undertaking IGAs was the second most impor-
tant reason for RMP and IGVGD participants.
  Given that livestock- and poultry-rearing were the two most important 
enterprises  for  those  who  adopted  IGAs  after  the  training,  we  computed 
the values of these two types of assets for program beneficiary households 
and compared the values for those who started IGAs after the training and 
those who did not. Table 5.7 shows that the values of both types of assets 
are higher for those who adopted IGAs than for those who did not across the 
three programs. The difference is particularly large for IGVGD participants; 
those who undertook IGAs had livestock assets almost three times as valuable 
as those of participants who did not. These results show the success of par-
ticipants’ adoption of IGAs after receiving the training. However, this success 
may not be fully attributable to training; qualitative field research found that 
IGVGD’s built-in provision of microcredit is instrumental in such success.
  The following experiences of program participants, recorded during qualita-
tive field research, illustrate some aspects of training the programs provide:
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Table 5.7  Value of livestock and poultry assets for those who 
started income-generating activities (IGAs) after receiving 
training and for those who did not
  Value of assets (taka per household)
Assets  IGVGD  FSVGD  RMP
livestock assets
  For those who started an IGA  5,569  4,818  4,255
  For those who did not start an IGA  1,947  2,319  3,362
Poultry assets
  For those who started an IGA  555  701  525
  For those who did not start an IGA  293  396  339
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in bangladesh for the study “Relative Effi-
cacy of Food and Cash Transfers.”
note:    FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; IGVGD—Income-Gen-
erating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance Program.•	 	 “Training	helped	me	speak	in	front	of	strangers,	which	I	could	not	do	
before,” said Anu, an IGVGD participant from Shaghata upazila of Gai-
bandha district, who received awareness-raising information and training 
on IGAs. She added, “Training on livestock rearing alone cannot help the 
poor earn a living. It would have been useful if I could get a calf or a cow 
from the program.” Abeda, another IGVGD woman from the same upazila, 
reported that she did not receive any training from the program.
•	 	 Rasheda,	an	FSVGD	beneficiary	from	Bhajanpur	village	in	Tetulia	upazila, 
received training from Manob Kollyan Songstha (a service-provider nGO) in 
livestock-rearing, making hand fans, and running a tea stall.
•	 	 Shefali,	an	IGVGD	participant	from	Sadarpur	upazila of Faridpur district, 
received training from bRAC on how to develop a nursery to raise veg-
etable seedlings. After six months of training, she received a loan of 3,000 
taka from bRAC and started a nursery. Shefali reported that the nursery 
was a profitable enterprise. She also said, “Mujibor, my husband, is a very 
nice man. I learnt from the training the bad effects of wife-battering and 
asked my husband to tell this to other men in the village. He convinced 
many men that mistreating wives is bad for their family.”
•	 	 Nurjahan,	 an	 RMP	 participant	 from	 Tetulia	 upazila,  received  training 
in earth-digging, raising dikes, and road maintenance–related activities 
before starting RMP work. She also received awareness-raising information 
and training in business skills, preventing violence both at work and home, 
and providing first aid for fellow workers. nurjahan thought that the train-
ing was very useful in developing her awareness.
•	 	 “All	of	the	training	I	received	I	apply	them	in	my	real	life.	I	raise	poultry	
which gives my children nutritious food,” said Mansura, an RMP woman 
from Tetulia upazila.
Targeting Performance
According to the latest poverty estimates, 29.3 percent of people in rural 
bangladesh were in extreme poverty in 2005 (bbS 2006). The safety-net pro-
grams cover only a fraction of those who are extremely poor. Taking mistar-
geting and leakage into account, a recent study estimates that the safety-net 
system covers only about 6–7 percent of the poor (World bank 2006).
  To address the irreconcilable chasm between the resources available for 
targeted transfer programs and the large population of needy people, safety- 
net programs must improve their targeting effectiveness to reach the poorest 
of the poor. Targeting effectiveness indicates the extent to which program 
benefits are received by the most needy versus the less needy or nonneedy 
population.
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vide  income  transfers  to  the  extremely  poor.  Three  of  these  programs— 
IGVGD, FSVGD, and FFA—use both geographic and individual targeting meth-
ods. In contrast, RMP is not geographically targeted in the sense that its 
selection of beneficiaries is uniform across rural bangladesh. RMP is a nation-
wide program that covers 4,200 unions out of the total of 4,463 unions in 
rural bangladesh, and it selects 10 women from each union. RMP uses a set of 
selection criteria to ensure that only the neediest women are employed.
  IGVGD  follows  a  two-step  targeting  mechanism.  First,  although  the 
IGVGD  program  operates  nationwide,  it  concentrates  more  resources  in 
food-insecure areas of the country through a geographic targeting mecha-
nism. About two-thirds of the resources are directed to about one-third of 
the upazilas. Consequently, coverage is higher in more food-insecure areas. 
Gob  and  WFP  have  devised  a  resource  allocation  map  for  food-assisted 
development on which each upazila of the country has been categorized by 
its relative level of food insecurity. based on this map, VGD food resources 
geographically target upazilas in proportion to their food insecurity levels. 
Second,  within  each  upazila,  an  IGVGD  selection  committee  selects  the 
beneficiaries according to a set of officially prescribed targeting criteria.
  In 2005–06 the VGD program, which included IGVGD and FSVGD, operated 
in 421 upazilas out of the total of 640 rural upazilas in the country. IGVGD 
covered 364 upazilas, and FSVGD covered 57 upazilas. The FSVGD and IGVGD 
selection processes are the same at the upazila level.
  FFA covers 38 upazilas. both FFA and FSVGD operate in relatively food-
insecure areas in northern bangladesh. In addition to allowing people to self-
target based on willingness and physical ability to work, FFA uses a set of 
selection criteria to target the poorest.
Criteria for Beneficiary Selection
VGD Selection Criteria
The union parishad (UP) committee, together with partner nGOs, selects VGD 
(IGVGD and FSVGD) participants on the basis of set criteria. In the 2005–06 
VGD cycle, a new set of selection criteria was introduced. According to the 
inclusion criteria, to be selected a household should meet at least four of the 
following criteria:
1.   The household consumes less than two full meals per day.
2. It owns no land or less than 0.15 acres of land.
3.   It has very poor housing conditions (construction material and sanitation 
facilities).
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labor.
5.   It is headed by a woman with no adult male income earner and no other 
source of income.
Households that meet all five criteria will be given priority.
  The new criteria also included exclusion criteria stating that no VGD card 
will be provided to a woman in any of the following categories:
1.   Women not within the 18–49 age group.
2.   Those who were already members of other food and/or cash assistance 
programs.
3.   Those who were VGD cardholders at any time during 2001–04.
  A household can have only one VGD card. The selected VGD cardholder 
woman should be physically and mentally sound and must be from among the 
most vulnerable and poor households in the union.
FFA Selection Criteria
The FFA component of the IFS program targets the following participants:
1.   Individuals  who  depend  predominantly  on  manual  or  casual  labor,  have 
extremely low or irregular income, and do not operate and are not employed 
at a business.
2.   Those from households that do not own or operate more than 0.15 acres 
of land.
3.   Those who are physically fit to carry out the scheduled work.
4.   Those from households with malnourished pregnant or nursing mothers 
and/or children of school-going age who are often engaged in paid work.
5.   Female heads of households (women who are widowed, separated, divorced 
or deserted, or have disabled husbands).
6.   Individuals from households with virtually no productive assets.
7.   Those in households with no more than one participant.
8.   Those who are not underaged or overaged (the recommended age group is 
18–50 years).
  Among the individuals listed based on the previously stated criteria, prior-
ity will be given to the following:
1.   Women who are heads of households (for example, women who are wid-
owed, separated, divorced or deserted, or have disabled husbands);
2.   Women or individuals from households with virtually no productive assets 
and no confirmed source of income (such as women from absolutely land-
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disadvantaged and live on others’ land and have no agricultural land); and
3.    Former VGD women who meet the previously stated criteria and are not regu-
larly receiving benefits from any service-providing agency (such as nGOs, the 
RMP, or the bangladesh Rural Development board) and are also not engaged 
in significant IGAs (still suffering from hunger and malnutrition).
RMP Selection Criteria
RMP women are selected for road maintenance using pre-established selec-
tion criteria. The women should have the following characteristics indicating 
their disadvantaged status:
1.   The women are divorced, widowed, or abandoned.
2.   They are predominantly single heads of households.
3.   They are young, 18–35 years, with children.
4.   They are physically and mentally fit to do road maintenance work and 
receive life management training.
5.   They are illiterate, having had little or no schooling.
6.   They and their families are well below the “extreme poverty line.”
7.    They are unable to provide their families with three balanced meals daily.
8.   They have few assets and may be landless and without their own shelter.
9.   They are forced to seek irregular, short-term work at low wages.
Assessing the Beneficiary Selection Process
The household survey was designed to permit an assessment of the beneficiary 
selection process for each of the four programs on the basis of the established 
targeting criteria. because the status of land and other asset ownership and 
the occupation of beneficiary households could be different after program 
participation,  the  household  survey  collected  information  on  households’ 
preprogram status regarding these variables. A few criteria (such as number 
of meals consumed) could not be included in the analysis, however, because 
baseline information was not available. Although there are some differences 
in selection criteria across the programs, we assessed the fulfillment of each 
and every criterion by all program beneficiaries to facilitate comparisons.
  Table 5.8 presents the results of the assessment. “Female-headed house-
hold” is a common criterion across all programs. Although only 21 percent of 
RMP women did not meet this criterion, 78 percent of FSVGD, 70 percent   
of IGVGD, and 64 percent of FFA beneficiaries failed to meet this criterion 
but were selected for the programs.
  The  programs  require  beneficiaries  to  be  within  certain  age  ranges. 
Eighty-nine percent of both IGVGD and FSVGD beneficiaries and 94 percent 
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programs. Two-thirds of RMP women were aged 18–35 and had children—a 
criterion that applies only to RMP selection—and virtually all RMP women (97 
percent) were aged between 18 and 49 at the time of selection.
  Among the four programs, only RMP uses illiteracy or lack of education, 
which is a good indicator of poverty, as a selection criterion. We looked at the 
literacy and educational attainment rates of RMP women and compared these 
rates with those of beneficiaries of the other three programs. Only 9 percent 
of RMP women were literate (that is, they could read and write), whereas the 
rates were 17 percent for IGVGD and 16 percent for FSVGD women. Among 
the four programs, the literacy rate was the lowest for FFA women. The level 
of educational attainment of all beneficiary women is extremely low; 73 to 
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Table 5.8  Households meeting selection criteria
  Households meeting each criterion (%)
Criterion  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP
Female-headed household  31.1  21.7  36.0  79.3
beneficiary women who
  Are divorced, widowed, abandoned  29.3  20.3  26.0  77.7
    Divorced  4.0  2.0  4.0  21.7
    Widowed  21.0  15.3  16.7  34.3
    Abandoned  4.3  3.0  5.3  21.7
  Are aged 18–35 years with children   53.2  51.6  53.6  66.3 
    aged 0–12 years 
  Are aged 18–49 years  89.3  88.7  93.7  97.0
  Are illiterate  82.7  84.3  92.7  91.3
  never went to school  75.0  73.0  87.7  84.7
  Had few years of schooling   1.0  1.0  0.5  0.5 
    (average number of years) 
before joining the program,  
    beneficiary women
  Owned less than 0.15 acres land  82.0  78.7  91.7  88.7
  Operated less than 0.15 acres land   75.3  60.7  88.0  84.3 
    (including rented/leased-in land) 
  Owned no cultivable land  86.3  79.7  93.3  91.7
  Owned no land  20.3  17.0  36.7  41.7
  Were daily wage laborers  38.0  51.0  56.7  48.3
  Had no productive assets   26.0  16.7  20.3  32.3 
    (including livestock) 
  Had no productive assets   34.3  26.3  28.3  41.7 
    (excluding livestock) 
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.88 percent of the women from the four programs never attended school. The 
rates  of  illiteracy  were  higher  than  the  rates  of  never  attending  school, 
showing that some of those who attended school did not learn how to read 
and write. The preprogram status of beneficiaries suggests that most met 
the land-based selection criteria. The results also indicate that, among all 
program participants, FFA participants were the land-poorest.
  One  of  the  FFA  selection  criteria—lack  of  productive  assets—is  difficult 
to assess because it is not well defined. An asset that a household uses to 
generate income (such as agricultural implements) is usually termed a produc-
tive asset. However, households can use some assets (for example, a sewing 
machine) for consumption or income generation or both. In this analysis, we 
incorporated a list of productive assets in the household survey questionnaire 
and asked respondents if they owned any such assets. Table 5.6 shows that FFA 
beneficiaries owned some productive assets before program participation.
  A program’s effectiveness in reaching the poorest depends largely on the 
appropriateness of indicators used for beneficiary selection. Good indicators 
are those that are highly correlated with poverty yet are easy to observe, 
record, and verify. A number of indicators used by the programs are difficult, 
if not impossible, to observe and verify. For example, “members consume 
less than two full meals per day” (a VGD criterion) or “unable to provide their 
families with three balanced meals daily” (an RMP criterion) are difficult to 
verify. Also, “no productive asset” (an FFA criterion) and “extremely low 
and irregular family income from daily or casual labor” are too ambiguous to 
have any operational relevance. Such imprecise selection criteria provide the 
scope for exercising perverse discretion in the beneficiary selection process. 
Therefore, the official targeting criteria need to be improved for better iden-
tification of the poorest households.
  The qualitative research offers evidence of malpractice in the selection 
process, as indicated by the following stories and quotations:
•	 	 Female	UP	members,	who	have	the	official	privilege	of	selecting	50	per-
cent of the VGD women, are supposed to play a key role in selecting pro-
gram participants. A female UP member from Faridpur district reported, 
however, “no woman member distributes [IGVGD] cards. The influential 
people make the list of beneficiaries and enjoy benefit out of it. I am only 
a signatory on the list.” She continued, “Once the UP chairman called a 
meeting of UP members and I was given ten cards for distribution. but 
later the chairman snatched away the cards from me and gave them to 
one of his men for distribution.”
•	 	 Another	female	UP	member	said,	“It	is	difficult	to	change	the	chairman’s	
list. He becomes annoyed whenever I find ineligible women’s names on the 
list and ask him to drop the names.”
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man and some of the members took bribes ranging from 500 to 1,000 taka 
from each woman in exchange for FSVGD cards. I know seven such cases, 
but disclosing this will be risky. The chairman also used the cards to get 
votes in the UP election.”
  Table 5.9 shows beneficiaries’ prior knowledge of the programs and their 
assessment of the selection process. The sources of their knowledge were 
quite  different  across  the  programs.  Whereas  the  majority  of  IGVGD  and 
FSVGD participants learned of the programs from UP members, about half of 
the FFA participants came to know about the program from service-provider 
nGOs. About 41 percent of RMP participants reported that they were aware 
of the program from loudspeaker announcements in their communities.
  Participants’ descriptions of the basis of their selection also varied sig-
nificantly. About 59 percent of IGVGD and 42 percent of FSVGD participants 
reported that the UP had selected them, whereas 36 percent of FFA partici-
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Table 5.9  Participants’ selection into the program
  Percentage of participants
Source of knowledge/selection process  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  All
How participant learned about the program
  From union parishad (UP) chairman  9.3  14.3  9.0  6.3  9.8
  From a UP member  66.7  58.0  21.3  24.7  42.7
  From an nGO worker  4.3  3.7  49.0  1.3  14.6
  From friends or neighbors  15.7  15.0  17.7  11.7  15.0
  From a loudspeaker announcement in the   0.0  0.0  0.0  40.7  10.2 
    community 
  From former beneficiaries  2.7  6.7  1.0  14.0  6.1
  Other  1.3  2.3  2.0  1.3  1.8
How participant was selected for the program
  Participant applied and got selected  22.3  23.3  25.3  1.0  18.0
  Participant was selected by a UP  58.7  42.0  16.7  1.0  29.6
  Participant was selected by an nGO  3.3  2.0  35.7  0.7  10.4
  Participant was selected by lottery  0.7  0.3  7.0  95.7  25.9
  Participant pursued selection  7.7  17.3  8.7  0.3  8.5
  Another member of the program pursued   5.7  12.0  6.0  0.3  6.0 
    selection for the participant 
  Participant does not know  1.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.3
  Other  0.7  3.0  0.7  0.7  1.3
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.pants stated that they had been selected by nGOs. In contrast, 96 percent 
of RMP participants affirmed that they had been selected through lottery. 
Among the VGD and FFA participants, 22 to 25 percent indicated that they 
had been included in the programs through application. About 29 percent of 
FSVGD and 13 percent of IGVGD participants reported that their own persis-
tent demands or those of other members of the programs made their inclu-
sion in the programs possible.
Assessing the Effectiveness of Targeting
We assessed the effectiveness of targeting of each of the four programs by 
looking  at  the  patterns  of  income  distribution  of  program  participants. 
Although the IFPRI household survey collected data on household consumption 
expenditures for the sample households, these data are insufficient to show 
the  pattern  of  distribution  of  program  beneficiaries  across  income  groups 
in the society because the sampling frame did not include all households at 
the community levels. Therefore, we adopted a method of comparing the 
expenditure patterns of the households of program participants in the IFPRI 
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Table 5.10  Distribution of program beneficiary 
households by 2005 Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey per capita expenditure deciles
Per capita  
expenditure  
decile  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP
 1 (lowest)  43.0  37.7  71.9  49.3
 2  11.0  15.3  9.0  9.7
 3  12.7  9.7  3.0  5.3
 4  7.3  8.0  4.0  9.3
 5  7.3  7.7  2.7  6.0
 6  5.7  8.7  1.7  7.7
 7  3.3  4.7  2.7  4.0
 8  3.3  3.0  2.0  3.7
 9  2.0  4.0  1.7  3.7
10 (highest)  4.3  1.3  1.3  1.3
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source:    Estimates by authors using data from the 2005 Household 
Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) of the bangladesh 
bureau of Statistics and the IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in 
bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and Cash 
Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable 
Group Development; IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable 
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household survey with those of households from a nationally representative 
household survey in bangladesh to assess targeting performance. For this we 
used the dataset of the HIES conducted by the bangladesh bureau of Statistics 
(bbS) in 2005. The latest poverty estimates are based on the 2005 HIES.
  Our assessment of targeting effectiveness involved the following steps:
1.   From the 2005 HIES we selected the districts in which IFPRI had carried out 
the household survey for this study. We then selected all HIES households 
that lived in rural areas of these districts.
2.   From the IFPRI survey data we subtracted transfer values from the total 
household expenditures of program participants to reflect the preprogram 
economic status of program participants.
3.   To make our survey data comparable to HIES data, we deflated the total 
per capita consumption expenditures (food plus nonfood) derived from the 
2006 IFPRI household survey data to 2005 prices using the rural consumer 
price index.5
4.   We calculated  the  per capita  monthly  expenditure  deciles  of the  HIES 
households selected in Step 1. We then determined the expenditure cut-
off point of each of the deciles.
5.   Finally we assigned program participants’ households from the IFPRI survey 
to the HIES decile groups by matching their inflation-adjusted per capita 
expenditures with the expenditures at the HIES decile cut-off point.
  The distribution of participants’ households across the monthly per capita 
expenditure groups is presented in Table 5.10. Figure 5.4 illustrates the pat-
terns of distribution. The patterns show that all programs fairly well target 
the poorest, with FFA the best-targeted program.
  In the absence of the program, 72 percent of all FFA beneficiary house-
holds would have been among the poorest 10 percent and 84 percent among 
the poorest 30 percent of all households in the income distribution. In the FFA 
program, both female and male beneficiaries do physical work that mainly 
involves moving earth. Only out of desperation would a rural bangladeshi 
woman be willing to work with men at onerous, low-paying manual labor. As 
a result, the program is strongly self-targeted.
  Among the other three programs, 67 percent of IGVGD, 64 percent of RMP, 
and 63 percent of FSVGD households would have belonged to the poorest 30 
percent of all households in the income distribution without the programs.
5 The food and nonfood items included in the IFPRI household survey and in the HIES are almost 
identical.CHAPTER 6
Impacts of the Programs on Livelihood and Food 
Security and the Cost-Effectiveness of Transfers
T
he first part of this chapter presents estimates of the impacts of the 
four case study programs on livelihood outcomes and food and nutri-
tion security—specifically, food consumption at the household level, 
calorie consumption and nutritional status of individuals within the house-
hold, total household income/consumption, poverty, and assets. The second 
part provides the results of cost-effectiveness analysis. The results show the 
costs of transferring income in food and cash to program participants, as well 
as the costs of improving selected livelihood and food security outcomes.
  In looking at these results it is important to remember that these four 
programs differ in a number of ways: the size of transfers, the form of trans-
fers, the requirements that beneficiaries must fulfill in order to obtain the 
transfers, and the presence or extent of complementary forms of assistance, 
such as savings and credit. All factors play a role when we assess impacts and 
compare impacts across programs.
Assessing Impact: General Issues
In this report we are undertaking two broad sets of comparisons to answer the 
following questions: what is the impact of participation in IGVGD, FSVGD, FFA, 
or RMP on measures of individual and household welfare, and, comparatively 
speaking, are there differences in the effectiveness of these programs?
  Credible  assessments  of  a  program’s  impacts  on  welfare  require  that 
program beneficiaries (the individuals or households who receive the “treat-
ment”) are as comparable as possible to those not receiving benefits from 
the program (the individuals or households who are the “control group”). 
As explained in Chapter 3, the most appropriate approach here is PSM. In 
our application of PSM, we first estimate a probit regression in which the 
dependent variable equals one if the household participates in a given pro-
gram, zero otherwise. Because we consider four programs, we estimate four 
separate probit regressions; for reasons explained in Chapter 3, each has a 
88different control group. The control variables (regressors) include both the 
determinants  of  participation  in  the  program  and  factors  that  affect  the 
outcomes. These variables are either preprogram levels (such as the value of 
assets) or contemporaneous measures of variables that are unlikely to change 
as a result of participation in the program (such as level of education of adult 
household members).
  Specifically, we include the following variables in these probit regressions: 
household size and demographic composition, indicators of the level of literacy 
and educational attainment of the household head and spouse, whether the 
household is headed by a female, whether the household head’s occupation 
was daily laborer prior to the commencement of the program, the preprogram 
level of ownership of land and other assets, whether the household had elec-
tricity before joining the program, and the types of cooking fuel used. Also 
included are a set of union dummy variables that capture all time-invariant   
union-level characteristics, such as spatial differences in markets, prices, wages, 
infrastructure, flood-proneness, and administrative structures.
  Having estimated these probit regressions, we calculate the propensity 
score for participation in the program, and we match treatment and control 
households on the basis of these scores.1 Table 6.1 describes the treatment 
and  control  groups  used  and  their  sample  sizes.  Table  6.2  presents  the 
results of probit regression models that are used to calculate the propensity 
scores used to estimate the impacts on income of the four programs. Appen-
dix B explains the implications of using PSM on sample size and shows the 
distributions of estimated propensity scores for the treatment and control 
groups.
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1 The technical details of our approach are as follows. As described in the text, we first esti-
mate these probits. We then check the balancing properties of the propensity scores. The bal-
ancing procedure tests whether or not treatment and comparison observations have the same 
distribution of propensity scores. (A balancing test fails when a t-test rejects the equality of the 
means of these variables across ranked groupings of the propensity score.) When this occurred, 
we tried alternative specifications of the probit model; the specifications used in this report are 
the most complete and robust specifications that satisfied the balancing tests. The quality of 
the match can be improved by ensuring that matches are formed only when the distribution of 
the density of the propensity scores overlaps treatment and comparison observations—that is, 
when the propensity score densities have “common support.” For this reason, we used the com-
mon support approach for all PSM estimates. For the common support sample, the probit model 
was estimated again to obtain a new set of propensity scores to be used in creating the match. 
We also retested the balancing properties of the data. All results presented in the following 
pages are based on specifications that passed the balancing tests. We matched treatment and 
comparison observations by means of local linear regression with a tricube kernel. We used 
Stata’s PSMATCH2 command with common support imposed. The standard errors of the impact 
estimates are calculated by bootstrap using 1,000 replications for each estimate.  Comparative assessment of these programs requires clarity about program 
similarities and differences. Table 6.3 summarizes the characteristics of these 
four interventions.2 Whereas IGVGD provided only food payments, RMP pro-
vided only cash payments, and FSVGD and FFA provided a combination of food 
and cash, these are not the only differences across these programs. In addition 
to the differences in the form of payment, there are five salient differences.
Payment Size
FFA and RMP provide substantially larger payments than either IGVGD or FSVGD. 
In addition, all four programs have a compulsory savings component, but only 
RMP forces participants to save a significant amount of money.
Type of Food
There are differences across programs in the type of food households receive. 
Food transfers from FFA are solely in rice, as is about 60 percent of the food 
transfers under IGVGD. In contrast, under FSVGD virtually all food transfers 
are in the form of micronutrient-fortified atta (whole-wheat flour).
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Table 6.1  Sample size of treatment and control groups 
used for propensity score matching
  Unions (number)  Sample size (number)
Current program  Treatment  Control  Treatment  Control
IGVGD  20  10  300  200
FSVGD  10  10  300  100
FFA  10  40  300  400
RMP  30  30  300  300
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative 
Efficacy of Food and Cash Transfers.”
notes:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulner-
able Group Development; IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulner-
able Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance Program. For 
IGVGD, FSVGD, and RMP, 10 control households per union from 
corresponding program unions were used for matching. For FFA, 
however, all control households were used for matching because 
the number of control households was not sufficient for propensity 
score matching estimates.
2 Although program characteristics are provided in Chapter 2 and the patterns of transfer 
receipts are reported in Chapter 5, this summary is presented here for easy reference.Work Requirements
There is no meaningful work requirement for IGVGD or FSVGD. In contrast, 
the work requirement for FFA is substantial; participants are expected to 
undertake physically demanding work all day and are paid on a piece-rate 
basis. The work requirement for RMP is less onerous; participants work for 
only half a day and are paid on a salaried basis. Awareness of these work 
requirements is important, because the work requirement has an opportunity 
cost: the work (and income) forgone by participating in these programs.
Access to Complementary Services
All four programs provide training, but no participant in FFA had received this 
training at the time of the survey. In addition to providing training, IGVGD 
facilitates access to credit.
Timeliness of Payment
IGVGD recipients received food transfers on a monthly basis, and beneficia-
ries under FSVGD also received fairly regular food transfers. By contrast, cash 
payments were received less frequently, and 9.7 percent of FFA and 6.8 per 
cent of RMP beneficiaries received no cash payments in the six months prior 
to the household survey. Here it is important to note that the RMP program 
was in transition at the time of the household survey, which caused major 
disruptions in payments in the reference period.
  Differences in “payment size” and “type of food” are especially impor-
tant when we assess the impact of different programs on food consumption. 
As we explain in more detail in Appendix C, economic theory suggests that 
the size of a transfer matters in determining its effect on consumption. If 
the transferred food ration is less than the amount of the food the recipient 
household would have consumed without the transfer, the ration is termed 
“inframarginal.” An inframarginal food transfer is equivalent to what would 
have been bought using a cash transfer of equal value. Put another way, an 
inframarginal food transfer has the same income effect as a cash transfer.
  In contrast, the food transfer is “extramarginal” if the size of the trans-
fer  is  greater  than  the  amount  of  the  food  that  the  recipient  household 
would have consumed without the ration. Here the transfer may have two 
effects—an income effect and a substitution effect.3 The pure price effect of 
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3 Income and substitution effects are the two analytically different effects that come into play 
when an individual is faced with a changed price for a commodity. Income effects arise because 
a change in the price of a commodity will affect an individual’s purchasing power. Even if pur-

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 6.3  Summary of program characteristics and transfer payments
  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP
Program characteristics
  Program cycle for beneficiaries (months)  24  24  24  48
  length of time of beneficiaries’ program   18  18  6  25 
    participation at the time of the survey  
    for the study (months) 
  Compulsory savings per beneficiary   32  32  25  300 
    (Tk/month) 
  Work requirements?  no  no  yes  yes 
      Full day  1/2 day 
      Physically  Moderately 
      demanding  demanding 
      Piece rates  Fortnightly 
        salary
  Access to credit (built-in credit service in   yes  no  no  no 
    the program) 
  Access to training?  yes  yes  yes, but  yes 
      not started 
      before 
      survey
Actual transfers received by beneficiaries
  Value of transfer per beneficiary (Tk/month)  407  404  837  694
  Value of transfer per capita (i.e., per member   112  114  254  235 
    of beneficiary household) (Tk/month) 
Composition of actual value of transfers  
    received (%)
  Wheat  4  3  0  0
  Pusti atta (nutrient-fortified whole-wheat   35  50  0  0 
    flour) 
  Rice  61  0  68  0
  Cash  0  48  32  100
Frequency of food transfers in previous six  
    months (percentage of all beneficiaries)
  Monthly  84.3  1.3  4.0  —
  Four or five transfers  15.7  77.0  49.3  —
  one, two, or three transfers  0  21.7  46.7  —
  no food transfer received  0  0  0  —
Frequency of cash transfers in previous six  
    months (percentage of all beneficiaries)
  Monthly  —  0  0  0
  Four or five transfers  —  0.3  38.0  11.1
  one, two, or three transfers  —  99.7  52.3  82.1
   no cash transfer received  —  0  9.7  6.8
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
note:    — denotes not applicable. FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulner-
able Group Development; IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; 
RMP—Rural Maintenance Program.
94  CHAPTER 6the ration is captured through the substitution effect.4 The net effect, which 
also includes the income effect, may lead to an increase in the consumption 
of the ration commodity as well as increased consumption of complementary 
products and reduced consumption of substitutes.5
  The substitution effect, however, will take place only if the resale of a 
ration is effectively prohibited, if the resale price is lower than the market 
price,  or  if  the  resale  entails  a  high  transaction  cost  that  decreases  the 
implicit selling price for the ration recipient. Although none of the food trans-
fer programs imposed restrictions on resale of the ration, our survey data 
show that FSVGD participants—receiving an extramarginal ration—sold only 8 
percent of the total quantity of atta rations received, at a price 26 percent 
lower than the market price of atta. The remaining quantity consumed was 
23 times more than the quantity consumed by the matched control group of 
households. Two factors most likely prevented the atta recipients from sell-
ing a larger share of their extramarginal ration: (1) the resale price was lower 
than the market price and (2) the resale involved transaction costs.
Impact on Food Consumption
We begin our reporting of impacts by considering the effect of these pro-
grams on food consumption. Recall that our household survey collected data 
on quantities of food acquisition and prices for a comprehensive list of food 
items.  Food  acquisition  consists  of  the  quantities  of  food  purchased  and 
obtained from home production and other sources, including food transfers 
from various programs and private sources. The quantities of food produced 
by the household and the food transfers received were valued at the average 
unit market prices of foods and converted to monthly per capita figures.6
  Table 6.4 presents the PSM impact estimates for per capita food expen- 
ditures. Participation in all four programs leads to statistically significant 
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4 Microeconomic theory holds that the substitution effect of a price change is always negative. 
This implies that the substitution effect of a free or subsidized food ration will always increase 
the consumption of that food.
5 If the transferred food is an inferior good (that is, if it has a negative income elasticity), the 
income effect of the ration will reduce its consumption.
6 The valuation of home-produced food should ideally be at farmgate prices, especially for those 
households with difficult access to market. If the difference between farmgate and average 
market prices is substantial, it could substantially influence decisionmaking. This potential prob-
lem, however, is negligible for the sample of households included in the survey for the following 
reasons: (1) Most sample households are landless; therefore, the share of food consumed from 
their own production is quite small. (2) Bangladesh has a very high density of rural roads. As a 
result, the lack of access to markets is not a serious problem in rural areas. Except for the Chit-
tagong Hill tracts district (which is not included in the survey), food markets in rural Bangladesh 
are well integrated, and marketing margins for foods—particularly rice—are quite small.increases in food expenditures. In absolute terms, participants in FSVGD have 
the largest increase in food expenditure and FFA participants the smallest.
  next we investigate the impact of transfers on food consumption in terms 
of total energy or calorie intakes. For this analysis we used individual-level 
food intake data, collected through the dietary module of the household sur-
vey, to estimate the actual nutrient intakes of individual household members 
(see Chapter 3 for details). Table 6.5 provides the PSM impact estimates of 
calorie intakes. All estimated differences in daily per capita calorie intakes 
between program participants and matched control groups of households are 
statistically significant. Participation in IGVGD, FSVGD, FFA, and RMP increases 
households’ per capita food consumption by 164, 247, 194, and 271 kilocalories 
per person per day, respectively.
  Because the size of the transfer varied considerably among the four pro-
grams (see Table 6.3), interpreting these results is easier if we adjust them 
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Table 6.4  Propensity score matching impact estimates of per capita 
food expenditure per month (taka)
Program  Treatment  Control  Difference  t-statistic  p-value
IGVGD  468  380  89  2.78  0.006
FSVGD  515  388  127  3.46  0.001
FFA  443  387  56  2.94  0.004
RMP  520  407  113  4.12  0.000
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.
Table 6.5  Propensity score matching impact estimates of calorie intake 
(kcal per person per day)
Program  Treatment  Control  Difference  t-statistic  p-value
IGVGD  1,785  1,620  164  2.18  0.030
FSVGD  2,042  1,795  247  1.82  0.070
FFA  1,838  1,644  194  1.98  0.048
RMP  1,928  1,657  271  3.81  0.000
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.to take this variation into account. Figure 6.1 does so, showing the increase 
in calories consumed (per capita per day) per one taka transferred (per capita 
per day) for each program.
  These increases can be interpreted as the marginal propensity to con-
sume calories (MPCc) out of income transfers in food (IGVGD), cash (RMP), 
and a food-cash combination (FSVGD and FFA). Three of these, for IGVGD, 
FFA, and RMP, are consistent with the findings of Hoddinott, Skoufias, and 
Washburn (2000). They showed that for very poor households the MPCc given 
an increase in income lies in the range of 0.3 to 0.45. The MPCc for FSVGD 
lies above this range, however, and is considerably higher than that reported 
for each of the other programs. This finding is particularly striking given that 
FSVGD participants were better off before joining the program (see Table 
5.10) relative to participants in the other programs and that MPCc typically 
declines as household income levels rise. As noted earlier, differences in the 
size and type of food rations may be playing a role here.
  FSVGD participants received an average per capita monthly ration of 3.58 
kilograms of atta. To examine whether the FSVGD atta ration was extra-
marginal we used PSM to match FSVGD households’ atta consumption with 
that of the matched control households. The average monthly per capita atta 















Figure 6.1  Increased calories per 1 taka transferred
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food 
and Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.consumption of the matched control households is only 0.11 kilograms.7 The 
FSVGD atta ration per month is vastly greater (33 times) than the monthly 
atta consumption of the control households; the atta ration is clearly extra-
marginal.
  We performed the same analysis for the FFA rice ration. The amount of 
the rice ration was 10.84 kilograms per capita per month on average. The 
average monthly per capita rice consumption of the matched control house-
holds (matched with FFA households) is 13.14 kilograms.8 This indicates that 
the FFA rice ration is inframarginal: the amount of the ration is 18 percent 
smaller than the amount of rice the FFA participants would have consumed 
without the program.
  owing to the substitution effect of the extramarginal atta ration (shown 
in Appendix C), the FSVGD households consumed much more atta than their 
matched control households and increased their consumption of other prod-
ucts because of the income and cross-price effects of the ration. Because a 
large part of the consumption of other products is food, the net effect on 
food  consumption  was  quite  large  for  FSVGD  households.  In  contrast,  for 
example, FFA’s inframarginal rice transfer had only an income effect. This 
explains why participation in FFA had a smaller effect on food consumption. 
Because 56 percent of the IGVGD ration was rice, which had only the income 
effect, the food consumption effect of the IGVGD ration was less than that of 
the FSVGD ration.
Impact on the Caloric Intake and Nutritional Status  
of Women and Children
The preceding analysis describes the impact of the programs at the household 
level, but it does not provide information on how the consumption of food by 
specific household members is affected; there can be no presumption that 
all members will benefit or benefit equally. Because our survey collected 
information on individual-level dietary intake, we can assess the impact of 
these programs on the calorie intakes of individuals.
  Table 6.6 shows the results of program participation on the caloric intake 
of children aged 1–5, adult women aged 16–49, adult men aged 16–49, and all 
other household members. There are several striking findings. First, participa-
tion by an adult female in any of these programs does not lead to increased 
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7 The PSM result shows that FSVGD households consumed 2.50 kg of atta per capita per month, 
and the difference between FSVGD and the control is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level.
8 The PSM result shows that FFA households consumed 13.5 kg of rice per capita per month, but 
the difference between FFA and the control is not statistically significant.caloric  intakes  of  preschool  children.  Second,  only  in  the  case  of  the  RMP—
which provides transfers in amounts about 70 percent higher than do IGVGD and 
FSVGD—do the caloric intakes of school-age and older persons increase. Third, 
the benefits in terms of increased caloric intake from the cash-only program, 
RMP, appear to be evenly split between men and women; however, there is an 
important caveat to this finding, to be discussed later. Fourth, the food inter-
ventions that provide rice (IGVGD and FFA) have a larger effect on men’s caloric 
intake relative to women’s, whereas the converse is true for the one intervention 
that provides atta flour (FSVGD). Although this finding needs to be treated cau-
tiously because the levels of statistical significance are a little low in some cases, 
it suggests that the form of food transfer has an effect on who within a household 
benefits. Here it appears that the use of atta—a less preferred food—increases 
the share of food that goes to women relative to men.
  Another way of considering the intrahousehold impacts of the programs on 
individuals is to assess their impact on nutritional status. For women we use 
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Table 6.6  Propensity score matching impact estimates of calorie intakes 
by individual household members (kcal per person per day)
Household members  Treatment  Control  Difference  t-statistic  p-value
Children aged 1–5 years
  IGVGD  863  816  47  0.23  0.810
  FSVGD  1,075  943  132  0.66  0.513
  FFA  936  730  206  1.09  0.279
  RMP  1,036  943  93  0.50  0.619
Women aged 16–49 years
  IGVGD  1,969  1,917  52  0.58  0.564
  FSVGD  2,236  2,016  220  1.69  0.093
  FFA  2,005  1,866  139  1.34  0.180
  RMP  2,217  1,772  445  5.23  0.000
Men aged 16–49 years
  IGVGD  2,463  2,182  281  1.40  0.164
  FSVGD  2,684  2,563  121  0.44  0.663
  FFA  2,404  2,102  302  1.51  0.131
  RMP  2,428  1,966  462  2.12  0.036
other family members: Children aged 6–15 years  
    and elderly aged 50 years and over
  IGVGD  1,661  1,712  –51  –0.55  0.582
  FSVGD  1,973  1,718  255  1.03  0.306
  FFA  1,706  1,605  101  1.01  0.312
  RMP  1,800  1,520  280  3.86  0.000
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.BMI—weight (in kilograms) divided by height (in meters) squared. Table 6.7 
shows that although the average absolute values of women’s BMIs are some-
what higher for program beneficiaries’ households than for their matched 
control households, the difference is statistically significant only for FSVGD 
households. Women aged 16–49 in FSVGD households had 6 percent higher 
BMIs than did those from the matched control households. This finding might 
seem puzzling given that other programs such as RMP significantly increase 
calorie consumption. Remember, however, that women participating in the 
two public works programs are required to do manual labor for the projects, 
and such work burns up additional calories.
  Table  6.8  provides  PSM  impact  estimates  for  three  indicators  of  the 
nutritional status of children aged 6 to 60 months: height for age, a measure 
of stunting; weight for height, a measure of wasting; and weight for age, a 
measure of whether a child is underweight. The mean differences in z-score 
values between program and matched control groups suggest that children 
belonging to the IGVGD, FSVGD, and RMP households have better nutritional 
status than do those from matched control households. These differences, 
however, are not statistically significant.
Impact on Livelihood Outcome: Income
We  now  consider  a  more  general  measure  of  household  well-being:  total 
expenditures on consumption of all food and nonfood items. We note that, 
consistent with the broader economic literature, total consumption expendi-
ture can also be thought of as a proxy for household income. First, expendi-
tures are likely to reflect permanent income and hence are a better indicator 
of consumption behavior (Friedman 1957). Second, data on expenditures are 
generally more reliable and stable than income data. Because expenditures 
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Table 6.7  Propensity score matching impact estimates of nutritional 
status (BMI) of women aged 16–49 years (excluding pregnant women)
Program  Treatment  Control  Difference  t-statistic  p-value
IGVGD  19.58  19.19  0.39  0.87  0.385
FSVGD  19.40  18.28  1.12  1.75  0.081
FFA  19.22  18.88  0.34  0.66  0.509
RMP  19.45  19.10  0.35  1.01  0.313
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.are intended to serve as a proxy for income, the terms “expenditure” and 
“income” are used interchangeably in this report.
  Table 6.9 presents PSM estimates of the average impacts on the household 
incomes (measured in terms of monthly per capita total household expendi-
tures in taka) of program participants from IGVGD transfers in food, FSVGD 
and  FFA  transfers  in  a  combination  of  food  and  cash,  and  RMP  transfers 
in cash. All estimated differences in income between treatment (program 
participants)  and  matched  comparison  (control)  groups  of  households  are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The results suggest that the 
combination  of  food  and  cash  transfers  from  the  FSVGD  program  has  the 
greatest impact on increasing household income (by 32.3 percent) compared 
with the matched control group, closely followed by cash transfers from the 
RMP program (31.4 percent). Food transfers from the IGVGD program increase 
income by 27.8 percent, and the combination of food and cash transfers from 
the FFA program increases income by 13.3 percent.
  Recall, however, that the size of the transfer varied substantially among 
the four programs. So, as earlier, expressing the absolute values of increased 
income per unit of transfer is a more meaningful way of comparing impacts 
across programs, as seen in Figure 6.2.
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Table 6.8  Propensity score matching impact estimates of nutritional 
status of children aged 6–60 months
Program  Treatment  Control  Difference  t-statistic  p-value
Weight-for-height z-score
  IGVGD  –1.01  –1.06  0.05  0.09  0.929
  FSVGD  –1.29  –1.46  0.18  0.33  0.742
  FFA  –0.97  –0.68  –0.29  –0.70  0.482
  RMP  –1.07  –1.65  0.58  1.09  0.278
Weight-for-age z-score of children aged 6–60 months
  IGVGD  –1.79  –2.08  0.29  0.55  0.584
  FSVGD  –2.21  –2.14  –0.08  –0.17  0.867
  FFA  –1.84  –1.61  –0.23  –0.61  0.540
  RMP  –2.16  –2.39  0.24  0.45  0.654
Height-for-age z-score of children aged 6–60 months
  IGVGD  –1.87  –2.07  0.20  0.26  0.797
  FSVGD  –1.99  –2.31  0.32  0.51  0.609
  FFA  –2.00  –1.77  –0.23  –0.42  0.674
  RMP  –2.26  –1.83  –0.43  –0.68  0.495
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
notes:    The child growth standards developed by the World Health organization (WHo) were 
used in calculating z-scores. FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vul-
nerable Group Development; IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Develop-
ment; RMP—Rural Maintenance Program.102  CHAPTER 6
Table 6.9  Propensity score matching impact estimates of per capita 
total expenditure per month (taka)
Program  Treatment  Control  Difference  t-statistic  p-value
IGVGD  776  607  169  3.44  0.001
FSVGD  782  591  191  3.21  0.002
FFA  689  608  81  2.78  0.006
RMP  833  634  199  4.16  0.000
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
















Figure 6.2  Increased income per 100 taka of transfer
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food 
and Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.
  Two striking results appear in Figure 6.2. For FFA and RMP, a transfer of 
100 taka increases consumption by significantly less than 100 taka. In contrast, 
the increase in consumption for IGVGD and FSVGD is considerably larger than 
the size of the transfer. A number of program-specific factors, supported by 
qualitative field work, would seem to account for these findings:1.   IGVGD and FSVGD do not require their participants to do physical work. 
Although participants in these two programs are supposed to attend train-
ing sessions, these sessions are normally held once a week and do not 
affect participants’ income-earning activities.9 There is some qualitative 
evidence suggesting that this training has been effective, such as the fol-
lowing quote:
	•     “I received training from Manob Kollyan Songstha [a service-provider 
nGo] on livestock-rearing, making hand-fans, running tea stall, etc. 
I now make hand-fans, sell them, and earn money,” said Rasheda, an 
FSVGD beneficiary from Bhajanpur village in Tetulia upazila.
2.   In contrast, FFA and RMP have work requirements that may crowd out other 
income-generating opportunities. note, however, that these requirements 
differ across the two programs. Whereas FFA engages its members mostly 
in moving earth for construction, RMP engages its crews in road mainte-
nance. Whereas most FFA participants work a full day during the working 
season, the daily RMP work schedule is 8 a.m. to 2 p.m.10 The FFA work is 
also relatively harder than that of RMP. For these reasons, wage earners in 
public works programs, particularly FFA, hardly find the time and energy 
to engage in additional income-earning activities. The following quotes 
illustrate the demands of the work:
	•     “We get up at 5 o’clock and say our prayers. From 7 in the morning to   
5 in the afternoon we work in an earth-digging project,” said someone in   
a FGD with FFA participants in Panchapukur union of nilphamari district.
	•     “From 8 to 5 I have to dig earth and carry it to another place. often I 
work standing in waist-high water, digging mud,” said Momena in the 
FGD.
	•     “The amount of money depends on the amount of earth I dig. I work 
hard and dig up to 50 cft [cubic feet] a day,” said Hafiza, an FFA par-
ticipant in Debiganj upazila of Panchagarh district.
	•     “My face and eyes were always covered with mud when I worked,” said 
Tomiza, a former FFA participant in Debiganj upazila of Panchagarh 
district.
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 9 FFA and RMP also provide training to participants, but in the case of FFA, training had not 
started when the survey was fielded.
10 note that in the FFA program, food- and cash-for-work activities are normally carried out 
from December to May, which is the period suitable for moving earth. Training in awareness-
building and income-generating activities is conducted from June to november. The FFA par-
ticipants were in the program for six months at the time of the household survey. They had just 
completed the work activities and started attending training when the household survey was 
carried out in June–July 2006.3.   Among participants in the four programs, 78 percent of RMP women do not 
have husbands (that is, they are widowed, divorced, or have been aban-
doned by their husbands) compared with 29 percent of IGVGD women, 20 
percent of FSVGD women, and 26 percent of FFA women. Thus, for the 
majority of the RMP households, RMP transfers are their only source of 
income.
	•     “The work is laborious and we often suffer from sickness due to the hard 
work. Since we don’t have any men to supplement our income, we have 
to work even when sick,” said someone in a FGD with RMP participants 
in Tetulia upazila of Panchagarh district.
4.   In addition to training services, the IGVGD program has a built-in mecha-
nism to provide credit support to program participants (see Chapter 2). 
The value of this feature is reflected in the following quote:
	•     “I became a BRAC member right after I had received the [IGVGD] card. I 
got training from BRAC on how to develop a nursery [to raise vegetable 
seedlings]. After six months of training, I borrowed 3,000 taka from 
BRAC and started a nursery. Many people come to see my nursery. The 
current value of the nursery is 10,000 to 15,000 taka,” proudly said She-
fali, an IGVGD member from the Sadarpur upazila of Faridpur district.
Impact on Livelihood Outcome: Poverty Status
A limitation of our analysis of the programs’ impact on consumption is that 
it is not sensitive to the distribution of changes. To remedy this problem, 
we estimated the impact of transfers from each of the four programs on the 
poverty status of program participants. In Bangladesh, poverty rates are esti-
mated by the BBS in collaboration with the World Bank. The BBS periodically 
conducts HIESs, and the poverty estimates are based on data from these sur-
veys. The latest poverty estimates are based on the 2005 HIES (BBS 2006).
  Although the BBS uses two methods to estimate poverty—the cost of basic 
needs (CBn) and direct calorie intake methods—CBn is the preferred and 
standard method used in Bangladesh and elsewhere. Two poverty lines are 
constructed using the CBn method: an upper poverty line and a lower poverty 
line.11 People below the upper poverty line are considered poor, and those 
below the lower poverty line are considered extremely poor. The headcount 
poverty incidences based on the CBn method suggest that 43.8 percent of the 
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11 The upper poverty line includes the food consumption expenditure and the cost of consuming 
a bundle of nonfood items. The lower poverty line identifies extremely poor households whose 
total household expenditures are below the food poverty line. The food poverty line represents 
the cost of acquiring a basic food basket that provides the minimum nutritional requirement of 
2,122 kilocalories per person per day.rural population were below the upper poverty line and 29.3 percent were 
below the lower poverty line in 2005 (BBS 2006).
  our assessment of poverty impact involved the following steps:
1.   From the list of the 2005 CBn regional lower poverty lines (expressed in 
per capita total household expenditure) we selected the regional rural 
poverty lines that correspond to IFPRI household survey areas. We used 
the lower poverty lines because our study focuses on the ultra poor.
2.   In order to make our survey data comparable to the 2005 CBn poverty 
lines, we deflated total per capita consumption expenditures (food plus 
nonfood) derived from the 2006 IFPRI household survey data to 2005 prices 
by using the rural consumer price index.12
3.    using the inflation-adjusted per capita total expenditure series, we esti- 
mated  the  proportions  of  IFPRI  survey  households  below  the  region- 
specific lower poverty lines selected in Step 1.
4.   Finally, using the PSM method, we estimated poverty impacts by compar-
ing the proportions of households in extreme poverty in each of the four 
programs with those in the corresponding matched control groups.
  Table 6.10 presents the PSM estimates of poverty impacts. Program trans-
fers reduced extreme poverty by 20 percentage points for IGVGD, 30 percent-
age points for FSVGD, 15 percentage points for FFA, and 16 percentage points 
for RMP households. Even after considerable poverty reduction, however, 60 
percent of IGVGD, 51 percent of FSVGD, 64 percent of FFA, and 48 percent 
of RMP households remained in extreme poverty.
  Why do such large percentages of program participants remain in extreme 
poverty? The size of transfers and their multiplier effects on income are not 
enough  for  most  beneficiaries  to  move  out  of  extreme  poverty.  Although 
most program participants were extremely poor before they joined the pro-
grams, the range of their income varied considerably. Therefore, those who 
were extremely poor but lived closer to the poverty line were able to escape 
extreme poverty, but those further away from the line remain in poverty. 
nevertheless, program participation has likely lessened the severity of pov-
erty of these poorest of the poor.
Impact on Livelihood Outcome: Assets
The ownership or control of productive assets is an important indicator of 
livelihood because assets generate income. Physical asset bases (productive 
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12 The food and nonfood items included in the IFPRI household survey and in the HIES are almost 
identical.and consumption assets) also reduce the risks of vulnerability of households to 
disruptions in income flows, because part of the asset base can be sold in times 
of  hardship.  When  income  shocks  occur,  however,  family  coping  strategies 
often lead to the sale of productive assets (for example, to meet food con-
sumption needs or to cope with health-related emergencies), thereby aggra-
vating these risks. lack of assets is therefore both a cause and a consequence 
of poverty. Income transfers from safety-net programs can play an important 
role in protecting and expanding the asset bases of poor households.
  our household survey collected information on land, livestock, and other 
productive and consumption assets of households. Respondents were asked 
whether a particular asset was used to generate income (as in the case of 
agricultural implements and other productive assets) or consumption (as in 
the case of cooking utensils, furniture, radio) or both (for example, when a 
cow’s milk was partly consumed and partly sold). The household survey also 
collected information on savings—liquid assets that can be used for future 
consumption and investment.
  Access to land is the most important asset in rural Bangladesh, but 87 
percent of IGVGD, 80 percent of FSVGD, 94 percent of FFA, and 92 percent 
of RMP households own no cultivable land. The study did not look at the pro-
grams’ impact on landownership given the smallness of transfers in relation 
to land prices. Indeed, the household survey data suggest that none of the 
program participants bought any land after joining the programs. Instead, we 
investigated the programs’ impact on land rented or leased-in for cultivation. 
Table 6.11 provides the PSM results. The difference in the amount of rented 
or  leased-in  land  between  program  and  control  households  is  statistically 
significant only for IGVGD participants. The amount of rented or leased-in 
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Table 6.10  Propensity score matching impact estimates of  
extreme poverty reduction (percentage of households below the  
lower poverty line)
Program  Treatment  Control  Difference  t-statistic  p-value
IGVGD  59.8  79.5  –19.7  –2.01  0.046
FSVGD  50.6  80.4  –29.8  –2.98  0.003
FFA  64.0  78.8  –14.9  –2.96  0.003
RMP  47.7  63.5  –15.9  –1.74  0.082
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.land is 186 percent higher for IGVGD members than that for their matched 
control group, which suggests a substantial impact. Among the four programs, 
only IGVGD has a built-in system for providing microcredit to its members. 
Perhaps this feature of the program enabled the participants to rent or lease 
additional land for crop cultivation, as the following quote illustrates:
“After I had joined VGD, I received a 4,000 taka loan from BRAC,” 
reported Julekha, an IGVGD beneficiary, during a presurvey field visit 
to the Taraganj upazila of Rangpur district. She continued, “With that 
money I rented a small piece of land for 2 years. My husband and I 
grow potatoes, chilis, and vegetables on that land. We sell most of 
what we produce.”
  Table 6.12 presents the PSM impact results for consumption assets. All 
programs had statistically significant impacts in increasing the value of the con-
sumption asset bases of participating households compared with their matched 
control groups. Whereas FSVGD had the highest impact (81 percent increase) 
followed by IGVGD (70 percent increase), the two public works programs had 
relatively lower impacts in generating consumption assets for their members—a 
41 percent increase for FFA and a 42 percent increase for RMP.
  In  the  case  of  productive  assets,  the  IGVGD,  FSVGD,  and  FFA  programs 
had  statistically  significant  impacts,  but  not  the  RMP  program  (Table  6.13). 
Compared with the matched control groups, participation in the FFA program 
resulted in a 63 percent increase in the value of productive assets. The increase 
was 41 percent for IGVGD and 52 percent for FSVGD households.
  In the impact analysis we excluded livestock and poultry holdings from 
consumption and productive assets because these assets are often used for 
both purposes. livestock and poultry are important assets for the rural poor 
in Bangladesh. The training component of each of the four case study pro-
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Table 6.11  Propensity score matching impact estimates of rented, 
leased-in, share cropped land (decimals)
Program  Treatment  Control  Difference  t-statistic  p-value
IGVGD  10.91  3.81  7.10  1.86  0.064
FSVGD  10.72  8.18  2.54  0.56  0.574
FFA  4.69  3.25  1.44  0.99  0.321
RMP  10.84  8.97  1.87  0.36  0.715
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.grams put emphasis on developing the livestock- and poultry-raising skills 
of program participants. Because of the importance and programmatic rel-
evance of these two categories of assets, we carried out separate analyses 
for each.
  Table 6.14 presents the PSM impact assessment results for livestock assets 
(cattle, goats, and sheep). The average value of livestock holdings increased 
by 96 percent for IGVGD and by 108 percent for RMP members compared 
with their matched control groups, and these differences are statistically 
significant. However, there was no statistically significant impact on livestock 
assets for FSVGD and FFA members. Buying cows and bullocks requires a rela-
tively large amount of cash, and these domestic animals are among the most 
expensive assets the poor can own. Access to nGo loans may have enabled 
IGVGD women to buy livestock, as the following examples from the qualita-
tive research illustrate:
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Table 6.12  Propensity score matching impact estimates of consumption 
assets (value in taka)
Program  Treatment  Control  Difference  t-statistic  p-value
IGVGD  2,404  1,418  987  2.56  0.011
FSVGD  2,051  1,133  918  3.05  0.002
FFA  1,313  932  381  2.20  0.028
RMP  2,210  1,553  657  2.17  0.031
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.
Table 6.13  Propensity score matching impact estimates of productive 
assets (value in taka)
Program  Treatment  Control  Difference  t-statistic  p-value
IGVGD  2,710  1,920  790  1.66  0.098
FSVGD  2,360  1,553  807  2.13  0.034
FFA  1,701  1,042  659  3.16  0.002
RMP  2,612  2,007  605  1.23  0.219
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.•	 	 Rokeya,	an	IGVGD	woman	from	Sadarpur	upazila of Faridpur district, bought 
two milk cows through a loan from BRAC.
•	 	 Another	IGVGD	woman	named	Saleha	from	the	same	upazila bought a milk 
cow with a BRAC loan, repaid the loan by selling milk, and took a second 
loan from BRAC. She now runs her family from her own income.
  For RMP participants, the relatively larger amount of cash transfers as well 
as the lumpiness of these transfers may have enabled them to expand their 
livestock holdings. As already shown, RMP cash transfers per capita were 110 
percent higher than IGVGD food transfers and 106 percent higher than FSVGD 
food and cash transfers. Further, most RMP members received their entitle-
ments in lump-sum amounts; 43 percent of RMP women received their transfers 
for the six-month period prior to the survey in a single payment, and 32 percent 
of them received it in two installments (see Chapter 5).
  The  PSM  impact  estimates  suggest  that,  compared  with  the  matched 
control groups, the average value of poultry holdings increased by 83 percent 
for IGVGD, 98 percent for FSVGD, and 36 percent for RMP participants (Table 
6.15). FFA participants did not have any statistically significant increase in 
poultry holdings.
  In addition to assessing the impact of program participation on the build-
ing of physical assets, we estimated the impact on liquid asset holdings in the 
form of savings. The PSM impact estimates presented in Table 6.16 suggest 
that, compared with the matched control groups, the average amount of sav-
ings increased by 512 percent for IGVGD, 269 percent for FSVGD, 415 percent 
for FFA, and a staggering 1,341 percent for RMP households. All differences 
in the average amounts of savings between treatment and control groups are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. As reported in Chapter 5, the 
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Table 6.14  Propensity score matching impact estimates of livestock 
assets (value in taka)
Program  Treatment  Control  Difference  t-statistic  p-value
IGVGD  3,687  1,881  1,806  1.66  0.098
FSVGD  2,764  2,298  466  0.40  0.692
FFA  1,534  1,220  314  0.44  0.659
RMP  3,399  1,636  1,763  3.04  0.003
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.mandatory savings requirement of the case study programs accounted for 
64–80 percent of the total savings of program participants. The amount of 
savings required is much higher for RMP participants than for participants of 
the other three programs (see Chapter 2), which explains why the impact on 
savings is so high for RMP women.
Sustainability of Livelihood
Is the impact of transfers on the livelihood improvements of program par-
ticipants sustainable? We attempt to answer this question by analyzing the 
household survey data using PSM. We used household income as the livelihood 
indicator.
  Besides current participants, the IFPRI household survey included former 
program beneficiaries from completed program cycles. Program participation 
had ended 25 months prior to the household survey for former RMP house-
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Table 6.15  Propensity score matching impact estimates of poultry 
assets (value in taka)
Program  Treatment  Control  Difference  t-statistic  p-value
IGVGD  407  223  184  2.85  0.005
FSVGD  503  253  249  2.20  0.029
FFA  248  179  69  1.40  0.161
RMP  401  294  107  1.67  0.095
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.
Table 6.16  Propensity score matching impact estimates of household 
savings (taka)
Program  Treatment  Control  Difference  t-statistic  p-value
IGVGD  2,038  333  1,705  2.93  0.004
FSVGD  1,304  353  950  4.64  0.000
FFA  842  164  679  5.16  0.000
RMP  7,483  519  6,964  15.28  0.000
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.holds, 18 months prior for former IGVGD and FSVGD households, and 6 months 
prior for former FFA households.
  Table  6.17  presents  the  PSM  impact  estimates  for  income  (measured 
in terms of per capita total expenditures). The results show that, among 
the four programs, former IGVGD, FFA, and RMP households sustained their 
increased income even beyond the transfer period. Income was 28 percent 
higher for former IGVGD, 36 percent higher for former FFA, and 49 percent 
higher for former RMP households than for their matched comparison groups, 
and these differences are statistically significant. The difference in the level 
of income between former FSVGD households and their matched comparison 
group, however, is not significantly different from zero statistically.
  As shown, current FSVGD participants had the greatest increase in income 
among participants of the four programs. Assuming that former FSVGD par-
ticipants had achieved similar improvements during their participation in the 
program, one can conclude that former FSVGD households had not been able 
to maintain their improved livelihoods after leaving the program.
  Former FFA households had been without the program for just six months 
prior to the survey, so this short-term evidence of their livelihood sustainabil-
ity cannot be validated for a longer term from the survey data available.
  IGVGD and RMP showed reasonably long-term sustainable improvements in 
the income of their beneficiaries—at least 18 months for former IGVGD and 
25 months for former RMP households. IGVGD probably achieves this result 
through a program design that consciously incorporates graduation steps—
particularly the built-in provision of microcredit (Matin and Hulme 2003)—as 
the following example from the qualitative research shows:
•	 	 Komola,	a	former	IGVGD	woman	from	Sadarpur	upazila of Faridpur district, 
received a loan of 5,000 taka from BRAC when she was in the program. She 
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Table 6.17  Propensity score matching impact estimates of former 
program beneficiaries’ per capita monthly household expenditure (taka)
Program  Treatment  Control  Difference  t-statistic  p-value
Former IGVGD  798  624  174  2.37  0.019
Former FSVGD  738  596  142  1.24  0.218
Former FFA  877  647  231  3.66  0.000
Former RMP  934  628  306  3.78  0.000
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.bought a hybrid milk cow for 8,000 taka. She reared the cow, and in a year 
she was selling about 7 liters of milk every day. She used the savings to buy a 
second cow. Her family now lives well, and her four daughters attend school.
  The  main  reason  for  RMP  women’s  sustained  livelihood  improvements 
is likely their relatively large accumulation of savings, which is due to the 
relatively high rate of mandatory savings required by RMP. The participants 
receive their savings after completing the program cycle.
The Cost-Effectiveness of Transfers
The preceding analysis assesses the impact or effectiveness of these pro-
grams but does not assess their cost-effectiveness. At what cost does the 
government transfer income to program participants? How much does it cost 
to increase the monthly income of program participants by 100 taka? How 
much does it cost to increase daily energy intakes by 100 kilocalories? What 
is the annual cost of reducing extreme poverty by 1 percent through program 
transfers? How much would it cost to move all participant households out of 
extreme poverty for the short term? This section addresses these questions.
  An assessment of the cost-effectiveness of transfers involves a comparison 
of the costs of providing measured benefits to transfer recipients.13 The fiscal 
costs consist of the direct costs of the transfers themselves (cash transfers 
and/or the value of food transfers) and the costs of delivering the transfer 
amounts to the points of distribution (that is, uP premises for food transfers 
and local bank branches for cash transfers).14 A benefit consists of the mon-
etary value of the transfer received by a program participant.15 Benefits are 
the supply-side values of transfers, with food commodities (wheat and rice) 
valued at procurement prices (domestic and c.i.f. import prices are used as 
appropriate). Any pilferage or leakage in the process of transfer to the dis-
tribution point represents a system loss and therefore is counted in the cost 
calculation. Appendix D describes the method of calculating transfer delivery 
costs, provides cost components, and shows the calculations in detail.
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13 note that in calculating the value of transfers to program beneficiaries, the actual quantities 
of food transfers received by program beneficiaries are valued at local market prices.
14 For fortified atta, the costs of milling, fortification, bagging, storage, and transportation are 
included in the cost calculation (see Appendix D).
15 The two public works programs—FFA and RMP—create benefits at the community level (the 
value of the road being maintained by RMP, community assets created by FFA) where these 
programs are implemented. As community members, the participants in these programs also 
share the benefits. However, these benefits are not considered in the cost-effectiveness analy-
sis because the study assesses the impacts of income transfers (in terms of food and/or cash) 
received by beneficiaries on their food security and livelihoods. This essentially implies house-
hold and individual levels of analysis.  It is important to note that this analysis represents the fiscal costs, which 
do not necessarily reflect the opportunity costs of private and public resources. 
The primary reason for using the fiscal costs instead of the real resource costs 
for the analysis is that the former tend to have more policy relevance. The 
results of this analysis would provide policymakers and program managers with 
a clear understanding of how much benefit accrues to a program participant 
from one unit of government budgetary outlay. This information would be 
useful to policymakers in ranking programs according to budgetary costs rela-
tive to benefits; such ranking would not be feasible from the information that 
includes the opportunity cost of program participation, for example. Further, 
one main advantage of using budgetary costs is that the calculations tend to 
be unequivocal because they do not depend on assumptions (often question-
able) of the opportunity costs of public and private resources.
  Figure 6.3 presents the costs of transferring 1 taka of income to a program 
participant  through  food  and  cash.  on  average,  the  food-based  programs 
(IGVGD, FSVGD, and FFA) transfer 1 taka’s worth of food at a cost of Tk 1.20, 
which includes the cost of the transferred food. In other words, the delivery 
cost of transferring Tk 1 worth of food is Tk 0.20 (or 20 paisa). In contrast, 
the delivery cost of cash is virtually zero; it costs only 15 paisa to transfer Tk 
1,000 to a cash recipient.
  The delivery costs of transferring wheat and atta to program beneficiaries 
are higher than delivering rice, mainly owing to handling costs and the costs 
of pilferage or loss incurred for wheat at the ports. our calculation suggests 
that 96 percent of all wheat (including the wheat used to produce fortified 
atta) provided to the food-based programs was imported and that only 4 per-
cent  was  domestically  procured  from  farmers.  In  contrast,  100  percent  of   
all rice was domestically procured. “All food” is composed of 6 percent wheat, 
36 percent atta, and 58 percent rice.
  Figure 6.4 shows the cost of transferring 1 taka from each program to its 
participants. The type and composition of transfer commodities influence the 
differences in transfer costs per taka. The average shares of transfer values 
for the four programs were as follows: IGVGD, 66 percent in rice, 30 percent 
in atta, and 4 percent in wheat; FSVGD, 42 percent in atta, 3 percent in 
wheat, and 55 percent in cash; FFA, 66 percent in rice and 34 percent in cash; 
and RMP, 100 percent in cash.16
  Based on full entitlements, we estimated the total annual costs of trans-
fers for each program in 2006. These costs were Tk 342.4 crore (uS$49.58 
million) for IGVGD, Tk 48.5 crore (uS$7.02 million) for FSVGD, Tk 40.2 crore 
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16 Food transfers are valued at procurement prices (domestic and c.i.f. import prices are used as 
















Figure 6.3  Cost of transferring 1 taka to a program participant,  
by commodity















Figure 6.4  Cost of transferring 1 taka to a program participant,  
by program
Source:    Estimates by authors using data from the World Food Programme–Bangladesh and the 
IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food 
and Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.(uS$5.83 million) for FFA, and Tk 76.3 crore (uS$11.05 million) for RMP. The 
total transfer cost for all four programs was Tk 507.3 crore (uS$73.47 million) 
in 2006. The annual total costs of transfers per beneficiary (based on full en- 
titlements) in 2006 were Tk 5,343 (uS$77.38) for IGVGD, Tk 4,431 (uS$64.17) for 
FSVGD, Tk 10,266 (uS$148.67) for FFA, and Tk 18,360 (uS$265.89) for RMP.
  Figure 6.5 shows the full monthly cost (that is, the transfer cost plus 
delivery cost) of increasing the daily energy intakes of household members 
by 100 kilocalories per program participant. This cost is lowest for FSVGD, 
mainly owing to its distribution of the extramarginal atta ration, as already 
explained. In contrast, FFA incurs 182 percent higher costs than FSVGD in 
increasing caloric intakes by the same amount, primarily because it distrib-
utes an inframarginal quantity of rice.
  Figure 6.6 shows the full monthly costs of increasing a household’s monthly 
income  by  100  taka  per  program  beneficiary.  FSVGD  and  IGVGD  increase 
household incomes at much lower costs than do FFA and RMP because FSVGD 
and IGVGD transfers have multiplier effects in terms of generating incomes, as 
mentioned earlier. It is worth noting, however, that whereas FSVGD increases 
income at the lowest cost for its current participants, their increased level of 
















Figure 6.5  Cost of increasing per capita daily calorie intake by  
100 kilocalories
Source:    Estimates by authors using data from the World Food Programme–Bangladesh and the 
IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food 
and Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.earned income may not be sustainable after they leave the program, as the 
results reported earlier indicate.
  Figure 6.7 shows the full monthly costs of reducing extreme poverty by 
1 percent during program participation, in taka per program beneficiary. In 
2006 the four case study programs covered a total of 830,840 beneficiary 
households, of which IGVGD covered 640,721 households (77 percent), FSVGD 
109,379 households (13 percent), FFA 39,200 households (5 percent), and RMP 
41,540 households (5 percent).17 In aggregate terms, the total annual costs of 
reducing extreme poverty by 1 percent for all beneficiary households under 
each of the four programs are Tk 15.9 crore (uS$2.31 million) for IGVGD, Tk 
1.7 crore (uS$0.25 million) for FSVGD, Tk 2.7 crore (uS$0.39 million) for FFA, 
and Tk 2.2 crore (uS$0.31 million) for RMP.
  How much would it cost to move all participant households out of extreme 
poverty for the short term? The impact estimates suggest that 59.8 percent 
of IGVGD households, 50.6 percent of FSVGD households, 64.0 percent of 
FFA households, and 47.7 percent of RMP households were extremely poor in 

















Figure 6.6  Cost of increasing household monthly income by 100 taka
Source:    Estimates by authors using data from the World Food Programme—Bangladesh and the 
IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food 
and Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.
17 Each household has one participant.2006, as discussed earlier. The annual costs for the complete elimination of 
extreme poverty during the program for all households in each of the four 
programs could amount to Tk 953 crore (uS$138.03 million) for IGVGD, Tk 86 
crore (uS$12.46 million) for FSVGD, Tk 173 crore (uS$25.00 million) for FFA, 
and Tk 104 crore (uS$15.00 million) for RMP. The total cost of eliminating 
extreme poverty for the 830,840 beneficiary households would have been Tk 
1,315 crore (uS$190.49 million) in 2006 (the total transfer cost was Tk 507 
crore, or uS$73.47 million, in 2006). For the same 830,840 households (58.2 
percent of which were in extreme poverty), the IGVGD program, which has 
national coverage, could completely eliminate extreme poverty at an annual 
cost of Tk 1,203 crore (uS$174.14 million)—9 percent less than the cost of 
doing so through the four programs.
  It is important to note that the calculations of the costs of reducing poverty 
are based on short-term impacts of the programs on income poverty reduction 
during the program. Those who escape extreme poverty during their program 
participation could fall back into poverty after leaving the program. Therefore, 
these findings should be interpreted with caution and should not be quoted 
out of context.















Figure 6.7  Cost of reducing extreme poverty by 1 percent
Source:    Estimates by authors using data from the World Food Programme—Bangladesh and the 
IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food 
and Cash Transfers.”
note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.  Although these transfer programs have an important role in helping ultra-
poor households, they should be seen as one component of a portfolio of 
activities designed to eradicate poverty. In the long run, sustainable poverty 
reduction will require accelerated, broad-based economic growth centered 
around employment and income generation.
Transfer Costs with Leakage at the Beneficiary Level
In the preceding analysis of cost-effectiveness, the transfer costs consist of the 
costs of delivering the transfer amounts to the points of distribution and the 
costs of any pilferage or leakage in the process of delivering the transfers to   
the distribution points. Here we present calculations of transfer costs that take 
into account leakages or misappropriation of transfers at the beneficiary level.
  leakage at the beneficiary level is defined as the unintended diversion of 
allocated food or cash from officially listed program beneficiaries that takes 
place at the distribution point. In other words, the difference between the trans-
fer entitlement and the amount of the transfer actually received by an officially 
listed program beneficiary represents leakage at the beneficiary level.
  An IFPRI study on food aid leakage in Bangladesh provides estimates of 
the leakage of food transfers at the beneficiary level for the IGVGD and FFA 
programs (Ahmed et al. 2003). For IGVGD, the study estimates leakage of 8.0 
percent of the total amount of food entitlement of a program participant. The 
estimate of leakage increases to 13.6 percent when the calculation includes 
cases in which a food distributor (that is, a uP member) makes a VGD card-
holder “share” her VGD card with a noncardholder woman, with the result 
that the cardholder receives only half of her ration entitlement. For the FFA 
program, leakage is estimated at 5.9 percent of the food wage entitlement. A 
recent World Bank study reports a leakage of 2.0 percent for the RMP’s cash 
transfer (S. Ahmed 2005).
  To estimate transfer costs accounting for leakage at the beneficiary level, 
we use leakage rates of 13.6 percent for the IGVGD food transfer and 2.0 
percent for the RMP cash transfer. For FSVGD, using the composition of the 
actual amount of food and cash transfers received and applying leakage rates 
of 13.6 percent for food transfers and 2.0 percent for cash transfers, we esti-
mate leakage of 8.1 percent of the total value of the transfer entitlement. 
Similarly, for FFA, applying leakage rates of 5.9 percent for food transfers 
and 2.0 percent for cash transfers to the actual composition of food and cash 
received, our estimate of leakage comes to 4.7 percent.
  our estimates show that, accounting for leakage at the beneficiary level, 
IGVGD transfers 1 taka of income to its participants at a cost of Tk 1.32, FSVGD 
at a cost of Tk 1.19, FFA at a cost of Tk 1.14, and RMP at a cost of Tk 1.02.
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Gender-Related Impacts
T
his  chapter  examines  the  gender-related  impacts  of  food  and  cash 
transfers that target women. Interest in the gender-related impact of 
transfers that target women has been motivated by several decades 
of  research  on  intrahousehold  allocation.  This  research  has  revealed  that 
men and women have different preferences, responsibilities, access to and 
control over resources, and decisionmaking authority (Agarwal 1997; Haddad, 
Hoddinott, and Alderman 1997).1 It also shows that women are often at a 
disadvantage in terms of the distribution of resources and lack decisionmak-
ing authority (Quisumbing 2003). Thus, development interventions that do 
not take gender disparities into consideration can skew the distribution of 
benefits within a household in ways that reinforce women’s subordination.
  Although  many  studies  (reviewed  in  detail  in  Appendix  E)  have  shown 
that channeling resources to women has concrete benefits, few address the 
empowerment  effects  of  such  efforts.2  This  is  because  women’s  empower-
ment, although it is often viewed as essential to achieve gender equity and 
promote lasting social change, is an elusive and complex concept. Despite the 
challenges of measuring empowerment, it is worthwhile to investigate whether 
development programs that target women have the potential to encourage 
women  to  challenge  their  subordinate  status  and  create  opportunities  for 
women at the household, community, and societal levels. Understanding which 
approaches are most effective in promoting women’s empowerment can have 
important implications for the design of future development interventions.
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1 A key element of the Nash bargaining framework is the recognition that individuals within 
households do not necessarily share the same preferences and that bargaining power affects  
the outcome of intrahousehold allocations. Although we do not explicitly use a Nash bargain-
ing framework in this report, our results are consistent with expansions of the Nash framework, 
notably the work of McElroy and Horney (1981) on the importance of extraenvironmental param-
eters in determining bargaining power within the household. The provision of food/cash trans-
fers targeted specifically to women within the household is one such example.
2 Appendix E discusses various definitions of empowerment and frameworks for understanding 
this concept in order to provide the basis for the analysis and aid us in interpreting the results. 
It also includes a discussion of intrahousehold dynamics, knowledge of which is fundamental for 
understanding women’s empowerment.  In this chapter we examine the impact of the four targeted interventions 
on measures of women’s well-being, autonomy, participation in decisionmak-
ing, mobility, and access to and control over resources. In a methodology 
similar to that used in Chapter 6, we use PSM to create a counterfactual for 
program participants from a subsample of women who were eligible for the 
programs but were not selected into them due to capacity constraints of the 
programs. Matching is done based on individual and household characteris-
tics, and balancing on these characteristics at different levels of propensity 
scores is used to confirm the validity of the comparison group. We also draw 
on findings from the related qualitative assessment involving FGDs with par-
ticipants and interviews with key informants to supplement and interpret the 
results and the quantitative analysis.
  It is important to keep in mind that this analysis of gender-related issues 
is limited in several ways. First, the empowerment process is complex and 
nuanced,  making  it  difficult  to  measure  and  explain  through  statistical 
analysis. Second, the indicators used in this study do not capture all aspects 
of women’s empowerment. This study focused on measuring the extent of 
women’s bargaining power and status within the household, using indicators 
of  women’s  independence,  control  over  their  lives,  participation  in  deci-
sionmaking, control over household resources, mobility, and freedom from 
physical and verbal abuse. However, it did not capture psychological changes 
that may have occurred as a result of the program, affecting women’s self-
esteem, confidence, and attitudes. In particular, the social awareness and 
skills training offered by the VGD programs may have influenced women’s 
perceptions of themselves and their role in the family and the community. 
The qualitative information gathered through FGDs and informal interviews 
suggests that this may have been the case.
  This chapter is organized as follows. The first section presents descriptive 
statistics on empowerment and gender-specific outcomes, and the next gives 
results from the PSM exercise. The section after that section concludes the 
chapter with a discussion of the limitations of the study and lessons for other 
development interventions seeking to promote women’s empowerment.
A Description of Empowerment and Gender-Related Outcomes
Empowerment is difficult to measure because of its context-specificity and 
lack of precision. Scholars and practitioners from all disciplines, however, are 
beginning to recognize that empowerment is essential to the development 
process. Empowerment is now often viewed as important for both its intrin-
sic value (as an end in itself) and for its instrumental value (as a means of 
achieving other development objectives) (Kabeer 2001; Narayan 2002; Stern, 
Dehier, and Rogers 2005). It is often argued that empowerment increases the 
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economic growth, reducing socioeconomic inequalities, and improving devel-
opment  outcomes  at  the  project  level  (Narayan  2005;  Stern,  Dehier,  and 
Rogers 2005). Therefore, more efforts are being made to clarify its definition, 
explain how it fits into the development process, and overcome the difficul-
ties involved in measuring it empirically.
  Because empowerment is multidimensional and complex, we use a number 
of indicators as proxy measures. The IFPRI household survey dataset contains 
a rich set of variables that facilitate a robust assessment of the impact of the 
programs on women’s well-being and empowerment. In addition to soliciting a 
wealth of information on individual and household characteristics and program 
participation, the survey gathered data on women’s status in the household and 
the community. It included questions on women’s autonomy and participation 
in decisionmaking in order to capture their ability to influence household deci-
sions, a direct reflection of their power and agency. Both everyday decisions 
(such as decisions regarding basic household expenditures) and more major 
life decisions (such as the decision to work, to take loans from an NGO, or to 
use birth control) are measured. Women’s autonomy is determined by whether 
they made decisions independent of their husbands; joint decisionmaking by 
a woman and her spouse was considered an indication of her participation 
in decisionmaking. A third measure of decisionmaking considers whether the 
women make decisions independently or jointly with their spouses.
  Another direct measure of women’s empowerment is their control over 
household resources. Therefore, the survey included a number of questions 
regarding women’s ability to use household resources to make purchases for 
themselves and their families. In order to capture women’s freedom of move-
ment and their ability to act independently, variables on their mobility within 
the  community  are  also  included.  These  variables  are  important  because 
empowerment does not occur in isolation but rather depends on the social 
context or opportunity structure in which women are embedded. For instance, 
even  if  a  woman’s  status  and  power  within  her  household  increases,  that 
does not mean that her ability to act more freely in her surroundings will also 
increase. Also recorded were measures of women’s well-being, including their 
nutritional status and signs of physical, emotional, or psychological abuse.
  Tables  7.1–7.6  present  descriptive  statistics  for  the  outcome  variables 
used in this study. The data related to women’s work activities shown in 
Table 7.1 show that a large percentage of women in program and control 
households are working. Among these women, many made the decision to 
work themselves, with fewer women claiming to have decided jointly with 
their  spouses.  A  small  percentage  of  working  women  claim  to  have  been 
initially prevented from working by their husbands. In terms of who controls 
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across the various program and control groups. Although many women claim 
to control the income they earn, a significant number also report turning over 
all or portions of their income to their husbands.
  The data show that women taking loans from an NGO often share with 
their husbands the decision to borrow and spend the loan proceeds (see Table 
7.2). A majority of women also report sharing with their husbands the decision 
to use birth control, with only a small number of women making this decision 
on their own (see Table 7.3). Table 7.4 shows that women’s autonomy and 
participation in spending decisions vary widely across programs and by type 
of expenditure. A majority of women do report having control over money to 
buy items for themselves, such as clothes, medicines, and toiletries, as well 
as food for their families.
  Table 7.5 shows a variety of responses regarding freedom of movement 
outside the household by program and destination. It appears that women 
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Table 7.1  Decisions to work and spend income from work, program 
participants versus controls
  Percentage of participants making decision
Decision  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control
For women to work to earn   70.00  79.33  97.33  97.00  77.92 
    additional income 
If working, where to work
  Inside the home  62.86  49.16  13.36  7.22  27.04
  Outside the home  22.38  21.85  54.79  66.32  45.60
  Both  14.76  28.99  31.85  26.46  27.36
If working, decision to work
  Decided alone  63.81  64.29  58.90  87.63  74.59
  Decided with husband  31.90  29.83  33.90  8.25  20.20
If working, decision not to work   1.43  5.46  3.08  3.09  3.26 
    (made by husband) 
How to dispose of income
  To give it all to the woman’s   29.05  20.59  17.12  9.28  19.22 
    husband/other 
  To give some to the woman’s   23.33  26.47  24.66  19.24  18.89 
    husband/other 
  To keep all  47.62  52.94  58.22  71.48  61.89
If working, how to spend work  
    income
  Decided alone  48.10  34.45  43.84  81.44  57.00
  Decided with husband  38.57  44.54  44.18  12.03  26.38
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.Table 7.2  Decisions to take loans from NGOs and to spend loan 
proceeds, program participants versus controls
  Percentage of participants making decision
Decision  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control
For women to take a loan from an NGO  66.33  50.33  35.33  52.67  33.25
To take a loan from an NGO
  Decided alone  25.63  11.26  24.53  63.29  28.24
  Decided with husband  51.76  51.66  52.83  21.52  42.75
  How to spend loan proceeds
  Decided alone  21.61  7.95  22.64  63.29  24.43
  Decided with husband  51.26  47.68  55.66  22.15  47.33
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.
Table 7.3  Reproductive decisions, program participants versus controls
  Percentage of participants making decision
Decision  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control
For woman to use birth control  65.17  74.66  70.27  49.33  61.93
If yes, who decided to use birth control
  Decided alone  10.00  16.10  17.23  8.05  14.21
  Decided with husband  48.62  47.60  45.27  37.25  39.85
If not, reason
  Husband didn’t allow  23.76  12.16  7.95  17.22  19.33
  Makes woman feel sick  7.92  10.81  9.09  3.31  6.67
  Didn’t feel the need to  59.41  59.46  72.73  72.19  64.00
  Other  8.91  17.57  10.23  7.28  10.00
  Husband has used birth control  5.00  6.69  6.00  1.34  5.08
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.
can more easily visit relatives, go to the bazaar or clinic, and attend train-
ing than they can engage in leisure activities, such as going to the cinema, 
fair, or theater. A number of women across program and control groups also 
report suffering from physical and verbal abuse (see Table 7.6). The data 
show that a majority of these women decided to remain in or return to their 
marriages.
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  Percentage of participants making decision
Decision  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control
Food
  Decided alone  35.33  23.67  43.00  77.33  45.43
  Decided with husband  36.67  42.67  40.67  10.33  29.95
Housing
  Decided alone  30.33  20.67  35.33  74.67  41.62
  Decided with husband  35.67  40.00  44.67  12.67  27.66
Health care
  Decided alone  32.33  21.67  37.67  77.00  42.89
  Decided with husband  40.33  44.67  46.00  13.00  31.98
Education
  Decided alone  34.33  25.00  39.33  79.00  46.70
  Decided with husband  39.00  43.33  46.67  13.00  31.22
Clothing
  Decided alone  35.00  24.33  37.67  80.00  44.42
  Decided with husband  39.67  45.33  46.67  11.33  29.95
Whether the woman controls the money to buy
  Food from the market  60.00  58.33  78.67  93.67  68.78
  Clothes for herself  60.67  60.00  78.67  95.00  65.99
  Medicine for herself  64.00  59.67  81.33  95.67  70.30
  Toiletries or cosmetics for herself  68.67  65.67  84.00  96.00  73.35
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.
Table 7.5  Women’s mobility, program participants versus controls
  Percentage of women who decide by themselves  
  to engage in the given activity
Decision  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control
Visit friends of relatives  41.00  36.00  49.00  81.00  49.49
Go to the haat or bazaar  30.00  22.00  42.33  74.33  42.39
Visit the hospital, clinic, or doctor  38.33  29.67  50.67  80.67  47.46
Go to the cinema, fair, or theater  20.33  7.00  16.00  43.67  23.60
Attend training for NGO programs  48.33  52.33  58.33  85.33  44.16
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.
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dence of the women participants in RMP. A vast majority of the women in this 
program report making decisions on their own, having control over resources, 
and having greater mobility than women in the other groups. These results 
must be interpreted in light of the high percentage of female-headed house-
holds in RMP. We later control for the difference in the number of female-
headed households across programs by examining the differential impact of 
the programs on women who are widowed, divorced, or separated and on 
those who are married.
Results
Determinants of Participation
The estimation of the propensity scores revealed some interesting results 
regarding the determinants of participation in each of the four programs. For 
each program, the individual and household characteristics discussed earlier 
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Table 7.6  Domestic abuse, program participants versus controls
  Percentage of women abused
Form of abuse or result  IGVGD  FSVGD  FFA  RMP  Control
Husband threatened wife with divorce  9.60  6.28  5.38  13.51  12.50
Husband threatened to take another   7.58  7.08  6.28  13.51  11.74 
    wife 
Verbal abuse  48.37  53.62  41.90  40.19  54.52
Physical abuse  24.08  17.03  19.37  15.38  27.02
If threatened or abused, woman   84.42  89.95  93.30  88.36  83.62 
    wanted to leave 
If threatened or abused, woman left
  Permanently  4.17  4.76  8.33  35.29  28.95
  Temporarily  45.83  38.10  33.33  17.65  31.58
If did not leave permanently, reason
  Husband did not mean it  56.52  30.00  54.44  18.18  14.81
  Came to an agreement with husband  4.35  15.00  9.09  0.00  3.70
  Did not have a place to go  13.04  30.00  9.09  63.64  33.33
  Could not support herself  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  3.70
  Parents could not support her  0.00  5.00  9.09  0.00  7.41
  Society would not accept it  0.00  5.00  9.09  0.00  11.11
  For the children  21.74  10.00  9.09  18.18  22.22
  Social pressure  4.35  5.00  0.00  0.00  3.70
Source:    IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food and 
Cash Transfers.”
Note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVGD—Food Security Vulnerable Group Development; 
IGVGD—Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development; RMP—Rural Maintenance 
Program.are included as conditioning variables in the model of participation. As noted 
previously,  only  variables  determined  to  be  exogenous  (not  likely  to  be 
affected by the program) were selected as regressors. Table F.1 in Appendix 
F presents the probit estimates for individual participation in each of the 
four programs. These probit regression models of program participation are 
slightly different from those used in Chapter 6 of the study because of the 
inclusion of assets at marriage as an indicator of bargaining power within 
the household. A growing literature (such as Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003) 
has demonstrated that women who bring more assets to marriage exercise 
greater influence over household allocation decisions. The results reported 
here are based on the specification that satisfied the balancing test across 
program and control observations at various levels of the propensity score. 
Also included in the model were the union fixed effects for the unions in 
which  there  was  an  overlap  of  treatment  and  control  households.  These 
results are not shown in the table.
  Women with more assets at marriage are more likely to participate in 
IGVGD, suggesting that women who already had greater bargaining power 
within the household before joining IGVGD were more likely to participate in 
the program. These women also come from households with more children 
and female young adults, larger landholdings, better housing conditions, and 
more assets in 2004—an indication that they may have been slightly better off 
than women in the control group prior to joining the program.
  Similarly, FSVGD women with more assets and better living conditions are 
more likely to participate in the program. A few of the variables, such as num-
ber of chickens, total landholdings, and whether the household has a sanitary 
latrine, appear positive and significant. In the case of FFA, however, women 
with fewer assets appear to be more likely to participate.
  Households with more young adult females are more likely to participate 
in IGVGD, FSVGD, and FFA. Perhaps the presence of young females in the 
household to help with everyday tasks facilitates the beneficiary women’s 
participation  in  program  activities  such  as  training  or  standing  in  line  to 
receive transfers in the case of IGVGD and FSVGD and work in the case of 
FFA. Women with fewer small children are more likely to participate in RMP, 
perhaps because women with small children are less able to work outside the 
home. Households with greater landholdings and more bicycles, dhekis (rice-
husking equipment), and chickens are more likely to participate in RMP.
The Average Impact of Participation
Tables 7.7–7.13 present the estimates of the average impact of participation 
in each of the four programs. In terms of the decision regarding whether to 
work (Table 7.7), it appears that IGVGD increased women’s participation in 
126  CHAPTER 7decisionmaking. IGVGD beneficiaries were 19.6 percentage points more likely 
than participants in the other programs to participate in the decision to work. 
This result is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The indicator for 
whether the woman decides to work independently or jointly with her spouse 
shows an increase of 13.3 percentage points (significant at the 10 percent 
level), but the indicator for whether the woman decides alone is not statisti-
cally significant. This result suggests that although more IGVGD beneficiaries 
have input into the decision regarding whether to work, the program had no 
effect on their autonomy in decisionmaking or their ability to control the 
resources they earned from working.
  The results also show that IGVGD women are taking advantage of the 
access to credit provided by the program (Table 7.8). The probability of ever 
taking a loan from an NGO increased by 27.9 percentage points as a result of 
the program. This result is likely due to the fact that program administrators 
strongly encouraged participants to borrow from NGOs as one of the program 
activities (in contrast to FSVGD, where borrowing from an NGO was not simi-
larly emphasized). However, IGVGD did not increase women’s autonomy or 
participation in decisionmaking about whether to take the loan or how to 
spend the loan proceeds. Table 7.9 shows that the program also had no signif-
icant effect on women’s control over or participation in decisions regarding 
household expenditures, and, in the case of housing decisions, participation 
in IGVGD had a negative impact. Fewer IGVGD women (by 14.4 percentage 
points, significant at the 10 percent level) had decisionmaking power over 
housing purchases. Table 7.10 shows that the program did not affect women’s 
control over household funds to buy personal items or food for their family.
  With regard to women’s mobility (Table 7.11), the results show a nega-
tive program impact. Relative to controls, IGVGD participants are less able to 
travel freely to the bazaar or engage in leisure activities (visiting the cinema, 
fair, or theater). This finding could be an indication that women’s new access 
to resources through the program may have provoked other family members’ 
insecurities, causing them to try to regain control over the beneficiary women. 
Table 7.12 shows that the program had no impact on women’s ability to influ-
ence decisions regarding their use of birth control. However, it did influence 
men’s use of birth control by 3.8 percent (significant at the 10 percent level). 
No significant differences were found between IGVGD beneficiaries and the 
controls with regard to the incidence of domestic violence (Table 7.13).
  These results are confirmed by the FGDs with IGVGD women and their 
spouses  (or  other  male  family  members)  reported  in  the  qualitative  field 
work. Several of these women reported having little say in decisionmaking and 
limited mobility in the community. Both men and women reported incidents 
of physical abuse. One husband of an IGVGD participant reported, “There is 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































134  CHAPTER 7no change in the gender relations. We used to beat our wives and still do.” 
The focus group discussions and case studies also provided evidence of adher-
ence to strict gender roles and norms and little appreciation for the work that 
women do in the household, suggesting that women still remain at a severe 
disadvantage in the home. When asked whether coordinating domestic work 
and project activities was difficult for women, one man responded, “Women 
do not have much work.” For instance, in two separate FGDs, both men and 
women noted that women always eat after men if there is any food remain-
ing. Not all comments were negative, however. Some women did mention 
being consulted more often by their husbands and having increased involve-
ment in household decisionmaking as a result of the program. In one local-
ity, it was reported that the social awareness training offered as part of the 
program was responsible for preventing three early marriages.
  Similar to the findings for IGVGD, the quantitative analysis revealed that 
women’s empowerment was not affected by participation in FSVGD. Although 
there were no negative impacts, as in the case of IGVGD, almost none of 
the outcome indicators were positively affected by the program. Table 7.7 
shows that the decision to spend money earned through work appears to be 
the only variable to have been affected by the program. FSVGD women were 
28.1 percentage points more likely than control women to participate in deci-
sionmaking about how to spend the income they earned. This result did not 
translate, however, into their having more influence over household expen-
diture decisions (see Table 7.9) or control over money to buy personal items 
or food for their family (Table 7.10). Similarly, the program had no effect 
on women’s mobility or reproductive decisionmaking or on the incidence of 
domestic abuse (Tables 7.11–7.13). Although providing access to credit was a 
component of the program, participants in FSVGD did not borrow from NGOs 
more than the controls because program administrators did not promote this 
aspect of the program as strongly as they did in IGVGD.
  The interviews and FGDs confirmed that there was little change in gender 
roles as a result of FSVGD. It appears that men continue to be the dominant 
figures in the household while women have little influence. There were also 
reports of physical and verbal abuse. One participant noted, “Wife beating is 
common.”
  In contrast to the VGD programs, the public works programs appear to have 
had a larger impact on women’s empowerment. Because work is an integral 
part of a public works program and a requirement in order to receive benefits, 
it is no surprise that FFA increased the number of women working by 16.5 per-
centage points. It did not, however, have an affect on women’s ability to make 
or influence the decision about whether to work. Nor did it have an impact on 
women’s control over the money they earned. When interpreting these results, 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































136  CHAPTER 7however, it is important to keep in mind that a large majority of women in 
both treatment and control groups decide independent of or jointly with their 
spouses whether to work and how to spend the money they earn.
  Table 7.9 shows that FFA did affect women’s control and influence over 
decisions regarding household expenditures. This table shows that although 
increases in women’s autonomy and participation are not statistically sig-
nificant with respect to expenditures for housing, health care, or education, 
when considered separately, the increase is significant when both autonomy 
and participation are aggregated. That is, the percentage of women who 
decide alone or jointly with their husbands on housing expenditures increased 
by 21.1 percentage points. When it comes to decisions related to health care 
or education, participation in FFA increased the number of women deciding 
alone or jointly with their spouses by 20.4 percentage points and 16.7 per-
centage points, respectively.
  FFA had no impact on women’s decisionmaking regarding other household 
expenditures such as food or clothing, nor did it influence women’s control 
over the money needed to buy personal items or food from the market (Table 
7.10). Tables 7.11–7.13 show that the program also had no significant affect 
on women’s mobility in the community, their reproductive decisionmaking, 
or the incidence of domestic violence and abuse.
  The FGDs and personal interviews with FFA beneficiary women and their 
spouses revealed that because of the program more women were consulted 
by their husbands with regard to family decisions and were able to make deci-
sions on their own. One husband mentioned valuing his wife more since she 
had become an income earner. Both men and women revealed that although 
women’s participation in household decisionmaking has increased, their par-
ticipation in the community has not. Rather than attributing this result to 
gender discrimination, the women suggested that their lack of involvement 
in the community is due to their low class and discrimination by the rich. One 
woman noted, “Cooking can be done by the poor but taking food from or with 
[the rich] is impossible.” It was also noted that the gender division of labor 
within the household had not changed despite women’s having taken on a 
greater workload outside the household. There were also reports of domestic 
violence and abuse among FFA households.
  Out of the four programs, the results show that RMP had by far the great-
est  impact  on  women’s  empowerment  and  well-being.  In  the  right-hand 
columns  of  Tables  7.7–7.13,  practically  every  outcome  indicator  appears 
significantly different from the controls. As a result of the program, 14.8 
percentage points more women are working (see Table 7.7). As in the case 
of FFA, the increase in the number of women working is not surprising given 
the design of the program. What is interesting is that RMP appears to have 
GENDER-RElATED IMPACTS  137   increased women’s autonomy (defined as whether they make decisions on 
their own) while decreasing their participation in decisionmaking (defined as 
whether they decide jointly with their spouses). Women’s autonomy in decid-
ing to work and spend their earnings increased by 12 percentage points and 
18.1 percentage points, respectively. However, women’s participation in the 
decision to go to work and in deciding how to spend their income declined 
by 11 percentage points and 12.4 percentage points, respectively, as a result 
of the program. Moreover, there are no statistically significant differences 
between RMP beneficiaries and the controls when women’s autonomy and 
participation in decisionmaking are examined together. These results show 
that owing to the program, women who previously made decisions jointly 
with their husbands are becoming more independent.
  The rest of the decisionmaking impact estimates follow a similar pattern. 
Table 7.8 shows that participation in RMP increased the number of women 
taking loans from an NGO by 13.4 percentage points. Moreover, as a result of 
the program more women are making the decision to borrow on their own (by 
29.2 percentage points) and deciding how to spend loan proceeds themselves 
(by 31.6 percentage points). Again, the number of women making these deci-
sions jointly with their spouses declined, although there was no difference 
between RMP women and control women when autonomy and participation 
in decisionmaking are examined jointly. As in the case of work decision indica-
tors, these results suggest that there was a shift from participation in deci-
sionmaking to greater independence for RMP women.
  Impact estimates show that women were also making decisions on their 
own with regard to household expenditures on food, housing, health care, 
education, and clothing, whereas the number of women making such deci-
sions jointly with their spouses declined (see Table 7.9). The fact that the 
estimates on the third decisionmaking indicator (whether a woman decides 
alone or with her spouse) remained significant despite the decline in par-
ticipation suggests that the reduction in participation does not fully account 
for the dramatic increase in women’s independence. In other words, women 
who previously were not involved in household decisionmaking now have a 
greater role.
  Table 7.10 shows that RMP women also have greater control over the 
money needed to buy personal items and food for their household—between 
23 and 29 percentage points more than control women. As a result of the 
program, RMP beneficiaries also have greater mobility in the community and 
are better able to travel freely to visit relatives, attend training sessions, 
shop at the bazaar, go to the clinic, and engage in leisure activities (going to 
the cinema, fair, or theater) (see Table 7.11). Fewer RMP women use birth 
control, however, and there is no difference between the RMP and control 
138  CHAPTER 7groups with regard to the decision to use birth control. There are also no 
differences between RMP and control women with regard to the incidence of 
physical abuse. Fewer RMP participants (18.4 percentage points), however, 
were verbally abused by their spouses.
  The qualitative findings are supportive of these results. FGDs and inter-
views with RMP women revealed their strong sense of independence. RMP 
women  reported  having  more  freedom  of  movement  and  decisionmaking 
power. Their spouses noted having greater appreciation for their wives as 
they contribute more to the family. Many women noted, however, that the 
work is difficult and that it is hard to manage both domestic tasks and work 
outside the home. One woman said, “The work was laborious and we often 
suffered from sickness. As we didn’t have any man or woman to supplement 
our work, we had to do it even when sick. They often took us to doctors but 
we had to pay for doctors’ fees and medicine.” They also noted feeling con-
strained by having few resources.
  Overall, these results highlight the success of the two public works pro-
grams, particularly RMP, whereas the direct transfer programs appear to have 
had little effect on women’s empowerment. This difference is likely linked to 
the dramatic difference in transfer amounts. FFA women received transfers   
of approximately 850 taka’s worth of food and cash, and RMP women received 
approximately 700 taka per month in cash; the monthly transfers to partici-
pants in IGVGD and FSVGD were worth only around 400 taka. Another expla-
nation for these results may be that women feel a greater sense of ownership 
for and control over money they earn themselves. Providing for their families 
may enhance women’s perception of their role in the family, causing them 
to become more involved in family decisionmaking. FGDs with male relatives 
of the participants certainly revealed that men respected their wives more 
when they became income earners, whereas there was little appreciation for 
and acknowledgment of women’s domestic work.
Impact by Marital Status: Widowed, Divorced, or Separated  
versus Married
It is also possible that the main results described may be driven by the par-
ticularly large number of female-headed households in RMP. In households 
with no male head, it is natural that women would be more independent and 
able to make decisions on their own. To explore this possibility we adjust 
the matching procedure to look at the differential impact of each of the four 
programs by marital status. For this analysis, only the variables that are rel-
evant to widowed, divorced, or separated women are examined. Therefore, 
for each of the decisionmaking variables we look only at women’s autonomy 
(whether they decide by themselves) as opposed to their participation in 
GENDER-RElATED IMPACTS  139   decisionmaking. We include the variables related to reproductive decisions 
because the survey questions were phrased so that they would apply to both 
widowed, divorced, or separated and married women. These questions asked 
if the women or their husbands ever used birth control. However, we do not 
look at variables related to physical, verbal, or psychological abuse, because 
these  would  not  apply  to  widowed,  divorced,  or  separated  women.  The 
results are presented in Table 7.14.
  For both the IGVGD and FSVGD programs, there appears to be no pat-
tern when the results are disaggregated by marital status, suggesting that 
the effects of the program (which were few) were evenly distributed across 
both sets of women (widowed, divorced, or separated and married). These 
results, therefore, are not presented. For FFA, on the other hand, there is 
some indication that the program had a greater impact on married women 
(see Table 7.14). Significantly more married women are working compared 
with the control group as a result of the program (see panel 1). In panel 5, the 
results show that although the program had no statistically significant impact 
on all women’s mobility in the community, it did have an impact on married 
women. More married women were able to visit friends and relatives and go 
to the cinema, fair, or theater.
  The  positive  outcomes  due  to  RMP  also  seem  to  be  mostly  driven  by 
married  women.  Relative  to  matched  controls,  more  married  women  are 
working, although the variables reflecting women’s autonomy in decision-
making regarding work (the decision to work and to spend the money they 
have earned) are not significant for married or for widowed, divorced, or 
separated  women  (see  panel  1).  With  regard  to  decisions  on  household 
expenditures, RMP seems to have an effect on married women’s autonomy 
in decisionmaking. More married women in RMP relative to the control group 
decide independently about expenditures on food, housing, health care, and 
clothing (see panel 3). Married women also have greater control over the 
money needed to buy personal items and food for the family as a result of the 
program (see panel 4). In addition, RMP caused married women to have more 
freedom of mobility. Married participants in RMP were better able to travel 
freely to visit friends or relatives, go to the clinic, or attend an NGO training 
course (panel 5). RMP had no significant impact on married women in terms 
of their control over reproductive decisions (panel 6). In contrast to the gen-
erally larger impacts on married women, more women who were widowed, 
divorced, or separated took out loans as a result of the program (panel 2). 
Although this could reflect a lack of resources among women who are likely 
to be the only income earners within the household and therefore have a 
greater tendency to borrow, it could also indicate increased access to finan-
140  CHAPTER 7cial services by women who are widowed, divorced, or separated. Without 
the program, these women could have faced difficulties in accessing financial 
services. Other studies on Bangladesh (Skoufias and Quisumbing 2005) have 
shown, for example, that the very poor do not have access to credit markets 
for consumption smoothing. They have found that the net amount of debt is 
higher for households whose heads have secondary or more schooling, as well 
as those with more nonland assets, possibly because the latter can be used 
as collateral.
Impacts by Terciles of 2004 Assets, Landholdings, and Schooling
The estimates of the average impact of each of the programs may conceal 
the impact of the program on certain groups of households. Particularly in 
cases in which the program had no significant aggregate effect (IGVGD and 
FSVGD), it is important to know whether the program affected particular 
groups of women. Therefore, we estimate the impact of each program on 
the same indicators disaggregated by terciles of preintervention asset hold-
ings, landholdings, and levels of schooling (no schooling, one to four years 
of education, and five or more years of education). This analysis enabled us 
to determine whether the program affected the poorest, most vulnerable 
women, or whether women who were slightly better off were better able 
to benefit from the program. Only impact estimates that were statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level or better are reported.
  The results (reported in Appendix F, Tables F.2–F.4) show that among 
IGVGD participants, women with some schooling were most affected by the 
program in both positive and negative ways (see Appendix F, Table F.2). 
Women with one to four years of schooling were more likely to participate 
in the decision to go to work and spend the money earned, and women with 
five or more years of schooling were also more likely to participate in the 
decision to work. Women with five or more years of schooling were also more 
likely to decide how to spend loan proceeds, although the opposite was true 
for women with one to four years of education. Women with no schooling and 
women with the most schooling were both more likely to borrow as a result 
of  the  program.  With  respect  to  household  expenditure  decisions,  IGVGD 
women  with  some  schooling  were  less  likely  to  make  decisions  regarding 
food and housing expenditures on their own but more likely to participate in 
decisionmaking regarding food and education. Women with some schooling 
also had less freedom of mobility. No pattern was evident across terciles of 
landholdings and assets. Thus, these results are not presented.
  Although some of the indicators are significant, there is no discernible 
pattern in the disaggregated results for FSVGD. Therefore, these results are 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.also not reported. In the case of FFA, it appears that the program had the 
greatest impact on those most in need of assistance (Appendix F, Table F.3). 
More women with no schooling were working as a result of the program, 
although these women had less influence over the decision to go to work 
(columns 1–3). Columns 7–9 show that women in the lowest asset tercile were 
more likely to make decisions independently regarding household expendi-
tures. Women in the lowest landholding class were also more likely to par-
ticipate in decisionmaking over such purchases (columns 4–5). Women in the 
highest landholding tercile appear to have been negatively affected by the 
program in terms of their control over the money needed to buy food from 
the market and medicine for themselves (panel 4). With regard to mobility 
within the community (panel 5) and reproductive decisions (panel 6), there 
are no clear patterns regarding the program’s impact on the various subsets 
of women. In contrast to the general pattern noted, the incidence of verbal 
and physical abuse appears to be significantly lower among FFA women with 
the highest level of schooling, whereas women in the middle asset tercile 
appear to suffer the most emotional abuse (panel 7).
  The analysis of the heterogeneity of the impact of RMP revealed more 
mixed results (Appendix F, Table F.4). In general, it seems that the program 
had the greatest impact on women with little or no schooling and women 
in the second and third asset and landholding terciles. In terms of decision-
making, these subgroups of women appear to have gained greater autonomy 
while making fewer decisions jointly with their spouses (panels 1–3). These 
women also have greater control over the money needed to buy personal 
items and food (panel 4) and greater mobility in the community (panel 5). 
The program seems to have had a negative effect on women’s use of birth 
control and their influence over the decision to use birth control for women 
with the most landholdings (panel 6, column 6). Women in the highest asset 
subgroup also appear to suffer from more emotional abuse in the home, 
whereas the incidence of physical abuse was reduced among women with 
the fewest assets (panel 7).
Program Comparisons: IGVGD versus FSVGD and FFA versus RMP
Given that the transfer amounts of the two VGD programs were similar, as 
were the transfer amounts of the two public works programs, FFA and RMP, 
it is appropriate to explore the relative efficacy of each pair of programs. We 
test this by examining the marginal effect of the combination program (FSVGD 
and FFA) over the average impact of the “pure” transfer program (food in the 
case of IGVGD and cash in the case of RMP) relative to the controls. The results 
are disaggregated by marital status. This analysis also provides an indication 
144  CHAPTER 7of the relative effectiveness of certain kinds of transfers—food, cash, or a 
combination—in affecting outcomes related to gender relations.
  Table 7.15 presents the significant results of the comparison between 
IGVGD and FSVGD. The first column shows the average effect of participating 
in either program compared to the controls. Very few outcome indicators are 
significant, suggesting that these programs had very little effect on women’s 
empowerment.  The  marginal  effect  of  FSVGD  over  the  average  effect  of 
IGVGD is mixed. Although FSVGD appears to have a positive effect compared 
to IGVGD in terms of the number of women working, the use of birth control, 
and the decision to use birth control, it has a negative effect on women’s 
autonomy in decisionmaking (panels 1–3) and mobility (panel 4) compared 
with  IGVGD.  The  results  disaggregated  by  marital  status  show  practically 
no marginal effect of FSVGD compared to IGVGD for widowed, divorced, or 
separated women. For married women, however, FSVGD appears to have a 
larger positive effect on a few variables, including the decision to work and 
the incidence of physical abuse.
  Table 7.16 shows that FFA and RMP had a stronger impact on gender-
related  outcomes  than  did  the  VGD  programs.  Comparing  both  programs 
combined  to  the  controls  (first  column)  showed  that  participation  had  a 
strong impact on the number of women working and taking loans from an 
NGO, their control over the money needed to buy personal items and food, 
and their mobility in the community. The marginal effect of FFA compared 
to RMP tends to be negative in most instances. FFA has a smaller impact on 
women’s autonomy in decisionmaking, their control over the money needed 
to buy personal items and food, their mobility in the community, and the inci-
dence of emotional abuse in their households. However, FFA had a positive 
effect compared to RMP with regard to the use of birth control by both men 
and women and to women’s control over the decision to use birth control. 
The results disaggregated by marital status show that the marginal effect 
of FFA compared to RMP is negative for most variables but positive for a 
few. For widowed, divorced, or separated women, FFA is less effective than 
RMP in encouraging them to work and borrow money but more effective in 
promoting greater freedom of mobility in the community (except for leisure 
activities). For married women, FFA has a negative marginal impact relative 
to RMP with respect to women’s autonomy in decisionmaking, their control 
over resources, and their ability to visit friends or relatives but a positive 
marginal impact on their use of birth control and on women’s control over 
the decision to use birth control.
  The relative effectiveness of combination versus pure transfer programs 
cannot be evaluated without paying explicit attention to marital status. The 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.results disaggregated by marital status suggest that married women benefit 
more from receiving cash: both FSVGD and RMP have the largest positive 
impact on this group of women. This result is likely because receiving cash 
enables married women to expand their area of control beyond their tradi-
tional roles. The decisionmaking and empowerment outcomes of widowed, 
divorced, or separated women, who are the decisionmakers in their house-
holds anyway, appear to have been affected least by participating in the 
programs. However, transfers of food in combination with cash, as in FFA, 
may have a stronger impact on this group of women. Perhaps because they 
are poorer and are their households’ only income earners, they appreciate 
being assured of food in addition to the cash transfers.
The Cost-Effectiveness of Realizing Women’s  
Empowerment Objectives
Because program resources are limited, the cost-effectiveness of realizing 
program  objectives  is  an  important  consideration.  If  increasing  women’s 
control of food expenditures is an important food security and empowerment 
objective, how well do the programs fare? We compare the two programs 
that had significant impacts on women’s decisionmaking on food expendi-
tures—FFA and RMP. The cost of increasing women’s participation in food 
decisionmaking by 1 percent amounts to 38.04 taka for FFA and 11.98 taka 
for RMP, suggesting that RMP is more cost-effective in increasing women’s 
participation in decisionmaking on food. Although FFA is a combination food 
and cash transfer program, it costs three times more for FFA to increase 
women’s  decisionmaking  on  food  relative  to  RMP.  We  also  compare  the 
cost of increasing the percentage of women taking NGO loans by 1 percent. 
IGVGD is the most cost-effective in terms of the taka cost of increasing the 
percentage of women taking NGO loans by 1 percent: this costs only 6 taka 
for IGVGD compared with 12 taka for FFA, 20 taka for RMP, and 45 taka for 
FSVGD. This result probably reflects differences in program priorities as well 
as effectiveness in implementation; as mentioned earlier, taking NGO loans 
is a high priority for IGVGD but less so for FSVGD.
Conclusion
The analysis of the impact of IGVGD, FSVGD, FFA, and RMP revealed several 
key findings. First, it appears that the size of the transfer matters. Both FFA 
and RMP had a much greater positive impact on the indicators of women’s 
empowerment  and  well-being  than  did  the  two  direct  transfer  programs, 
IGVGD and FSVGD. This result could be a direct reflection of the fact that 
both public works programs provided transfers almost twice as large as the 
two direct transfer programs.
156  CHAPTER 7  Second, these findings could also be attributed to differences in program 
design. The two public works programs required the women to work to earn 
the transfers they received. It is possible that this caused them to feel a 
greater sense of pride in their contribution to their families and a greater 
sense of ownership of the income they earned, causing them to seek a greater 
role in family decisionmaking and to become more independent. Moreover, 
the women’s providing income for their family may have caused other family 
members to have a greater appreciation for their contribution. In particular, 
husbands may be more willing to consult their wives regarding household 
decisions and less opposed to their wives’ independence.
  Third,  we  found  that  the  positive  impact  of  FFA  and  RMP  on  women’s 
empowerment should not be attributed to the presence of a larger proportion of 
widowed, divorced, or separated women in these programs. Rather, the analysis 
of the heterogeneity of program impact by marital status revealed that these 
programs promoted the greatest positive change among married women.
  Fourth, comparing the programs with similar transfer amounts revealed 
that, for married women, there is some advantage to having transfers of cash 
over transfers of food, whereas for widowed, divorced, and separated women 
there are some advantages to receiving both food and cash. It could be that 
receiving cash allows married women to expand their area of decisionmaking 
beyond their traditional roles as food providers and caregivers. Qualitative 
accounts suggest, however, that women still feel they have greater control 
over transfers of food and are concerned that cash transfers would be spent by 
their husbands. One former beneficiary of IGVGD said that her “husband will 
take cash and buy whatever he likes.” In households of widowed, divorced, 
and separated women, who make most of the decisions in their households 
anyway, having a food transfer (together with a cash transfer) assures the 
household of food while providing cash for other expenditures, given that 
these women are often the only source of support for their families. Program 
designers may want to examine ways of strengthening women’s control over 
cash in VGD programs, perhaps through savings accounts in women’s own 
names or through group savings accounts that women can draw on in times 
of need. One cannot discount, for example, the possible impact of the RMP’s 
compulsory savings requirement on the extremely high impact on women’s 
empowerment indicators.
  One must also consider that changes in a household do not automatically 
translate into changes at the community and societal levels. Although the 
programs appear to have had a large, positive, and significant effect on the 
status of women participants in FFA and RMP at the household level, their 
status in the community may not have changed at all or could have even 
worsened  owing  to  their  participation  in  the  program.  Some  participants 
GENDER-RElATED IMPACTS  157   mentioned that they were the victims of verbal attacks by other villagers 
because of their participation in these programs, because it is not considered 
appropriate for women to engage in manual labor. Although public works 
programs and interventions that challenge societal norms regarding women’s 
seclusion  seem  to  have  a  significant  impact  on  intrahousehold  relations, 
community norms are slower to change. Program implementers should not 
underestimate the difficulty of changing gender relations; social norms are 
well entrenched, and it is perhaps unrealistic to expect that they will change 
quickly. Implementers should therefore not be surprised to encounter resis-
tance from segments of the community, even as individuals and households 
appear more open to change. As indicated by the discussion of regional dif-
ferences in gender-related outcomes in Appendix G, however, there are also 
significant regional differences in societal norms regarding women’s roles. In 
communities with more conservative gender norms, prior consultation with 
husbands and community leaders and a more active program of social change 
should  be  undertaken.  Experience  from  other  programs,  such  as  Mexico’s 
PROGRESA,  shows  that  consulting  the  community  and  keeping  husbands 
informed of the program’s activities and objectives help overcome resistance 
to the intervention (Adato et al. 2003).
  With respect to monitoring and evaluating transfer programs, the apparent 
lack of significant impact on empowerment indicators could also indicate that 
measures of quantitative indicators, which are commonly collected in surveys, 
may underestimate the potential impact of such programs on gender relations. 
Quantitative or survey-based indicators need to be backed up by sound quali-
tative work among beneficiaries and their families in order to ascertain that 
the full range of impacts of the intervention has been considered. A common 
set of empowerment indicators may need to be monitored over time to see 
whether changes have taken place as a result of the program.
  The differences in performance of the programs across different types of 
gender-related indicators also suggests that program performance will differ 
across objectives, with some programs better at achieving a subset of objec-
tives than others. This result suggests that it is very difficult to come up with 
a blanket recommendation regarding what kind of program is the most effec-
tive in reducing the gender gap and empowering women in Bangladesh. The 
effectiveness of a particular program will depend heavily on the economic, 
social, and political context as well as the specific circumstances of benefi-
ciaries. In an ideal world, a whole range of programs would be available to a 
woman in her own locality, and she would be able to choose which program 
best suited her needs. For example, a woman with young children would 
probably not have time to participate in a public works program with work 
norms and would prefer to participate in a VGD-type program.
158  CHAPTER 7CHAPTER 8
Conclusions for Policy
P
rogram features and contextual factors help determine the effects of 
food and cash transfers. The four programs assessed here differ from 
each other in a number of respects, including—but not limited to—
whether they provide food and/or cash. We also note that programs differ 
in terms of their impacts on outcomes and that their relative effective— 
ness varies by outcome. For example, IGVGD and FSVGD are the most cost—
effective programs in terms of increasing household income, FSVGD is the 
most  cost—effective  means  of  increasing  women’s  caloric  intake,  FFA  is 
the best—targeted program, and RMP has the largest effect on savings. It is 
incorrect to perceive one program as “better” than another. Rather, assess—
ment of program effectiveness depends on the particular outcome that is 
of interest.
  The size of the transfer clearly matters, and so does the access to micro—
credit and savings offered by NGOs to program beneficiaries. Increasing the 
size of transfers and the length of assistance of VGD—type interventions, as 
well as strengthening access to microcredit and savings services, is critical 
to achieving sustainable improvements in the food security and livelihoods of 
the ultra poor.
  All programs are reasonably well targeted, but there may be some scope 
for  improving  the  targeting  performance  of  IGVGD  and  FSVGD  programs. 
Currently,  these  programs  rely  in  part  on  selection  criteria  that  are  nei—
ther observable nor verifiable. Options for improvement could include the 
increased use of community input into beneficiary selection.
  Delays in cash payments from FSVGD, FFA, and RMP have been quite 
common, and there have been large fluctuations in levels of cash payments.1 
Addressing this concern will be especially important if shifts from food to 
cash are envisaged. Our interviews with key informants suggest that these 
159
1 For RMP, however, the irregularity in cash disbursement was not endemic. During the study, 
RMP was undergoing a reform, and responsibility for implementation was being shifted from 
CARE to LGED. delays are mainly due to the complex and lengthy administrative processes 
of cash transfers, particularly in the case of FSVGD. The feasibility of intro—
ducing new technology, such as the use of electronic ATM cards for cash 
payments that will enable beneficiaries to easily withdraw payments and 
check balances, should be explored. Such technology has the potential to 
greatly facilitate timely payment disbursements to program participants. For 
example, ATM technology has made cash transfers quite effective in Malawi 
and Kenya.
  Among the different forms of transfer, the biggest improvement in the 
food security of the extreme poor, women in particular, is achieved through 
transfers of atta (whole—wheat flour). Atta is also technically better suited 
for micronutrient fortification than is rice or wheat. The current system for 
the milling, fortification, and distribution of micronutrient—fortified atta in 
sealed bags preserves the micronutrients, ensures the weight, maintains quality 
standards,  and  prevents  pilferage  or  leakage.  However,  there  are  opera—
tional issues associated with shifting from rice to atta. Bangladesh’s food 
policy operations are carried out through the Public Food Distribution System 
(PFDS).  The  PFDS  plays  three  key  roles:  (1)  providing  price  incentives  to 
Bangladeshi farmers for increased production through domestic procurement 
of rice and wheat, (2) maintaining a security stock of foodgrains to meet 
emergency  needs  arising  from  disasters  such  as  floods  and  cyclones,  and 
(3) supplying foodgrains to various groups of the population. PFDS stocks of 
foodgrains must be rotated to accommodate new stocks and to prevent losses 
resulting from quality deterioration. The PFDS operates through 15 distribu—
tion channels that broadly fall into two groups: eight monetized (sale) and 
seven nonmonetized channels. The latter are composed of the food—based 
safety—net programs, which accounted for 71 percent of the total PFDS distri—
bution in 2006, with rice accounting for 68 percent of the total nonmonetized 
distribution. Although a switch from rice to atta distribution in the transfer 
programs is possible, it will involve a major reshuffling of PFDS operations. 
This factor will also need to be considered if there is a significant shift from 
food to cash transfers, because such a shift would reduce or eliminate exist—
ing nonmonetized channels of the PFDS.
  One intermediate option that is in between food and cash transfers is to 
introduce a program of food stamps or food coupons to transfer income to the 
needy. A part of PFDS stocks could be used for such a system. Food stamps 
or cash vouchers could be distributed to eligible consumers. The stamps or 
vouchers would have a cash value when used for purchasing food and other 
commodities in a store, and the seller would redeem the stamps or vouchers 
at a bank or government office. The major advantage of such programs is that 
160  CHAPTER 8they would use the normal marketing system, thus eliminating some admin—
istrative burdens. A food stamp or a cash voucher program would be a viable 
option for transferring income to the poor but one that would need to be 
piloted and evaluated carefully before any large—scale expansion.
  Although the onerous work requirements of the FFA may contribute to the 
especially good targeting performance of that intervention, these require—
ments also limit its impact in terms of poverty reduction and reduce its cost—
effectiveness.
  Differences in the programs’ impact on women’s empowerment can be 
traced to a number of factors: (1) the size of the transfer, (2) differences 
in  program  design,  and  (3)  differences  in  the  proportion  of  cash  or  food 
received. Although one expects that programs with larger transfers will have 
larger absolute impacts, the findings regarding program design and the com—
position of transfers are important for the design of programs that empower 
women. Married women who participate in public works programs have better 
empowerment outcomes when they earn and control cash incomes, possibly 
because receiving cash allows women to expand their area of decisionmaking 
beyond their traditional roles as food providers and caregivers. Qualitative 
accounts, however, suggest that women still feel they have greater control 
over transfers of food and that they are concerned that cash transfers would 
be spent by their husbands. In the households of widowed, divorced, and 
separated women, however, having a food transfer (together with a cash 
transfer) assures the household of food while providing cash for other expen—
ditures, given that these women are often the only source of support for their 
families.
  Programs  that  require  women  to  work  may  have  contributed  to  their 
greater sense of ownership of the income they earned, causing them to seek 
a greater role in family decisionmaking and to become more independent. 
Moreover, providing income for the family may have increased other family 
members’ appreciation for the women’s contribution. In particular, husbands 
may be more willing to consult their wives regarding household decisions and 
less opposed to their wives’ independence. Nevertheless, changes in intra—
household relations do not necessarily translate to changes at the community 
and  societal  levels.  Traditional  communities  may  not  welcome  programs 
involving work requirements that challenge societal norms of women’s seclu—
sion. Program planners will need to take into account communities’ recep—
tiveness to such programs when deciding where workfare programs will be 
placed.
  One should not underestimate the difficulty of changing gender relations—
social norms are well entrenched, and it is perhaps unrealistic to expect that 
CONCLuSIONS FOR POLICy  161   they will change quickly. A common set of empowerment indicators may need to 
be monitored over time to see whether the program has resulted in changes.
  Finally, although these programs have an important role in helping ultra— 
poor households, they cannot be the sole mechanisms for sustainable poverty 
reduction. Rather, they should be seen as one component of a portfolio of 
activities designed to eradicate poverty.
162  CHAPTER 8APPENDIX A




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SUMMARy OF kEy SAFETy-NET PROGRAMS  169   APPENDIX B
Implications of Using PSM for Sample Size and the 
Distributions of Estimated Propensity Scores
O
ur  use  of  the  PSM  method  of  impact  estimation  involves  several 
steps. We first estimate a probit regression in which the dependent 
variable equals one if the household participates in a given program, 
zero otherwise. Because we consider four programs, we estimate four sepa-
rate probit regressions for each outcome (for example, calorie intake), and 
each has a different control group. We then check the balancing properties 
of the propensity scores. The balancing procedure tests whether treatment 
and comparison observations have the same distribution of propensity scores. 
A balancing test fails when a t-test rejects the equality of the means of 
these variables across ranked groupings of the propensity score. When this 
occurred, we tried alternative specifications of the probit model that satis-
fied the balancing tests.
  The quality of the match can be improved by ensuring that matches are 
formed only when the distribution of the density of the propensity scores 
overlap between treatment and comparison observations—that is, when the 
propensity score densities have “common support.” For this reason, we used 
the common support approach for all PSM estimates. Common support can 
be improved by dropping treatment observations whose estimated propensity 
scores are greater than the maximum or less than the minimum of the compar-
ison group propensity scores. Similarly, comparison group observations with 
propensity scores below the minimum or above the maximum of the treat-
ment observations can be dropped. A shortcoming of this approach identified 
by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) is that treatment observations near 
these cut-off points face a potential comparison group with propensity scores 
that are either all lower or all higher than those of the treatment observa-
tion. To account for this problem, we modified this “min/max” approach to 
identifying a region of common support using the following procedure.
  We identified the lower and upper cut-off points of common support in 
the comparison or treatment groups in our first estimate of the probit model 
for program participation. Typically only comparison observations were dropped 
170in the left part of the distribution and treatment observations in the right. 
We then added back the 5 percent of observations from each tail that had 
been dropped that were closest in terms of propensity scores. In addition, we 
trimmed the treatment observations from the interior of the propensity score 
distribution that had the lowest density of comparison observations. We chose 
to drop 2 percent of treatment observations with this trimming procedure. For 
this common support sample, the probit model was estimated again to obtain 
a new set of propensity scores to be used in creating the match. We also 
retested the balancing properties of the data. All impact results presented in 
this study are based on specifications that passed the balancing tests.
  We matched treatment and comparison observations through local linear 
matching  with  a  tricube  kernel  using  Stata’s  PSMATCH2  command.  Heck-
man, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) and Smith and Todd (2005) argue in favor of 
local linear matching over other matching techniques. Local linear matching 
performs well in samples with low densities of the propensity score in the 
interior of the propensity score distribution. Frölich (2004) provides evidence 
in support of the finite-sample properties of local linear matching relative 
to most other matching estimators, with the exception of an infrequently 
used  ridge-matching  approach.  Finally,  the  standard  errors  of  the  impact 
estimates are estimated by bootstrap using 1,000 for each estimate.
  Table B.1 shows the effects of enforcing the common support on sample 
size. Overall, only about 11 percent of all observations were dropped. The 
levels of rejection, however, were not evenly distributed across the programs 
for treatment and control observations. Hardly any of the FFA treatment and 
control observations were discarded for imposing common support. On the 
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Table B.1  Observations dropped as a result of imposing the  
common support
      Number of  Percentage of 
    observations in the  observations 
  Number of   final probit after  dropped for 
Treatment and  observations in  imposing common  imposing 
control groups  the first probit  support   common support
IgVgD and control  415  326  21.4
FSVgD and control  364  263  27.7
FFA and control  557  552  0.9
rMP and control  450  441  2.0
Source:    Intermediate computer outputs of propensity score matching estimates.
Note:    FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVgD—Food Security Vulnerable group Development; 
IgVgD—Income-generating Vulnerable group Development; rMP—rural Maintenance 
Program.other hand, 27.7 percent of FSVgD treatment and control observations were 
dropped. Even this relatively higher level of rejection, however, is unlikely 
to compromise the representativeness of the results.
  The feasibility of PSM requires an overlap in the distribution of propen-
sity scores between treatment and control groups. A high degree of overlap 
implies a strong common support. Figure B.1 shows the distributions (kernel 
densities) of estimated propensity scores for treatment and control groups for 
household-level observations for each of the four programs; these are used to 
compare outcomes such as household income between treatment and control 
groups. Figure B.2 illustrates these distributions for individual-level observa-
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Figure B.1  Distributions of estimated propensity scores for  
household-level observations
Source:    IFPrI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “relative Efficacy of Food 
and Cash Transfers.”
Note:    PPS—predicted propensity score; FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVgD—Food Security 
Vulnerable group Development; IgVgD—Income-generating Vulnerable group 
Development; rMP—rural Maintenance Program.Figure B.2  Distributions of estimated propensity scores for individual-
level observations (child nutritional status)
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Source:    IFPrI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “relative Efficacy of Food 
and Cash Transfers.”
Note:    PPS—predicted propensity score; FFA—Food for Asset Creation; FSVgD—Food Security 
Vulnerable group Development; IgVgD—Income-generating Vulnerable group 
Development; rMP—rural Maintenance Program.
tions, which are used to compare child nutritional status between treatment 
and control groups. For example, in Figure B.1 we see a greater overlap of 
propensity scores between treatment and control groups for IgVgD—hence, 
an  evidence  of  stronger  common  support—than  for  rMP,  which  thus  has 
weaker common support.APPENDIX C
Consumption Effects of Food Transfers
T
he effects of free or subsidized rationed food on household consump-
tion of goods (food and nonfood items) will depend on the relative 
size of the ration and its resale status. If the size of the ration is less 
than what a household would have consumed without the ration, the ration 
is inframarginal. The ration is extramarginal if the amount of the ration is 
greater than the amount of that commodity the household would have con-
sumed without the ration.
  If the ration is extramarginal and if resale of the ration is prohibited or 
entails a high transaction cost, the transfer of income through such a ration 
may have two effects—an income effect and a substitution effect. On the 
other hand, the effect of an inframarginal ration is equivalent to the income 
effect only (that is, the value of the income transfer from the ration), regard-
less of its resale status.
Extramarginal Ration: FSVGD Atta
The likely household-level consumption effects of an extramarginal ration are 
illustrated in Figure C.1 using the example of the FSVGD atta (whole-wheat 
flour) ration. The quantity of atta (Q) is shown on the horizontal axis, and 
the aggregate quantity of all other goods (Y) is shown on the vertical axis. 
Each indifference curve (I1, I2, and I3) identifies the various combinations of 
Q and Y that would give the household equal satisfaction. The budget line AB 
represents the maximum quantities of Q and Y that the household could pur-
chase with its given budget before participating in the FSVGD program. The 
optimum choice of the household before entering the program is denoted by 
the point m, at which the household selects the combination of OQ0 amount 
of atta and OY0 amount of all other goods for consumption. This is the point 
at which the budget line AB just touches the indifference curve I1—that is, 
the point of tangency (m).
  The FSVGD program provides a fixed monthly free ration of 15 kilograms 
of atta per participating household. If the resale of rationed atta were abso-
lutely prohibited, the recipient household would consume the entire amount 
174of the ration, denoted by OQ1. This would lead to two types of movement in 
the budget line: it would rotate around the vertical intercept A and would 
become a horizontal line up to the point R, corresponding to OQ1, the quan-
tity of rationed atta. This portion of the budget line would be horizontal 
because the price of the OQ1 quantity of rationed atta is zero. The point R 


























Figure C.1  Consumption effects of an extramarginal atta ration
Source:    Developed by authors.
Notes:    Atta is whole-wheat flour. IE—income effect; SE—substitution effect; TE—total effect.represents an endowment bundle that allows the recipient household to con-
sume OQ1 quantity of atta and OA quantity of all other goods. Beyond point 
R, the movement represents an outward shift parallel to the original budget 
line from AB to RD. The new budget line is depicted by ARD, with a kink at 
point R.
  The resale of FSVGD atta, however, is not prohibited. If the recipient 
household could sell its entire ration at market price, the budget line would 
shift outward in a parallel way, passing through the endowment bundle R. 
Here the effect of transferring income in atta is equivalent to the income 
effect only. A number of studies show that the income elasticity of demand 
for  atta  or  wheat  for  rural  households  in  Bangladesh  is  negative,  which 
implies that atta is an inferior good in rural areas (Bouis 1989; Ahmed and 
Hossain 1990; Goletti 1993; Ahmed and Shams 1996). That is, an increase in 
income would lead the households to consume less atta. Thus, the household 
consumption bundle would be, say, at point n, where the budget line CD just 
touches the highest indifference curve I3. The household would consume OQ2 
amount of atta and OY1 amount of all other goods. Because atta is probably 
an inferior good, the household would consume less atta than the amount it 
would have consumed without the ration, OQ0. Thus, the transfer would lead 
to a reduction in household atta consumption in this case.
  If the resale price of rationed atta were lower than the market price or 
if the resale entailed a high transaction cost that decreased the implicit sell-
ing price, the upward portion of the budget line from the endowment bundle 
(point R) would become flatter. Because the endowment bundle is always 
affordable, the budget line would rotate around the point R. The RD portion 
of the budget line, however, is unaffected because the market price of atta 
remains unchanged. The resulting budget line is represented by the heavy 
line ERD with a kink at point R, as shown in Figure C.1.
  The IFPrI household survey data  suggest  that,  on average,  the  FSVGD 
recipient households sold only about 8 percent of their atta ration at a price 
26 percent lower than the market price of atta. The remaining quantity con-
sumed, however, was 23 times greater than the quantity consumed by the 
matched control group of households. Two factors most likely prevented the 
atta recipients from selling a larger share of their extramarginal ration: (1) 
the resale price was lower than the market price and (2) the resale involved 
transaction costs.
  Because atta is an inferior good, the resale of a portion of the atta ration 
at a lower price and the larger quantity consumed show that the household 
consumption bundle is located on the FR portion of the budget line (corre-
sponding to Q0Q1 quantity). The optimum choice of the household is denoted 
by the consumption bundle at point s. The household indifference curve I2 is 
176  APPENDIX Ctangent to the budget line at this point. The household would consume OQ4 
amount of atta and OY2 amount of all other goods.
  To show the income and the substitution effects of OQ4 amount of atta 
consumption, the line E′R′ is drawn parallel to line ER, which just touches the 
original indifference curve I1 at point t. The movement along indifference 
curve I1 from m to t is attributable to the substitution effect (SE) of lowering 
the price of rationed atta. The substitution effect of a price change is always 
negative; that is, a decrease in the price of a commodity will always increase 
the consumption of that commodity. Assuming, however, that atta is an infe-
rior good in rural Bangladesh (as empirical studies suggest), the income effect 
(IE) would offset part of the substitution effect. The total effect (TE) would 
still be an increase in atta consumption (OQ4 – OQ0), because atta is not a 
“Giffen good.” The household would increase its consumption of all other goods 
by the amount (OY2 – OY0) because of the income and the cross-price effects 
of the ration.
  A digression: If the household could sell its entire atta ration at market 
price, the consumption effect would be exactly the same as that of a cash 
transfer of the equivalent value. As microeconomic theory suggests, a house-
hold will be better off if it can reach a higher indifference curve. Figure C.1 
shows that a cash transfer would enable the household to reach the highest 
feasible indifference curve I3, at which the household would maximize its 
satisfaction by selecting the consumption bundle at point n. This explains 
why a cash transfer should yield greater satisfaction than a transfer of food 
or another in-kind transfer in terms of program participants’ own perception 
of welfare.
Inframarginal Ration: FFA Rice
Figure C.2 illustrates the consumption effects of an inframarginal food ration 
such as the rice ration received by FFA participants. The rationed quantity 
OQ1 is less than the OQ0 quantity consumed by the household before partici-
pating in the FFA program. This leads the budget line to shift outward in a 
parallel way from the original budget line AB, which shows that the infra-
marginal ration has only the income effect. The new budget line is denoted 
by the heavy line ARH, with a kink at point R. rice is a normal good (that 
is, the income elasticity of demand for rice is positive).1 So the subsequent 
consumption bundle would be, say, at point z, where the RH portion of the 
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1 A number of empirical studies show that rice has a positive income (or expenditure) elasticity 
not only for the poor but also for wealthy Bangladeshi consumers (Bouis 1989; Ahmed and Hos-
sain 1990; Goletti 1993; Ahmed and Shams 1996).budget line is tangent to the indifference curve I2. The household would con-
sume OQ2 amount of rice and OY1 amount of other goods. Thus the household 
would increase its rice consumption with an increase in income from the 
transfer, because rice is a normal good. The potential substitution effect on 
rice consumption from the free ration will be lost entirely because the size 
of the ration is less than the preprogram quantity consumed.















Figure C.2  Consumption effects of an inframarginal rice ration
Source:    Developed by authors.
Note:    IE—income effect.APPENDIX D
Calculation of Transfer Delivery Costs
T
his section provides calculations of the fiscal costs of delivering the trans-
fer amounts (of food and cash) to the points of distribution (UP premises 
for food transfers and local bank branches for cash transfers).
  The cost of cash transfers involves only the bank transaction cost (or pro-
cessing fee) of 0.1 percent of the amount of money transferred. A 15 percent 
value-added tax (VAT) is charged on the processing fee. Therefore, the cost 
of transferring 1 taka to a program beneficiary at the distribution point (that 
is, the local bank branch in case of a cash transfer) is 1.00115 taka, which 
includes the value of the transfer itself (that is, 1 taka). In other words, the 
transfer cost is only 0.00115 taka (0.115 paisa) per taka transferred, or 15 
paisa per Tk 1,000 transferred to a cash recipient.
  The calculations for food transfers and the method of calculation are pro-
vided in Table D.1. Table D.2 shows the breakdown of costs incurred at ports 
and the internal transport, storage, and handling (ITSH) costs for imported 
wheat.
179Table D.1  Calculation of delivery costs of food transfers and costs per 
taka transferred
  Cost (taka/metric ton)
Item  Rice  Wheat  Attaa  Totalb
a. Purchase cost of imported grains   —  10,092  —  —   
     (c.i.f. price at $150/metric ton) 
b. Purchase cost of local grains   14,500  12,000  — 
     (domestic procurement price) 
c. Milling, fortification, and bagging  —  —  1,342  —  
     costs of atta 
d. Adjusted purchase costsc  14,500  10,166  11,508  13,181
e. Costs incurred at the ports;   —  2,689  —  — 
     internal transportation, storage,  
     and handling (ITSH) costs for 
     imported grainsd 
f. ITSH costs for local grainse  1,663  1,663  —  —
g. Delivery cost from local storage   205  205  205  — 
     depot (LSD) or mill to distribution  
     point (UP) 
h. Adjusted costs of leakage and lossesf  122  254  —  —
i. Adjusted total delivery costs,   2,016  3,108  3,108  2,580 
     including leakage and losses 
j. Adjusted total cost (d + i)  16,516  13,274  14,616  15,761
k. Cost per 1 taka transferred (j/d)  1.14  1.31  1.27  1.20
Source:    Calculated from data provided by the World Food Programme (WFP)–Bangladesh and 
the IFPRI 2006 Household Survey in Bangladesh for the study “Relative Efficacy of Food 
and Cash Transfers.”
Note:    — denotes not applicable.
aWhole-wheat flour.
bIn 2006, the composition of the total food distributed in the Income-Generating Vulnerable 
Group Development, Food Security Vulnerable Group Development, and Food for Asset Creation 
programs was rice, 58 percent; fortified atta, 36 percent; and wheat, 6 percent (IFPRI house-
hold survey). Estimates of total food are adjusted according to this composition.
cPurchase costs are adjusted by taking the following factors into account: In 2005–06, the food 
contribution by the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) was 60 percent and that of WFP/donors  
40 percent. GoB supplied the entire quantity of rice. Using the composition of total food distrib-
uted to the programs, our calculation suggests that 96 percent of all distributed wheat (includ-
ing the wheat used for producing fortified atta) was imported and only 4 percent was domesti-
cally procured by GoB.
dFor imported wheat, WFP–Bangladesh provided the information on costs incurred at the ports 
and ITSH costs. See Table D.2 for the breakdown of these costs.
eWe calculated ITSH costs for local rice and wheat as follows. The total handling and trans-
portation cost of imported grains from ports to silo, central storage depot (CSD), or LSD is Tk 
1,900 per metric ton (see Table D.2 for cost breakdown). This includes a transport cost of  
Tk 970. Because the ports are located at the southern end of the country, we used half of the 
transport cost (that is, Tk 485/metric ton) to reflect the average transport cost of domestically 
procured grains. Thus, we estimated the total handling and transport cost of local grains at Tk 
1,415. We added the storage cost of Tk 248/metric ton (see Table D.2) to the transport and 
handling costs. Therefore, the total ITSH cost for local rice and wheat is estimated at Tk 1,663 
per metric ton.
fLeakage and losses for imported wheat amount to 2.57 percent (1.55 percent at the ports plus 
1.02 percent in internal distribution) and for local rice and wheat 1.02 percent. The costs of 
leakage/losses for wheat are adjusted for imported and domestic shares of distribution. The 
estimates of leakage/losses have been obtained from Ahmed et al. (2003).CALCULATIoN oF TRANSFER DELIVERy CoSTS   181   
Table D.2  Costs incurred at ports and internal transport, storage, and 
handling (ITSH) costs for imported wheat
  Cost of chartered 
  shipment 
  (bulk wheat)  
Item  (taka/metric ton)
III.   Lightening at outer anchorage, unloading, and clearance at the ports 
of discharge
  a.    Lightening charges at outer anchorage  176.00
  b.    River dues and landing charges (1 + . . . + 14)  365.54
     1. River dues  34.10
     2.   Landing charges  46.00
     3.   Sliding charges  19.85
     4.   VAT for the above 3 items (15%)  15.00
     5.   Stevedoring charges (at jetty):  200.00
     6.   Weighbridge charges  2.50
     7.   Levy charges  6.85
     8.   Crane charges  5.00
     9.   VAT for the above 3 items (15%)  2.15
    10.   Rigging gang  25.00
    11.   other miscellaneous charges  6.00
    12.   Receiver agent fees (per vessel)  0.05
    13.   Surveyor cost (mother plus lightering vessel at outer anchorage)  1.66
    14.   Surveyor cost at jetty  1.38
Subtotal I (a + b)  541.54
III.    Handling/transportation costs from ports to silo, CSD, or LSD
  a.    Establishment costs  360.00
  b.    Cost of 12 gunny bags  497.00
  c.    Replacement cost of torn gunny bags  42.00
  d.    Internal freight (port to LSDs nearest to distribution points)  970.00
  e.    Contingency  2.00
  f.    Quality control charges  28.50
Subtotal II (a + b + c + d + e + f)  1,899.50
III.    Storage charges at silo, CSD, or LSD
  a.    Storage at CSD or LSD  213.00
  b.    Unloading and reloading charges  35.00
Subtotal III (a + b)  248.00
Total ITSH costs (I + II + III)  2,689.04
Source:    Calculated from data provided by the World Food Programme (WFP)—Bangladesh.
Note:    CSD—central storage depot; LSD—local storage depot.APPENDIX E
A Review of the Literature on Women’s 
Empowerment and Intrahousehold Relations
Definitions and Frameworks of Empowerment
E
mpowerment is generally defined as both an outcome (having greater 
access to and control over resources and decisionmaking) and a process 
of change (the process of expanding people’s freedom to act and their 
ability to make choices) (Kabeer 2001; Datta and Kornberg 2002; Alsop, Ber-
telsen, and Holland 2006). Other terms often associated with empowerment 
as both an outcome and a process are capability and power. Stemming from 
Amartya Sen’s (1999) capabilities approach, many argue that empowerment is 
closely related to increasing the capacity of the poor (Nussbaum 2000; Stern, 
Dehier, and Rogers 2005; Alsop, Bertelsen, and Holland 2006). Others stress 
the importance of power relations, referring to empowerment as an increase 
in the “power over” (control) and the “power to” (the ability and freedom to 
make decisions) (Datta and Kornberg 2002; Mosedale 2005). Deshmukh-Ranadive 
(2005) points to another type of power, the “power within,” to capture the indi-
vidual’s sense of freedom from restriction.
  Given the understanding that empowerment is both an end and a process, 
an outcome and an instrument, many authors have designed frameworks, 
drawing on a variety of disciplines, to better explain and illustrate this con-
cept. Most describe the opportunity structure (formal and informal institu-
tions), agency (individual and collective assets and capacities), and interac-
tion between these as determinants of empowerment (Alsop, Bertelsen, and 
Holland 2006; Narayan 2005; Petesch, Smulovitz, and Walton 2005). Alsop, 
Bertelsen, and Holland (2006) and Narayan (2005) identify the components 
or determinants of agency. These are informational, organizational, mate-
rial, social, financial, human, and psychological assets and capabilities. The 
opportunity structure is defined as the broader social and political context 
in which actors pursue their interests (Narayan 2005; Petesch, Smulovitz, 
and Walton 2005). Changing the opportunity structure to create space for the 
182disadvantaged  involves  removing  the  formal and  informal  barriers  to  par-
ticipation (Narayan 2005). Formal institutions include the laws, rules, and 
regulations of states, markets, civil society, and international actors, while 
informal institutions include the social norms that can subvert formal rules.
  This framework implies that empowerment is multidimensional and cannot 
be fully achieved by simply increasing individuals’ agency or removing insti-
tutional barriers (Narayan 2005; Petesch, Smulovitz, and Walton 2005; Alsop, 
Bertelsen, and Holland 2006). Rather, in the words of Petesch, Smulovitz, and 
Walton (2005), “Empowerment of the poor, excluded, or subordinate groups 
is a product of the interaction between the agency of these groups and the 
opportunity structure in which this agency is potentially exercised” (41). This 
framework also suggests that empowerment is a universal concept that is 
applicable in a variety of contexts and settings. Although some support this 
notion (Nussbaum 2000), others point out the relational and context-specific 
nature of empowerment (Mason 2005). In acknowledgment of the complexi-
ties of empowerment, it is important that frameworks allow for some flex-
ibility and variation by context and location (Narayan 2005).
  The complexity of empowerment also makes measurement more difficult. 
Although there may be some universal measures of empowerment and disem-
powerment, such as domestic violence (Narayan 2005), the extent to which 
empowerment is context-specific poses a challenge (Mason 1986, 2005; Mal-
hotra and Schuler 2005; Narayan 2005; Petesch, Smulovitz, and Walton 2005). 
The various dimensions and levels of empowerment also present measurement 
challenges (Malhotra and Schuler 2005; Narayan 2005). For these reasons, few 
empirical studies have attempted to shed light on the empowerment impacts 
of development interventions. Given the importance of empowerment as both 
an  outcome  and  an  instrument  for  promoting  development  effectiveness, 
however, more development organizations have made empowerment of the 
poor a specific objective of their work. Thus, it is worth examining whether 
such efforts are succeeding or new approaches are required. Some questions 
dealt with in this study include the following: Does placing resources directly 
in the hands of women enhance their empowerment, or are other approaches 
required? Do the type and size of transfers matter for empowerment?
  Using both universal and context-specific indicators that aim to capture 
various dimensions of empowerment, this study examines the potential for 
development  interventions  that  target  women  to  promote  greater  social 
change through the empowerment process. Given the fact that the programs 
examined in this report all have the objective of empowering poor women, it 
is important to assess whether this goal is being achieved.
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Intrahousehold Relations: Theory and Evidence
This section discusses how changes in our understanding of household deci-
sionmaking processes have given us new insights into the design of transfer 
programs. Early models of the household did not pay attention to differences 
in bargaining power between men and women in the household. These mod-
els, referred to as unitary models, view the household as a single unit in which 
individuals have the same preferences and agree on how to combine time and 
goods purchased in markets and produced at home to maximize their welfare 
(Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman 1997). That is, households are assumed to 
have only one utility function. In addition, this model assumes that individual 
members pool their resources and that all outcomes are Pareto efficient. 
Collective models, such as those developed by Chiappori (1988, 1992), do not 
assume that individuals share the same preferences or pool their resources 
but do require that allocations be Pareto efficient. Among these are coop-
erative bargaining models, which often use game-theoretic models to show 
how conflicts of interest among family members are resolved (McElroy and 
Horney 1981; McElroy 1990). These models introduce the concept of a fall-
back position or threat point determined by the individual’s “extrahousehold 
environmental parameters.” This means that the opportunity cost of family 
membership is important for the distribution of income and resources in the 
household and that a person’s fall-back position strengthens his or her ability 
to bargain in the household. Agarwal (1997) built on the concept of the fall-
back position by defining the specific factors that influence an individual’s 
bargaining  power.  These  are  identified  as  ownership  of  and  control  over 
assets (particularly land), access to employment and other means of earning 
income, access to communal resources, and access to traditional social sup-
port systems.
  Noncooperative models of the household drop many of the assumptions 
of the collective bargaining model, including Pareto efficiency and enforce-
able and binding contracts, while maintaining the concepts of the fall-back 
position and Nash bargaining (Agarwal 1997). The lack of binding agreements 
in this model means that individuals act independently without coordinating 
with each other. Other models have combined cooperative and noncoopera-
tive bargaining models. lundberg and Pollak (1994) described a “separate 
spheres” model, essentially a cooperative model in which the fall-back posi-
tion is not divorce but a noncooperative game. Other combined approaches 
recognize the possibility that elements of conflict, cooperation, and collec-
tive decisionmaking may all exist in the same household (Agarwal 1997).
184  APPENDIX EThe Impact of Increasing Women’s Control of Resources
A growing body of empirical evidence has shown that the unitary model is 
inadequate to capture household dynamics; this evidence has been reviewed 
by  Strauss  and  Thomas  (1995),  Behrman  (1997),  Haddad,  Hoddinott,  and 
Alderman (1997), and Quisumbing (2003), among others. This evidence sug-
gests that individuals in households may have different preferences and may 
bargain  over  the  household’s  resources  to  realize  those  preferences.  For 
instance, Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) showed that changes in the control 
over income among individual family members leads to changes in expendi-
ture patterns. Using data from Côte d’Ivoire, they find that increasing female 
income shares leads to greater expenditures on food and smaller ones on 
alcohol and cigarettes. Doss (2005) supported these findings with data from 
Ghana. She found that increasing women’s share of assets leads to changes 
in the expenditure patterns of households, with more funds devoted to edu-
cation and food. Furthermore, Thomas (1992) showed that in Brazil, if addi-
tional income is controlled by women, it increases the share of the household 
budget spent on health, education, and household services three to six times 
more than if the additional income is controlled by men.
  A number of studies also examine the relationship between women’s bar-
gaining power and other development outcomes. Quisumbing and Maluccio 
(2003) showed that the level of women’s assets at marriage, an indication 
of their bargaining power, is associated with larger shares of expenditure on 
education in Bangladesh and South Africa. Also, women’s having more assets 
at marriage has been shown to decrease the incidence of illness among girl 
children (Hallman 2000). Using other measures of bargaining power, such as 
education, has produced similar results. Smith and Haddad (2000) showed 
that increases in women’s education contribute to reducing the rate of child 
malnutrition. Using a measure of decisionmaking power based on indicators 
such as whether a woman works for cash, her age at marriage, the age dif-
ference between her and her husband, and the education difference between 
her and her husband, Smith et al. (2003) found that increasing women’s sta-
tus relative to men reduces child malnutrition in Sub-Saharan Africa, latin 
America, and the Caribbean, and particularly in South Asia.
  Other studies have shown that other interventions—such as changes in 
divorce law and changes in the economic opportunities available to women—
can influence women’s bargaining power. Rangel (2006) found that increases 
in  women’s  bargaining  power  due  to  the  extension  of  alimony  rights  to 
cohabitants in Brazil increased the leisure time of women and led to greater 
investments in the schooling of children, particularly older girls. Ashraf, Kar-
lan, and Yin (2006) showed that in the Philippines access to a commitment 
savings service increased women’s decisionmaking power and shifted house-
THE lITERATURE ON WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT AND RElATIONS  185   hold  expenditures  toward  female-oriented  goods.  Such  studies  show  that 
there are other measures available to policymakers to enhance the status of 
women and promote development effectiveness. In Bangladesh, programs of 
Grameen Bank and BRAC have had significant effects on a variety of measures 
of  women’s  empowerment,  including  mobility,  economic  security,  control 
over income and assets, political and legal awareness, and participation in 
public protests and political campaigning (Hashemi, Schuler, and Riley 1996). 
Pitt and Khandker’s (1998) study on the impacts of three NGO microcredit 
programs tested the differential impact of male and female borrowing on 
eight outcomes: boys’ and girls’ schooling, women’s and men’s labor supply, 
total household expenditure, contraception use, fertility, and the value of 
women’s nonland assets. They found that female borrowing had a significant 
effect on seven out of eight of these. By contrast, male borrowing was sig-
nificant in only three out of eight. One of the implications of their results is 
that household consumption increases by 18 taka for every 100 taka lent to 
a woman and by 11 taka for every 100 taka lent to a man (Morduch 1999). 
Kabeer (1998), using participatory evaluation techniques, found that despite 
increased workloads due to receipts of credit, women feel empowered by it. 
They clearly feel more self-fulfilled and valued by other household members 
and the community.
  Because the literature has shown that increasing women’s control of 
resources is associated with improved development outcomes, it is no sur-
prise that a number of interventions now directly target women for transfers. 
One of the most famous of these has been Mexico’s nationwide Programa 
Nacional de Educación, Salud, y Alimentación (PROGRESA), initiated in 1997 
to fight extreme poverty in the country’s rural areas. Now renamed Oportu-
nidades and expanded to urban areas, this multisectoral program provides 
an integrated package of health, nutrition, and educational services to poor 
families. The program offers monetary assistance, nutritional supplements, 
educational grants, and a basic health package to its beneficiaries for at least 
three consecutive years. One of the innovative aspects of the program is its 
attempt to transfer the monetary assistance to women. An impact evalua-
tion shows that the program has placed additional resources under women’s 
control, given women greater control over their movements, educated them 
on health and nutrition issues, provided new spaces in which to communicate 
with other women, educated girls to improve their position in the future, 
and increased women’s self-confidence and self-esteem (Adato et al. 2003; 
Skoufias and McClafferty 2003). Transfers to wives have also decreased the 
incidence of husbands’ sole decisionmaking regarding five of eight outcomes. 
These outcomes are medical treatment, child school attendance, child cloth-
ing expenses, food expenditures, and major household repairs. The change 
186  APPENDIX Ein decisionmaking patterns is consistent with PROGRESA’s focus on primary 
health care, nutrition, and education and its objective of empowering women 
to participate more fully in household decisionmaking. PROGRESA transfers 
also have a small but significant negative effect on the probability that a 
woman will let her husband decide how to spend her additional income. The 
significance of the monetary transfers confirms the belief that transfers that 
target poor women have the potential to change decisionmaking patterns in 
households.
  These studies show that increasing women’s bargaining power relative to 
men’s tends to be reflected in positive changes in the well-being of women 
and their families. In their study of household dynamics in the Bolivian Ama-
zon, however, Patel et al. (2007) suggested that the type of power structure 
in the family is also important. They found that parents who make joint deci-
sions regarding food acquisition and preparation have children with slightly 
better BMIs than children whose father or mother makes food decisions inde-
pendently. Thus, clearly more work in this area is warranted to determine 
the most effective approaches to increase women’s bargaining power and 
development effectiveness.
THE lITERATURE ON WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT AND RElATIONS  187   APPENDIX F



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































190  APPENDIX FTable F.2   Impact of participation in the Income-Generating Vulnerable 
Group Development program, by schooling terciles
  Schooling   
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  No  1–4  4 years 
  schooling  years  or more 
Panel 1: Work
  Decision to work
    Woman and husband  0.145  0.371  0.391
      t-statistic  1.071  2.171*  2.869***
  Decision to spend money earned
    Woman and husband  0.168  0.421  0.331
      t-statistic  1.229  1.685*  1.317
  Ever taken loan from Ngo  0.258  0.319  0.341
      t-statistic  1.761*  1.534  1.658*
Panel 2: Loans
  Decision to spend loan proceeds
    Woman alone  –0.276  –0.591  0.163
    t-statistic  –1.023  –1.857*  2.009**
Panel 3: Household expenditures
  Who makes the decision on the following  
      household expenditures:
    Food
      Woman alone  0.058  –0.395  –0.291
        t-statistic  0.370  –1.976**  –1.324
      Woman and husband  0.070  0.332  0.190
        t-statistic  0.473  1.728*  0.907
    Housing
      Woman alone  0.008  –0.348  –0.391
        t-statistic  0.050  –1.730*  –1.783*
    Education
      Woman and husband  0.092  0.315  0.361
        t-statistic  0.636  1.589  1.956**
Panel 4: Mobility
  Whether woman decides by herself to go to:
    Bazaar  –0.108  –0.454  –0.289
      t-statistic  –0.684  –2.282**  –1.318
    cinema  0.072  –0.447  –0.369
      t-statistic  0.563  –2.275**  –1.686*
Panel 5: Reproductive decisions
  Whether husband ever used birth control  0.011  0.070  0.065
      t-statistic  0.204  1.859*  1.942*
  Who made the decision to use birth control
    Woman alone or woman and husband  –0.067  0.349  0.007
      t-statistic  –0.437  1.719*  0.029
source:    IFPrI 2006 Household survey in Bangladesh for the study “relative Efficacy of Food and 
cash Transfers.”
Note:    *** indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level; ** indicates statistical signifi-
cance at the 5 percent level; * indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































198  APPENDIX FAPPENDIX G
Gender Outcomes by Region
T
able  G.1  presents  gender-  and  empowerment-related  outcomes  for 
program participants and controls, by region. There are highly signifi-
cant differences in most gender-related outcomes across regions, even 
taking into account differences in sample size. The direction of these regional 
effects is not always self-evident, and the results for the sample districts, 
particularly in Chittagong division, are counterintuitive. Women in Chittagong 
division do surprisingly well with respect to many of the empowerment indica-
tors, which is contrary to our expectations. The districts in Chittagong division 
are believed to be much more conservative than those in Rajshahi and Khulna 
divisions. Further, although Kurigram is the poorest district, women are less 
conservative there than those in, say, Chittagong or Noakhali districts.
  These counterintuitive results for Chittagong can be explained by a num-
ber of factors. First, respondents in the sample districts of Chittagong division 
are predominantly women living without their husbands; 75 percent of the 
sample are female heads of households. In contrast, in Kurigram, Nilphamari, 
and Lalmonirhat, 32 percent of women are living without their husbands, and 
in other districts of Rajshahi division, Dhaka division, and Khulna division, the 
corresponding figures are 39 percent, 42 percent, and 50 percent, respec-
tively. Thus, it is no surprise that a higher proportion of women in Chittagong 
are making decisions independently over a large number of areas, and there-
fore fare well with respect to the gender-related outcomes. Second, widows 
account for about 43 percent of the Chittagong sample compared with 16–22 
percent of the samples in other areas. Widows may be particularly reluctant 
to say negative things about their dead husbands and thus may choose not 
to reveal whether they were ever abused or threatened with divorce while 
their husbands were still living. Third, the districts in Chittagong are the 
richest in Bangladesh. They also have relatively better infrastructure (roads, 
electricity, and markets or trade). Indeed, for our sample of households, per 
capita expenditure is 19 percent higher in households in Chittagong than in 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































200  APPENDIX Gof societal norms in that region, we therefore concentrate on comparisons of 
gender-specific outcomes in the remaining four regions.
  Significant regional differences remain even when comparing the remain-
ing four regions. For example, the Dhaka division reports the highest pro-
portion of women taking loans from NGOs (52.55 percent) compared with 
39.66 percent in Kurigram, but the proportion of women in the Dhaka region 
threatened with divorce (13.08 percent) is much higher than that in the other 
regions, even conservative Kurigram (6.51 percent). Women in the Dhaka 
and Khulna regions report that higher proportions are deciding by themselves 
whether to attend NGO training in contrast to those in the Rajshahi region. 
Women in the Dhaka  region also report the highest incidence of physical 
abuse (28.45 percent), whereas women in the other districts of the Rajshahi 
region report the highest incidence of verbal abuse (61.54 percent). With 
respect to decisions to visit relatives outside the village, women in Khulna 
appear to be the most able to make decisions by themselves, whereas those 
from  Kurigram,  Nilphamari,  and  Lalmonirhat  are  the  least  able  to  do  so. 
Women in the other districts of the Rajshahi region are the least indepen-
dent in making decisions to go to the bazaar, clinic, and cinema; women in 
the Rajshahi division fare worst with respect to decisions regarding mobil-
ity, whereas those in Khulna fare best. These regional differences suggest 
that there may be significant differences in community norms and attitudes 
toward women participating in food and cash transfer programs, particularly 
those that require challenging the norms of purdah by going outside the home 
and the village. Thus, even if transfer programs have the potential to change 
intrahousehold relations (see Chapter 7 for a fuller discussion), they may be 
slower to change community norms.
  Finally, we need to offer some caution regarding the use of these regional 
breakdowns to infer regional differences in gender norms. For this study the 
sample was chosen to be representative of programs rather than of the popula-
tion at large. Thus, our attempt to discern regional effects in terms of gender- 
and empowerment-related outcomes by combining the samples from different 
programs and then disaggregating the results by region is imperfect.
GENDER OuTCOmES  201   APPENDIX H
Comparison of Households in the Household  
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